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Abstract 
  
 This thesis contends that the declarant of the English-language translation of an 
LEP suspect’s out-of-court testimony “must” become no one else but the suspect, not by 
making the interpreter the suspect’s “agent” through the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) 
or (D), but by ensuring that every interpreter passes muster as a true “language conduit” 
to enable the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A). 
 The “agent-and-conduit interpreter” theory is a dominant U.S. case law that has 
dealt with the hearsay issue of an interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimonial statement.  
To enable the application of “a party opponent’s vicarious admission” stipulated by FRE 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D), the theory claims that when two parties begin an interpreter-assisted 
conversation, the interpreter becomes a “dual agent” for both parties, who presume that 
the interpreter is acting as a language “conduit” with prima facie accurate translations. 
This hybrid legal theory of the traditional agency law and a 20th-century legal fiction
 
about a foreign-language interpreter, however, embodies critical logic dilemmas, 
especially faced with the renewed Confrontation Clause challenge from Crawford.   
 The thesis, comprising two main research results: a legal research and a 
forensic-linguistic research, calls for a complete overhaul of the “agent-and-conduit” 
theory used for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), by maintaining that it be 
replaced by a new implementation of the 21st-century-style “authenticated conduit” 
measure that will enable the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A) instead.   
 In Part I: Legal Research, the thesis demonstrates that no “agency relationship” 
takes place between the suspect and the interpreter in a police interview for the reason 
  
that the suspect neither consents to it nor controls the interpreter.  The thesis further 
argues that imposition on the suspect of any such consent to an assumed agency 
relationship with an interpreter will violate the suspect’s “non-waivable” Fifth 
Amendment due process right against “potential verballing.”  The thesis then advocates 
a realization of a “true conduit” that will enable the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A), by 
exerting 21st-century technological and intellectual resources that are becoming 
increasingly advanced, accessible, and available.  Also, to attest to the adequacy of 
attaining a “true conduit,” the thesis demonstrates that the “true conduit” notion is also 
in harmony with the doctrine of the copyright law on the protectible elements of the 
original copyright that continue to exist in its translation.  To achieve the “true conduit,” 
the thesis calls for mandatory introduction of video recording of interpreter-assisted 
custodial police interviews and mandatory authentication of the interpreter’s translation 
accuracy by a certified court interpreter who will also act as an expert witness.                                                                
   Part II: Forensic-Linguistic Research is an empirical substantiation for Part I, in 
the form of an action-study analysis, using an authentic recording of a custodial police 
interview with a Dari interpreter.  The thesis demonstrates that though there are certain 
ways, such as turn-taking cycles, rendition and pause time comparisons, monolingual 
extra round-trips, etc., by which monolingual parties (the police and the suspect) in a 
police interview can assess the interpreter’s accuracy and reliability, there is a maximum 
limit to such indirect accuracy confirmation without a complete check-translation.  The 
research empirically demonstrates that an authenticated check translation is absolutely 
crucial for fact-triers’ determination of the interpreting accuracy and impartiality, a result 
that strongly supports not only the introduction of digital recording but also mandatory 
production of an authenticated complete transcript of such check translation.     
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Introduction 
 
 The U.S. circuit courts are currently split on their interpretation of “interpreters.”  
When a law enforcement officer interviews a suspect who has limited English language 
proficiency, a foreign language interpreter is hired to translate both parties’ statements 
back and forth so the officer and the suspect can communicate with each other.  The 
officer records the suspect’s statements given in the form of English language 
translations rendered by the interpreter.  When the trial begins, the officer testifies in 
court to what the defendant stated during this “out-of-court” police interview.  This is 
when the big question arises.  Who exactly is the declarant of the statement this police 
officer is now testifying to in court? 
 If the answer is “the defendant,” then the police officer is simply testifying to 
the defendant’s own previously made statement, which raises no hearsay issue in court.1  
This is the position that has been taken by the majority.  These circuits maintain that the 
interpreter, who is a mere “language conduit,” serves as the defendant’s “agent” during 
the police interview, and that, therefore, according to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D),
2
 the interpreter’s statement becomes the defendant’s own                             
                                                   
 
1
 The Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2) stipulates five “non-hearsay” categories in 
which a statement such as this one is attributed to the party opponent (“the defendant” in this case) 
and thus does not become hearsay. 
 
 
2
 The Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2) stipulates that a statement made by a party 
opponent is not hearsay if: (C) it “was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a 
statement on the subject”; or (D) it “was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within 
the scope of that relationship and while it existed .”  Thus, “801(d)(2)(C)” and “801(d)(2) (D)” are 
often combined as “801(d)(2)(C) or (D)” to refer to a hearsay exception using the “agent theory.”   
   
2 
 
 
statement,
3
 making the defendant the declarant of the English-language statement 
rendered by the interpreter. 
 In 2013, however, the Eleventh Circuit adjudicated that the police officer was 
only testifying to the English-language statement made by the interpreter, which was a 
translation of what the defendant had told the interpreter in the original language, and 
that, therefore, the interpreter, not the defendant, was the declarant of the 
English-language statement that the police officer testified to in court.
4
  The Eleventh 
Circuit thus ruled that this police officer’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and that 
by not subpoenaing the interpreter to be cross-examined by the defendant, the lower 
court had violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right5 that had been guaranteed 
by the Supreme Court’s 2004 ruling of Crawford v. Washington.6   
 The two main issues that Judge Barkett addressed in Charles were the same as 
what Judge Berzon of the Ninth Circuit had expressed the previous year as a concern in 
her concurrence in United States v. Orm Hieng.
7
 First, preempting a hearsay issue using 
the “agent-and-conduit theory” is no longer reconcilable with the Crawford’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, which, in no uncertain terms, has ruled that the only 
way to test the reliability of any testimonial statement is through cross-examination.   
                                                   
 
3
 Major rulings which have taken this position are: United States v. Ushakow, 474 F2d 
1244 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Da Silva, 725 F2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Koskerides, 877 F2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991); 
and United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 
 
4
 United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013), 1324. 
 
 
5
 United States v. Charles, id., 1331. 
 
 
6
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
 
7
 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012), 5086, 5092-5093. 
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Second, as long as interpreting involves each interpreter’s linguistic judgment, which is 
even less scientific (and thus less objective) than forensic laboratory tests,
8
 there always 
exists a prima facie suspicion about accuracy and reliability of each translation, which 
can also be verified only through cross-examination.    
 In view of the fact that LEP (Limited Language Proficiency) suspects’ due 
process rights are so often violated during police interviews by the lack of access to 
reliable language assistance,
9
 the opinion presented by Judge Berzon and the ruling 
entered by Judge Barkett with the invocation of the Crawford’s Confrontation Clause 
definitely deserves high credit.  At the same time, however, as a long-time interpreting 
and translation professional,
10
 the author of this thesis could not help but feel very 
strange about an interpreter being regarded as someone who renders a statement in the 
target language that is deemed “not identical” to the client’s original statement in the 
source language, as interpreters’ work is nothing but rendition of an “equivalent meaning” 
in the target language.  If we are not doing that, then what are we doing?  This 
“gut-level” reaction was what prompted the author to conduct a comprehensive 
legal-linguistic analysis of this very issue.
                                                   
 
8
 United States v. Charles, id., 1328-1329. 
 
 
9
 Roseann Dueñas González, et al. emphasizes in Fundamentals of Court Interpretation: 
Theory, Policy, and Practice, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012) that “this 
critical juncture in the criminal justice system represents a [‘]no man’s land[’] for LEP suspects―
devoid of appropriate language policies and professional interpreting practices,” 444. 
 
 
10
 The author of this thesis is a Japanese-government-certified interpreter and guide, who 
has also taught Japanese-English interpreting and translation skills for twenty-five years at 
specialized interpreter training institutes as well as universities both at graduate and undergraduate 
levels, all in Tokyo, Japan.    
 
  
 
 
Part One: Legal Analysis 
 
Chapter I 
The “Agent-and-Conduit Interpreter” Theory Requires a Complete Overhaul 
 
 The “interpreter-as-an-agent-and-a-conduit theory” (“agent-and-conduit theory” 
hereafter) is a hybrid of the “interpreter-as-an-agent theory” (“agency theory” hereafter) 
and the “interpreter-as-an-conduit theory” (“conduit theory” hereafter).  The “agency 
theory” is a uniquely American legal invention that applied the traditional agency law’s 
vicarious admission to an interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimony, while and the 
“conduit theory” is a post-World War II legal fiction many jurisdictions in the world 
began to employ to cope with the accelerating linguistic diversity in criminal justice 
administration.   
 
A. Recent Inter-Circuit Appellate Split 
 The origin of the “agency theory” can be traced back to 1773,11 though the 
“conduit theory” appeared in U.S. courts only from 1973.12  During the Roberts’13 era 
of “indicia of reliability,” the “agency theory” was combined with the “conduit theory” 
                                                   
 
11
 Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 Howell’s State Trials 82-238, 123 (England 1773), a trial that 
took place in 1773-1774 in London.  A detailed explanation will be given in B-1, infra. 
  
 
12
 United States v. Ushakow, 474 F2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973). 
  
 
13
 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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and became the “dual agency conduit theory” (“agent-and-conduit theory”) in 1983,14 
and since then has continued to rule as a dominant case law in the U.S. 
          
1. “Agent-and-Conduit-Interpreter Theory” for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) 
 The “agent-and-conduit theory” enables the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or 
(D) “vicarious admission” to make the interpreter’s extrajudicial translation 
“non-hearsay,” which enables the circumvention of the hearsay issue of an 
interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimonial statement made by the suspect and also 
pre-empts the Crawford’s Confrontation Clause issue.  
 
2. Judge Berzon’s Concern, Judge Barkett’s Courage, and the Supreme Court’s Silence 
 Seven years after Crawford, the Ninth Circuit still continued to use the same 
“agent-and-conduit theory” for the Orm Hieng15 ruling.  However, one member of the 
panel, Judge Berzon, expressed a grave concern about the continued application of the 
“agent-and-conduit theory” in the era of Crawford and its progeny, saying that Orm 
Hieng relied on the pre-Crawford
16
 hearsay and Confrontation Clause analysis, which, 
in her view, created a great tension with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
17
 or 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
18
 when translation is “much less of a science than lab 
                                                   
 
14
 United States v. Da Silva, 725 F2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 
 
15
 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 
 
16
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 
 
17
 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 
  
18
 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ____ (2011). 
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tests.”19   
 Then, one year after the Ninth Circuit’s Orm Hieng ruling, the Eleventh Circuit, 
for the first time in the U.S. ruled in Charles that the application of the 
“agent-and-conduit theory” for FRE 801(d)(2) or (D), and not for FRE 801(d)(2)(A), 
was an attestation that the interpreter and the suspect were deemed as two different, 
separate identities, i.e., “separate declarants,”20 and that, therefore, Crawford required 
that the interpreter be cross-examined.  
 In the wake of this emerging inter-circuit split, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has persistently conveyed a silent message to this issue by continuously denying 
certiorari in all cases that specifically addressed this issue.
21
  Thus, the law continues to 
remain uncertain. 
     
 
 
                                                   
 
19
 “[T]hat a translator's out-of-court version of a testimonial statement need not be subject 
to cross-examination at trial—seems in great tension with the holdings of Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts… (2009)…and Bullcoming v. New Mexico… (2011), that laboratory reports may not 
be admitted without testimony by the individuals who conducted the laboratory tests.  Translation 
from one language to another is much less of a science than conducting laboratory tests, and so much 
more subject to error and dispute. Without the ability to confront the person who conducted the 
translation, a party cannot test the accuracy of the translation in the manner in which the 
Confrontation Clause contemplates” (in her concurring opinion), Orm Hieng, id., 1147. 
 
 
20
 “While Alvarez and Da Silva hold admissible, under the hearsay rules, a witness’s 
testimony of an interpreter’s out-of-court statements of what the defendant said, neither case holds 
that the defendant is the declarant of the interpreter's statements,” Charles. id., 1326. 
 
 
21
  The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following cases, which addressed this 
very issue: Cassidy v. State,149 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App. 2004);
 
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F3d 
1131 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Santacruz, 480 Fed. Appx. 441(9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Desire, 502 Fed. Appx. 818 (11th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Boskovic, 472 Fed. Appx. 607 (9th Cir 2012); United States v. Budha, 495 Fed. 
Appx. 452 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2013).  
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B. “Agency Theory”: Obscure Origin and Stretched Application 
 Fabrigas v. Mostyn,
22
 a 1773 ruling that took place in London, is allegedly the 
original authority that dates back to the pre-Revolutionary-War time.   
 
1. The “Agency Theory’’: Origin and Early Development   
 Strangely, however, Fabrigas never mentions “agency relationship” in its entire 
158-page-long court record.
23
  On the contrary, far from mentioning “agency,” 
Fabrigas ironically and very vividly reveals a classic problem of an interpreter-assisted, 
out-of-court testimonial statement, by demonstrating an unfortunate confusion and very 
possible misunderstanding that seemed to have taken place during the series of 
interpreter-assisted out-of-court exchanges, which the judge and the jury were unable to 
verify due to the absence of the two interpreters as in-court witnesses.
24
   
 The court could not ascertain whether the plaintiff (Fabrigas)’s original 
expression in the Minorquin language (“a mixture a of Italian and Spanish” or “a kind of 
bad Spanish”) had meant that Fabrigas would come back the next day “with one hundred 
and fifteen men” or that he would come back “with a petition backed by one hundred 
and fifty men.”  Also, the court had no way of finding what kind of corresponding 
                                                   
 
22
 Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 Howell’s State Trials 82-238, 123 (England 1773), a trial that 
took place in 1773-1774 in London.  A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for 
High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Present Time, 
with Notes and Other Illustrations, Complied by T. B. Howell, Esq. F. R. S. F. S. A., Volume XX. A. 
D. 1771-1777 (London: Printed by T. C. Hansard, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street, 1814), 82-238.   
 
 
23
 Fabrigas only contains one short sentence by Justice Gould, who admitted an 
interpreter- assisted, out-of-court testimony, saying “I think it is very clearly sufficient evidence.”  
The reason mentioned, however, was that the subsequent event was not contradictory to the content 
of translation.  Justice Gould never uses the word “agent” to describe the interpreter.  Fabrigas, id., 
123. 
  
 
24
 Fabrigas, id., 125-126, 128, and 169. 
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translations the two interpreters, John Vedall and Segui, had rendered to the defendant at 
that time.  Consequently, the court felt that the defendant might not have understood (or 
might have just misunderstood) the meaning of the interpreters’ translated renditions, 
and as a result might have overreacted to the situation, thinking that Fabrigas might be 
planning a sedition.  Such information, the judge said, could have greatly helped clarify 
this case for the jury, while that was not possible as the two interpreters never took the 
witness stand.
25
 
 In 1865, more than a hundred years after Fabrigas, the first case in the U.S. that 
used the “agent theory” was ruled in Massachusetts.  Camerlin v. Palmer Co.26 
determined that the “interpreter” had been an “agent” of the plaintiff (Mrs. Camerlin, the 
then forlorn wife of Mr. Camerlin, who later sued Palmer Co.), for the reason that Mrs. 
Camerlin herself had asked the interpreter to accompany her to communicate with the 
defendant.  The defendant testified to what he had heard from the interpreter as to what 
the plaintiff’s wife was saying to him at that time.  Camerlin ruled that the interpreter 
had acted as “the plaintiff’s wife’s agent” in communicating with the defendant, citing 
Fabrigas as authority in order to newly invent the “interpreter-as-an-agent theory.”27 
 Then a few decades later in 1892 in the same state of Massachusetts, 
                                                   
  
 
25
 Fabrigas, id., 125-126, 128, and 169. 
   
 
26
 Camerlin v. Palmer Co., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 539 (1865). 
 
 
27
 In Camerlin, a discrepancy appeared between what the defendant testified as to what he 
had heard from the plaintiff’s wife through her interpreter and what the plaintiff’s wife and her 
interpreter insisted had been communicated to the defendant.  Camerlin ruled that since the 
interpreter, employed by the plaintiff’s wife, had become her agent, what the defendant had heard 
through this interpreter had “to be taken” as what had been “truly stated,” because “in such case the 
interpreter is an accredited agent of the party, acting within the scope of his authority,” and somehow 
the authority the court cited for this new “agency theory” was Justice Gould’s statement in Fabrigas 
that “the evidence of the witness was clearly admissible,” which had never mentioned “agency 
relationship.”  Camerlin v. Palmer Co., id., 541-542.   
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Commonwealth v. Vose
28
 used the “interpreter-as-a-joint-agent theory” for the first time.  
Vose ruled that the interpreter had acted as a “joint agent” between the defendant and the 
victim and provided “prima facie accurate” translation, using the following logic. 
 When two parties adopt a mode of communication through an interpreter, 
accuracy is assumed and the interpreter’s words “presumptively” become the parties’ 
own words, and so the parties cannot complain if the interpreter’s words are taken as 
their own.  The only condition for this is that the two parties’ respective relations to the 
interpreter do not differ.  As to whether the principals become liable for the agent 
(interpreter)’s faulty translations, Vose only mentioned that such discussion was not 
necessary in this particular case.
29
 
 
2. Vose Misapplied Respondeat Superior to Interpreter Users   
 This logic of Vose, which misused the old common law doctrine of respondeat 
superior to conceal the issue of “interpreter-assisted out-of-court statement,” became the 
origin of the many problems that have persisted even into the 21st century.  While 
misapplying the common-law agency theory’s respondeat superior doctrine to preempt 
potential translation inaccuracy problems, Vose shifted “liability for inaccurate 
translation” to the users of the interpreting service by making them the principals of the 
agent (the interpreter), and thus making the traditional “agency determination criteria” 
almost non-existent. 
                                                   
 
       
28
 Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass 393 (32 NE 355) (1892). 
 
   
29
 “How far either would be bound by it if the interpreter should prove false, may depend 
on a variety of circumstances which it is unnecessary in this case to consider,” Commonwealth v. 
Vose, id., 395. 
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 For the establishment of an agency relationship, Vose only required that “the 
two parties adopt a mode of communication through an interpreter.”  Such a simple 
requirement would automatically include any and all interpreter-assisted bilateral talk, 
because almost all interpreter-assisted bilateral talks take the following steps: 1) Party X 
needs to talk to Party Y, but Party Y and Party X speak different languages; 2) Party X 
needs an interpreter to accompany him if he decides to talk to Party Y; 3) Party X 
procures an interpreter—here, the interpreter may become Party X’s agent; 4) Party X 
goes to Party Y with this interpreter and starts talking to Party Y through this interpreter; 
5) Party Y responds to Party X through Party X’s interpreter. 
 According to Vose, at the very moment of step 5), Party X’s interpreter 
automatically becomes Party Y’s agent as well, making Party Y liable, as the 
interpreter’s co-principal, for any up-coming translation inaccuracy, by requiring Party 
Y to accept any potentially inaccurate translation as Party Y’s own words.  In short, 
Vose failed to make a distinction between: a) an act of “willingly, knowingly, and 
voluntarily” appointing an interpreter as one’s agent; and b) an act of “merely 
responding” to the other party who initiated a verbal exchange, through the initiating 
party’s interpreter. 
 Vose uses a typical “answer-begging,” faulty logic to “guarantee accuracy” by 
“presuming accuracy.”  To rephrase the above-mentioned steps, the logic of Vose goes 
as follows.  A party who responds to another party that initiated a talk through an 
interpreter automatically becomes a co-principal of the other party’s interpreter, and this 
interpreter automatically becomes a co-agent for both parties.  As this interpreter has 
become a co-agent, the interpreter’s translation will become “presumptively accurate” 
for the two co-principals, because the two co-principals accept all the upcoming 
11 
 
 
translation as “prima facie correct,” and they will not, or will not be allowed to, 
challenge the translations’ accuracy by cross-examining the interpreter, because that 
would be the same as cross-examining themselves.  Would such logic be readily 
acceptable to any reasonable mind? 
 
3. Vose Kept Gaining Authority: “Dual Agency” for Police and Suspect   
 Despite this problematic logic, Vose’s “agency theory” kept gaining increasing 
authority in the early 20th-century U.S., with endorsement coming from such authorities 
as John Henry Wigmore.  In his 1908 work, A Supplement to a Treaties on the System 
of Evidence in Trials at Common Law Containing the Statutes and Judicial Decision 
1904-1907,
30
 Wigmore made an “additional note to a paragraph” that provided that “an 
interpreted statement may be used against a witness (not a party-opponent) as a 
self-contradiction, without calling the interpreter, where the witness, by selecting his 
interpreter, virtually made him his agent to speak, or otherwise adopted the interpreter’s 
statement.”31   
 Also, in his 1920 work, A Pocket Guide of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at 
Law,
32
 Wigmore made a more complete additional note to a provision that prescribed as 
follows: “1282 Par. (b) When a statement made by a person out of court, speaking 
through an interpreter, is to be introduced, the interpreter must be called as the witness to 
                                                   
 
30
 John Henry Wigmore, A Supplement to a Treaties on the System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law Containing the Statutes and Judicial Decision 1904-1907 (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1908).   
  
 
31
 Wigmore, A Supplement, 174. 
 
 
32
 John Henry Wigmore, A Pocket Guide of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1920). 
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the statement; (1) except where under the circumstances the person speaking was a party 
who made the interpreter his agent to speak for him.—(W. § 1810).”33 
 With the support of such powerful authority, Vose kept growing into a dominant 
case law in U.S. Courts.  In a sense, this is understandable because the “agency theory” 
probably worked as a strong, expedient, preemptive legal tool when accuracy 
verification of interpreter-assisted out-of-court testimonial statements was close to 
impossible without necessary resources, such as recording technology, trained language 
experts, etc., and was also extremely troublesome and time-consuming even with 
resources.  In addition, the theory’s “presumptive accuracy guarantee” may have 
seemed of critical importance to prevent a potentially unfair administration of criminal 
justice, as the theory successfully eliminated an impossibly high common-law hearsay 
bar involving nasty out-of-court interpreter-related issues. 
 Still, the U. S. is the only common-law jurisdiction that has adhered to the 
“agency theory” in handling interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimonies.  The “agency 
theory” in Vose was actually criticized by a high court in Australia back in 1960, in Gaio 
v. R,
34
 and the U.K., a nation of the longest common-law history, officially rejected 
admission of interpreter-assisted hearsay testimonies in as early as 1958 in R v. Attard,
35
 
which thereafter required prosecutors to ensure that their interpreters could and would 
testify in court whenever necessary. 
     
                                                   
 
33
 John Henry Wigmore, A Pocket Guide, id., 290. 
 
  
34
 Gaio v. R HCA 70; 104 CLR 419 (10 October 1960).  “I think, with respect, that this 
involves yet another misuse of that much misused word [‘]agent[’].”  Gaio, id., 428. 
 
 
35
 R v. Attard, Central Criminal Court (1958) 43 Cr. App. R. 90. 
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C. “Agency Theory” Grew into “Agent-and-Conduit Theory”  
Creating Further Confusion 
 The term “language conduit” most probably appeared for the first time among 
all the U.S. courts in the 1952 ruling of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, United States 
v. Plummer.
36
   
 
1. Emergence of “Conduit Theory” in the1950s and 1960s   
 Plummer, however, contained only a passing reference in the dissent opinion 
that “[c]ounsel for accused knew he was going to develop the theory of no fresh 
complaint and that the interpreter was the conduit through which any conversations must 
travel” (emphasis added).37 
 The concept of “conduit interpreter” is not unique to the U.S.  Around the 
same time, a high court in Australia in its 1960 ruling of Gaio v. The Queen,
38
 while 
criticizing Vose’s “agency theory,”39 ruled instead that the interpreter was “merely a 
mouthpiece” (emphasis added),40 describing that “the role played by Arthur [interpreter] 
…was not different…from that which…an electrical instrument might fulfill in 
overcoming the barrier of distance” (emphasis added).41 
                                                   
 
36
 United States v. Plummer, 3 CMA 107 (U.S.C. of Military Appeals 1952). 
 
 
37
 United States v. Plummer, id., 112. 
  
 
38
 Gaio v. R HCA 70; 104 CLR 419 (10 October 1960).     
  
 
39
 Gaio v. R HCA 70; 104 CLR 419, 428. 
 
 
40
 Gaio v. R HCA 70; 104 CLR 419, 430. 
 
 
41
 Gaio v. R HCA 70; 104 CLR 419, 430. 
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2. Unfortunate Mixture of “Agency Theory” and “Conduit Theory” 
 The first U.S. case that specifically used the “conduit theory” was a 1973 ruling 
by the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Ushakow.
42
  Unfortunately, however, Ushakow 
was an extremely terse ruling with no legal analysis.
43
  
 Ten years later, the Second Circuit made a landmark ruling, United States v. Da 
Silva,
44
 which combined Vose’s “agency theory” and Ushakow’s “conduit theory,” a 
hybrid that was invented in order to apply FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) to overcome the 
out-of-court interpreter hearsay issue with an additional theoretical reinforcement for 
“prima facie accuracy and reliability.”  Da Silva adjudicated that: 1) an interpreter is 
just a “language conduit,” adding no extra layer of hearsay; and that 2) unless otherwise 
shown, the interpreter’s translation is prima facie accurate (reliable).  With the dawn of 
the Roberts’45 “indicia of reliability” era, this new “agent-and-conduit theory” which 
provided additional reliability reinforcement to the “agency theory” kept gaining 
authority all the way into the 21st century.  
 
3. “Agency” Determination Criteria for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) Further Obscured  
 The “agency” determination process in Da Silva for applying FRE 801(d)(2)(C) 
or (D) stipulated as follows: 1) if the interpreter has no motive to mislead, and if there is 
                                                   
 
42
 United States v. Ushakow, 474 F2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973) 
 
 
43
 “Ushakow challenges the admissibility of certain testimony… Chicas spoke in Spanish 
and there was no proof that Ushakow understood Spanish.  However, the record reflects that Carlon 
was translating and was merely a language conduit between Ushakow and Chicas.  Therefore, his 
testimony is within the same exception to the hearsay rule as when a defendant and another are 
speaking the same language” (emphasis added), Ushakow, id., 1245.  
 
 
44
 United States v. Da Silva, 725 F2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983) 
 
 
45
 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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no reason to believe the translation is inaccurate, then the interpreter becomes a “dual 
agent” for the police and the suspect; and 2) additionally, the interpreter also becomes a 
language “conduit,” and this “conduit” status creates “testimonial identity” between the 
suspect and the interpreter for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).
46
  This way, 
by trying to reinforce “interpreter accuracy and reliability,” Da Silva succeeded in 
further obscuring the “agency” determination criteria for the application of FRE 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “vicarious admission.”   
 Ten years later, the Ninth Circuit took up in U.S. v Nazemian
47
 where the 
Second Circuit left off in Da Silva, further compounding the whole unfortunate issue.  
Nazemian rephrased Da Silva into a 4-Tier Test for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) 
or (D), which has become the current dominant U.S. case law.  The Nazemian’s four 
factors to determine “whether the interpreter’s statements should be attributed to the 
defendant under either the agency or conduit theory” are: 1) which party supplied the 
interpreter; 2) whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort; 3) the 
interpreter’s qualifications and language skill; and 4) whether subsequent actions were 
consistent with the translated statements.  Nazemian, considering these 4 factors, 
determined that the government-provided interpreter was a “mere language conduit” or 
“Nazemian's agent.”48  
 In addition to further obscuring the “agency” determination criteria for the 
application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “vicarious admission,” Nazemian’s 4-Tier Test 
began to present new problems and questions.  Test 1 is about which party supplied the 
                                                   
        
46
 Da Silva, id., 831. 
 
 
47
 United States v. Nazemian, 948 F2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 
        
48
 United States v. Nazemian, id., 948 F2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991), 527-528. 
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interpreter.  However, the current law almost always approves interpreters supplied by 
the police, so it seems that the only viable purpose of this test is to screen those supplied 
by the suspect or the victim.  Test 2 is as to whether the interpreter had any motive to 
mislead.  Here again, however, no clear criteria for finding such motive are shown 
while the case law has usually found “police-supplied” interpreters free of any motive to 
mislead.  In addition, finding of ill-motive or bias in an interpreter is fundamentally a 
Crawford Confrontation Clause issue, not to be determined in limine.   
 Test 3 is about qualifications and language skill of an interpreter, which 
concerns “translation accuracy” and thus “reliability” of the evidence.  “Accuracy” 
actually is the single most important issue in all interpreter-involved cases, and 
verification of “translation accuracy” practically can subsume all the other criteria tests.  
However, verification of “accuracy” is also the most difficult as well as the most 
troublesome issue since “what” should be verified “how” is not easy to stipulate or 
practice.  Looking into the interpreter’s “qualifications and experience” may be of 
some help, but they only serve as an indirect guarantee for the “accuracy” of any 
particular translation in question.   
 Finally, Test 4, “consistency of the subsequent action with the preceding 
translation,” may become of some help in an undercover investigation but has no real 
application value in a custodial police interview, so this is but another indirect 
assessment that gets subsumed by “accuracy” assessment.    
 
4. Logic Dilemma of “Agent-and-Conduit Theory”  
 The most serious problem created by the “agent-and-conduit theory” 
proclaimed by Da Silva and Nazemian is its inherent logic dilemma, resulting from the 
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fact that the “cause-and-effect” relation between “agency” and “conduit” has never been 
made clear.  The dilemma presents the following four questions.  1) Does an 
interpreter become an “agent” because the interpreter is a “conduit”?  2) Does an 
interpreter become a “conduit” because the interpreter is an “agent”?  3) Does an 
interpreter become an “agent” and a “conduit” at the same time?  4) Does an interpreter 
become either an “agent” or a “conduit”?  Each line of these four logic patterns 
presents problems as follows. 
 Frist, does an interpreter become an “agent” because the interpreter is a 
“conduit”?  Starting from Vose, this theory’s only condition for the establishment of 
“agency relationship” is that the “two parties commence communication through an 
interpreter,” which is deemed as an act that “presumes” that the interpreter’s translation 
is “prima facie accurate (a conduit),” which makes it an “answer-begging” logic for 
proving the “unproven accuracy (a conduit).”  In addition, , if an interpreter is already a 
conduit (accurate), an “agency” status is unnecessary or superfluous, because the 
“identicalness” of the “conduit” interpreter’s translation to the suspect’s original 
statement should pass any hearsay bar or even enable the application of FRE 
801(d)(2)(A). 
 Second, does an interpreter become a “conduit” because the interpreter is an 
“agent”?  If this is the claimed logic, then it makes an interpreter only “presumptively” 
accurate (a conduit) by making the interpreter a “co-agent.”  As to whether the 
interpreter is truly a “conduit” (accurate) or not is a question that requires a separate, 
independent, objective proof. 
 Third, does an interpreter become an “agent” and a “conduit” at the same time? 
As already stated with the first line of logic, finding of both an “agent” status and a 
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“conduit” status is superfluous and unnecessary.  If an interpreter is found to be an 
“agent,” that would already suffice the condition for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “vicarious 
admission.”  On the other hand, if the ultimate purpose of this theory is to prove that 
the interpreted statement is “identical” to the suspect’s original foreign-language 
statement in order to pass the hearsay bar, an interpreter only needs to become a 
“conduit” (accurate).  The “agency” determination is superfluous. 
 Fourth and last, does an interpreter become either an “agent” or a “conduit”?  
This would make the law simply opportunistic and arbitrary, using the “agency” theory 
if FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) fits in, but switches to the “conduit” theory for the admission 
of a non-party’s interpreter-assisted statement for which FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D)’s 
vicarious admission does not apply.            
 The fundamental cause of the above logic dilemma comes from the fact that 
Vose, Ushakow, Da Silva, and Nazemian have replaced the common-law “agency” 
determination for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) with a new set of “conduit” determination for 
out-of-court interpreters.  This is evident from the fact that the Nazemian ruling itself is 
extremely vague on the distinction between “agent” and “conduit.”  For instance, the 
ruling says that “[t]he circuits which have considered the question have recognized a 
number of factors which may be relevant in determining whether the interpreter’s 
statements should be attributed to the defendant under either the agency or conduit 
theory” (emphasis added),49 or that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, it was not 
plainly erroneous for the district court to treat the interpreter as a mere language conduit 
                                                   
        
49
 United States v. Nazemian, id., 527. 
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or as Nazemian’s agent” (emphasis added).50 
 
D. Fallacy of “Agent-and-Conduit Theory”: Ultimate Logic Dilemma 
 The ultimate dilemma of the “agent-and-conduit theory” can be summarized 
into the following two mutually exclusive contentions. 
 
1. Inherent and Ultimate Logic Dilemma of “Agent-and-Conduit Theory.”   
 Contention I: FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) vicarious admission is based on 
respondeat superior; therefore, if an interpreter indeed can become an agent for the 
suspect during a police interview, this alone becomes sufficient to fulfill the FRE 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) requirement without an additional and superfluous finding of the 
interpreter being a “conduit.”  
 Contention II: if FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) applies because an interpreter indeed 
is a “conduit,” then a “conduit” interpreter’s oral translation should be able to overcome 
any types of hearsay bar, not just for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), 
regardless of “for or against” any party, and it can also be used even with “a non-party,” 
making a finding of “agency” unnecessary and superfluous.  
 This dilemma has actually caused real confusion and inconsistency in “party or 
non-party” rulings.  One example is Correa v. Supreme Court of Orange County51 (Cal. 
App. 2000) and Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County
52
 (Cal. 2002).  The issue 
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 United States v. Nazemian, id., 528. 
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 Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County 84 4th 631 (Cal. App. 2000).  
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 Correa v. Superior Court, 27 4th 444 (Cal. 2002). 
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in Correa v. Supreme Court of Orange County (Cal. App. 2000) was whether and how to 
admit an interpreter-assisted extrajudicial statement by a “victim,” who was a 
“non-party.”   
 The People contended that “interpreters translating statements of nonparties 
(witnesses and victims) should be viewed as [‘]language conduits[’] who do not create 
an additional layer of hearsay,”53 but the ruling excluded the victim’s statement as 
hearsay because the vicarious admission by the “agency” theory only applies to a “party” 
opponent, adjudicating that “[t]he People fail to offer any logical or legal explanation as 
to why different standards should be applied for translated statements of parties and 
nonparties.”54  Two years later, however, Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County 
(Cal. 2002) reversed Correa (Cal. App. 2000), ruling that the “language conduit” 
concept was not limited to parties, if “the translated statement fairly may be considered 
to be that of the original speaker” based on the Nazemian’s Four-Tier Test.55 
 Another example is Oregon v Rodriguez-Castillo.
56
  Oregon’s OEC 
801(4)(b)(D)
57
 stipulates that: 1) an interpreter’s translated statement as an “agent” of 
the suspect can be admitted; but that 2) an interpreter’s translated statement as an “agent” 
of the victim cannot be admitted, because a “victim” is “not a party.”58  Therefore, in 
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 Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County, 84 4th 631 (Cal. App. 2000), 638. 
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 Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County, id., 638.  
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 Correa v. Superior Court, 27 4th 444 (Cal. 2002), 457.  For Nazemian 4-Tier Test, see 
Chapter I, C-3, supra. 
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 State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, id., 48. 
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order to get an interpreter-assisted victim’s extrajudicial statement admitted into 
evidence, the prosecutor tried to apply OEC 803(18a)(b), which permits admission of a 
sexually abused victim’s hearsay statement.  However, OEC 803(18a)(b) applied only 
if the detective had been able to hear the testimony directly from the victim.  It did not 
apply in this case because the detective had heard the victim’s statement indirectly 
through an interpreter, which added another layer of hearsay.
59
  The translation was 
made by an interpreter who would have become an “agent-and-conduit” for the victim 
by OEC 801(4)(b)(D), if the victim had been a “party opponent,” adding no extra layer 
of hearsay.  Therefore, the big question is: how and why does the same interpreter 
suddenly add an extra layer of hearsay if the application was for OEC 803(18a)(b), and 
not for OEC 801(4)(b)(D)? 
 
2. Re-Separate “Agency” and “Conduit” and Re-Examine “Agency” Validity  
 We must once again remember that the “agency theory” and the “conduit theory” 
were originally two different, separate theories.  The “agency theory” was invented all 
the way back in 1865 by Camerlin v. Palmer Co. in order to use “vicarious admission” 
to make an interpreter-assisted extrajudicial statement “non-hearsay.”  The “conduit 
theory,” on the other hand, was introduced more than a century later in 197360 in order 
to preempt “accuracy and impartiality (reliability)” verification and was combined with 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
59
 “The victim's statements that defendant had abused her would have been admissible 
under OEC 803(18a)(b) if she had made them to the detective and he had been able to testify to them 
without Perez's intervention. That did not happen, however. Instead, the victim told Perez what 
happened, and Perez told the detective. Perez's statements to the detective added another layer of 
hearsay but not the kind of hearsay that is admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b). Accordingly, the 
detective's testimony was admissible only if Perez's out-of-court statements came within some other 
exception to the rule against hearsay.”  State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, id., 48-49. 
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the “agency theory” in 1983,61 at the dawn of the Roberts’ “indicia of reliability” era, 
possibly as a reinforcement to “pre-empt” the need to “prove or verify accuracy and 
impartiality (reliability)” required by the pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause. 
      In order to resolve this inherent logic dilemma of the “agent-and-conduit theory,” 
therefore, the “agency theory” and the “conduit theory” must first be re-separated and 
re-examined independently of each other for each theory’s true validity, applicability, 
and realistic workability.
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Chapter II 
FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “Agency Theory” for Interpreters: Not Workable 
 
 This chapter will present one of the key arguments of this thesis, which is that 
FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “agency theory” for police interpreters is fundamentally 
unworkable.  
 
A. Use “Agency Law” for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) Determination 
 This section will begin with one of this thesis’ main contentions that the 
“agency” determination for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) in 
interpreter-assisted extra-judicial statements must be made strictly by the “agency law” 
only, and never by combining it with the “conduit” theory, for the following three 
reasons. 
 
1. Three Reasons Why Agency Determination Must Be Made by “Agency Law” Only 
 First, FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) requires independent proof by substantive 
“agency law.”  Second, evidence law drafters also intended that the determination for 
FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) to be based on the “agency law.”  Third, using the “conduit 
theory” will push the “agency” determination out of the FRE 801(d)(2) “non-hearsay” 
framework, since “conduit” fundamentally concerns “accuracy and reliability,” the 
determination of which inevitably invokes Crawford’s Confrontation Clause.  The 
following section will discuss these three reasons in detail. 
 First, FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) requires independent proof by substantive
24 
 
 
“agency law,” which is specifically stipulated by FRE 801(d)(2).  The law requires an 
independent proof, in addition to the hearsay statement itself for “bootstrapping,” that 
establishes “the declarant’s authority under (C)” or “the existence or scope of the 
relationship under (D).”62  Here, “the most common approach to answering this 
question” as to whether there really is an “agency relationship” is to “look to the 
substantive law of agency.”63 
 The second reason is that the evidence law drafters’ intention was also most 
probably for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) to be based on the “agency law.”  FRE 801(d)(2), 
or “non-hearsay as admissions by a party-opponent,” never had a separate, independent 
category labeled an “interpreter,” though it does for a “crime co-conspirator,” which is 
FRE 801(d)(2)(E), and thus the determination for which must be based specifically on a 
finding of co-conspiratorship between the suspect and the declarant,
64
 not an “agency” 
relationship.  There is no such independent category for an “interpreter.”  Therefore, 
to determine the “agency relationship” between the interpreter and the suspect, the 
substantive “agency law” must be applied. 
 Even Wigmore, an advocator of a separate “non-hearsay” category consisting of 
“admissions by a party-opponent, including vicarious admissions,” which he tried to 
clearly differentiate from other “hearsay exceptions,”65 never created a separate, 
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independent category for an “interpreter” within the “non-hearsay, vicarious admissions.”  
Wigmore listed the following eight separate categories as “[p]rivies in 
[o]bligation…[t]he statement of the other person…receivable whenever he is by the 
substantive law one who could at the time make the party liable”: a) co-promisor; b) a 
principal debtor; c) an agent, d) an attorney-at-law; e) a partner; f) a wife or husband; g) 
a co-conspirator; and h) a joint tortfeasor.”66  However, Wigmore never listed an 
“interpreter” as a separate, independent category.  He only mentioned an “interpreter” 
in a form of an additional note using the term “agency,” as follows: a) “[w]hen a 
statement made by a person out of court, speaking through an interpreter, is to be 
introduced, the interpreter must be called as the witness to the statement”;67 and b) 
“except where under the circumstances the person speaking was a party who made the 
interpreter his agent to speak for him” (emphasis added).68 
 Furthermore, the Manual for Courts Martial, both “MCM 1951” and “MCM 
2012,” uses the term “agent” based on the “agency law” doctrine.  The MCM is the 
only U.S. statute that has a clear provision for an “interpreter” acting as an “agent” under 
“agency theory” for “vicarious, ‘non-hearsay’ admission.”  Both MCM 1951 and MCM 
2012 provisions clearly use the term “agent” from the “agency law.”  MCM 1951 
stipulates “a statement made through an interpreter may be proved only by the testimony 
of the interpreter…and may not be proved by…the interpreter’s translation.  
                                                                                                                                                      
Federal Courts Law Review 5 (2011), 14.  
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 Wigmore, A Pocket Guide, p173, p 290.  Also see fn. 32, supra.  
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However,…such a statement may be proved by…the interpreter’s translation if the 
interpreter was acting as the agent of the person who made the statement” (emphasis 
added).
69
  Similarly, MCM 2012 also stipulates “Rule 801(d)(2)(C) makes admissible 
[‘]a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the 
subject.[’]…utilizing agency theory.  Rule 801(d)(2)(D) makes admissible [‘]a 
statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment of the agent or servant, made during the existence of the 
relationship.[’]…Statements made by interpreters…serving as a translator for a service 
member in a foreign nation…should be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) or Rule 
801(d)(2)(C)” (emphasis added).70 
 The third reason is that the use of the “conduit theory” will push the “agency” 
determination out of the FRE 801(d)(2) “non-hearsay” framework since “conduit” is 
basically about “accuracy and reliability,” and thus its determination will inevitably 
invoke Crawford’s Confrontation Clause.  While “conduit” is a “disguise” term for 
“translation accuracy” and “interpreter reliability,” the case law’s71 conditions for 
“conduit” only asserts “unproven accuracy and reliability.”    
 As has already been shown in Chapter I, C-3, supra, the first three conditions in 
Nazemian 4-Tier Test are: a) the interpreter has been supplied by a reliable party (usually 
the police); b) the interpreter has no motive to mislead or distort; and c) the interpreter 
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has sufficient qualifications and language skill.  If these three conditions are met, then 
the interpreter is deemed a “conduit.”  However, while pre-Crawford (Roberts) courts 
could have very easily made this determination in limine by FRE104(a), in 
post-Crawford courts, “reliability” must be found only though in-court confrontation, 
which is precisely what Justice Barkett in Charles
72
 objected to and warned against.  
Therefore, to test the real validity and applicability of the “agency theory,” it must be 
separated from the “conduit theory” and re-examined independently. 
 
2. “Agency Determination” in Common Law is by “Consent” and “Control”   
 In common law of agency (2nd and 3rd Restatement), the “agency relationship” 
is determined by two key factors: “consent” and “control,” which has long been 
established by the abundant case law.  Just to mention a couple of example rulings from 
a multitude of case law, in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Harms, 28 F3d 761 (8th Cir. 1994),
73
 
it was ruled that “[t]o establish an agency relationship, one must prove ‘the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf 
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act’ ” (emphasis added).    
 Also, Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubrication Techs., 148 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1998)
74
 ruled 
that “agency is a consensual, fiduciary relationship,” and that “parties must consent to a 
principal-agent relationship,” the test of which is “whether the alleged principal has the 
right to control the manner and method in which work is carried out by the alleged agent 
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and whether the alleged agent can affect the legal relationships of the principal” 
(emphasis added). 
    
3. Double Criteria for Civil Litigations and FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) 
 “Agency vel non”75 is often the most critical issue in many civil litigations as 
“[a]gency label carries significant legal consequences”76 to the principal in the form of 
liability for the damage caused by his or her agent, the rationale for which stems from 
the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior to protect an innocent third party.  
 In contrast, “agency determination” for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) is not a very 
high bar.  Although FRE does not define “agent” or “servant,” the case law shows these 
words refer to the “traditional agency relationship” based on common-law doctrine.77  
However, there is a seeming “double criteria” between the agency determination for civil 
litigations and that for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), though both are supposed to be based 
on “preponderance of evidence.”  As has already been mentioned, potential “legal 
consequences” of an “agency relationship” in ordinary civil litigations are enormous,78 
and thus agency determination very often becomes one of the most crucial litigation 
issues.  In contrast, the “agency determination” for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) is a 
preliminary issue that can be decided single-handedly by a trial judge by FRE104(a), 
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though both determinations are based on the same “preponderance of evidence.”  Even 
“bootstrapping” is permitted as long as there is an additional, separate proof.79       
 Moreover, while challenging evidential admissibility for FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or 
(D) is possible, in most cases such challenges usually turn out unsuccessful.  It is 
certainly true that the “statement…does not by itself establish the declarant”80 for (C), 
(D) and (E) in FRE 801(d)(2), and that the opposing party can still object to its 
conditional admission and challenge again later by FRE104(b).  Also, it is certainly 
true that in some very rare cases, such admissibility challenges have succeeded, as was 
in United States v. Bonds,
81
 a case on an alleged steroid use by a big-name Major 
League Baseball player.
82
  By and large, however, FRE 801(d)(2) “calls for generous 
treatment for this avenue to admissibility,”83 which brings about dire legal consequences 
for LEP (limited English proficiency) suspects who must respond to questions through a 
foreign-language interpreter in a custodial police interview. 
 
B. Interpreter Cannot Become a Dual-Agent for the Police and the Suspect 
 This section and the following section (Section C) will present the next major 
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contention of this thesis, which is that if we conduct a traditional common-law “agency 
determination” for the FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) admission of an interpreter’s translated 
statement of the LEP suspect’s original foreign-language statement in a custodial police 
interview, we will find “no agency relationship” between the interpreter and the suspect, 
thus invalidating the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).  This will be shown in 
two steps.  First, Section B will demonstrate that an interpreter in a police interview 
cannot become a “dual agent” for the police and the suspect.  Then, Section C will 
establish that an interpreter in a police interview does not become the suspect’s agent.   
 
1. An Interpreter in a Police Interview Becomes an Agent for the Police First  
 Interpreters for police interviews are usually divided into two types: 1) a 
“bilingual” police officer serving as an interpreter , and 2) an outside interpreter, usually 
employed by an independent interpreting service company (but could also be a complete 
free-lancer), who has been given an assignment by the employer (if employed) or has 
received a direct request from the police (if a free-lancer) to do the interpreting work, 
paid either through his or her employer who has a business contract with the police or 
paid directly by the police.  Whichever category an interpreter belongs to, an interpreter 
for a police interview becomes an “agent” for the police first upon assignment.    
 In the case of a “bilingual” police officer serving as an interpreter, since the 
interpreter is already an employee of the police, he or she is an “agent” for the police, 
“authorized to do the interpreting work between the interrogating police officer and the 
suspect” working “within the scope of this interpreting work.”   
 In the case of an outside interpreter, if the interpreter is an employee of an 
interpreting service company, the interpreter is an agent for this company, which has a 
31 
 
 
business contract with the police.  As to whether the interpreter (either dispatched by a 
private company or working as a complete free-lancer) is working as a “non-employee 
agent”84 for the police or “non-agent service provider” for the police will depend on 
several key factors,
85
 which will be discussed in detail below. 
 The first key factor is if there was a mutual “consent” to an agency relationship.   
For each assignment, the police formally and specifically make a request for the service 
to which the interpreter consciously and knowingly consents.  However, we must 
examine further to see whether the consent was made as a “non-employee agent” for the 
police or simply as a “non-agent service provider.”  In the case of an outside interpreter, 
the interpreter most probably signs a job assignment or agreement document, which 
usually states under what terms the police or the employer is assigning this particular 
interpreting job, which may say “non-agent service provider,” not “non-employee agent.”  
However, if a discrepancy appears between the terms of the agreement and the real 
content and the nature of the assigned task, the case law has usually supported the latter, 
not the agreement’s mere terminology.86  Therefore, the determination requires 
examination of other relevant factors as follows.        
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 The second key factor is how much “control (instructions, supervision, etc.)” 
the police or the interrogating police officer has over the interpreter’s work.  The police 
usually have a detailed manual and instructions on “how to use an interpreter,” and 
officers are usually thoroughly briefed on “how to keep the interview in control.”87  
Also, if they see any problems with the interpreter’s performance, they can stop the 
interview and arrange for a replacement, since the police are the ones that have “hired” 
the interpreter for the remuneration paid.  To describe this “remuneration” as one key 
factor giving the payer the power to influence the interpreter, one court ruling used an 
old proverb, “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”88  All in all, therefore, the 
interpreter will more likely be found serving as an “agent” for the police.     
 The third factor is the extent of required “special skill.”  If a very “special skill” 
is required to perform the task, then the interpreter will more likely be found a 
“non-agent.”  However, while “genuine” interpreting work is a “highly technical skill” 
that requires many years of professional training,
89
 a skill that requires far more than 
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just being “bilingual,” the status quo of “police interpreters in the U.S.” shows a 
widespread and increasing practice of using putatively “bilingual” police staff as ad hoc 
interpreters.
90
  If this is the case, no particularly special skill can be assumed, even 
though these police employees are agents of the police.  
 The fourth factor is the extent of necessary tools, equipment provided by the 
police.  Though the need for “equipment” is limited (unless the interview is recorded), 
the interview room or facility is of course all prepared by the police.  Therefore, this 
factor examination will more likely find the interpreter an “agent” for the police. 
 The fifth factor is the length of time served.  If the service time is long, the 
interpreter will more likely be found an “agent.”  Usually, each interpreting session 
lasts for only a few hours (sometimes longer), and each assignment is independently 
requested, though it is a little difficult to determine the criteria for the “length of time.”  
At the same time, however, it is also very common for the police to request the same 
interpreter repeatedly if he or she is found to be “reliable.”  
       The sixth factor is whether the interpreter is paid “by the job” or “by the time 
worked.”91 If the interpreter is paid “by the time worked,” then he or she will more 
likely become an “agent” for the police.  Interpreters are almost always paid by the 
“hours (time) served,” which means that this factor examination will more likely find the 
interpreter working as an “agent.” 
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 To summarize, not to speak of the current vast majority of police interpreters 
who are already “employees” of the police, it seems quite reasonable to say that “outside” 
interpreters in almost all cases also become an “agent” for the police upon assignment. 
      
2. Conflict of Interest: “Dual Agency” for the Police and the Suspect Is Not Possible  
 The next question is whether an interpreter who is already an “agent” for the 
police can also become an “agent” for the suspect.  This thesis contends that dual 
agency for the police and the suspect is as impossible as dual agency for the prosecutor 
and the defendant.   
 It is certainly true that the agency law (2nd and 3rd Restatement) does not 
prohibit “dual agency” itself,92 as long as: a) the agent has fully notified the principals 
of the existence of this dual agency; and b) the agent fulfills his or her “fiduciary duties” 
to all the principals.  However, it is also true that “unless otherwise agreed, an agent 
may not act for anyone whose interests might conflict with the interests of the 
principal.”93  Also, “the mere existence of a dual agency violates the duty of undivided 
loyalty,” and “the dual agent risks specific conflicts of duty.”94   
 The most typical example prohibiting such dual agency with clear conflict of 
interest would be that an attorney cannot simultaneously represent both the plaintiff (or 
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 “[O]ne may act as agent for both parties to a transaction if it be with their full 
knowledge and consent,” citing Warner v. Young, 308 Ill. 239, 241, 139 N.E. 393; Adams v. Larson, 
279 Ill. 268, 116 N.E. 658.  Manda v. Branham, 50 Ill. App. 3d 91; 365 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. App. 1977), 
219.    
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 Kleinberger, Agency, 154. 
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 Kleinberger, Agency, 154. 
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even the prosecutor) and the defendant in the same trial.  “Dual agency for the police 
and the suspect” sounds similarly oxymoronic, even if an interpreter is acting only 
within the scope of being a mere language translator between the two parties.  If such 
“impartiality” as a “mere language translator” is to be claimed, it would have to be 
accompanied by an institutional guarantee, such as a court appointing its interpreter as 
an “officer of the court” who works between the two adversary parties as a sworn, 
impartial interpreter, abiding by the code of ethics, being paid by neither one of the 
opposing parties but only by the court. 
 In addition, this “impartiality” argument will not pass the Crawford 
Confrontation muster.  As has been mentioned, a common argument approving “dual 
agency” for the police and the suspect is that the interpreter working as an agent for the 
police is only serving within the very narrow scope of “interpreting work of orally 
translating the statements of the police officer and the suspect back and forth,” and that, 
therefore, within this narrow scope of interpreting work, the interpreter is an “impartial 
and neutral language conduit” taking no special sides with either party, and thus enabling 
the dual agency status.
95
  However, the determination of whether or not the interpreter 
is really an “impartial and neutral language conduit” is ultimately a determination of: 1) 
accuracy of translation, that there are no errors or distortions; and 2) reliability of the 
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 Da Silva says, “The fact that Stewart was an employee of the government did not 
prevent him from acting as Da Silva's agent for the purpose of translating and communicating Da 
Silva's statements to Tripicchio. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 392 (1958) (dual agency 
permitted)” (emphasis added), Da Silva, id., 832.  Also, Nazemian says, “Other circuits have not 
held that the fact that the interpreter is provided by the government, in and of itself, is dispositive of 
the agency question. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832 (interpreter was a customs official 
supplied by the DEA); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135 (interpreter was employed by 
the American embassy and procured by the government); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 859 
(translation was by one undercover agent for the benefit of another). We likewise do not find it 
dispositive in this case” (emphasis added), Nazemian, 527-528.    
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interpreter, that he or she is impartial and has no ill-motive.  In post-Crawford courts, 
“reliability of evidence and or a witness” must be found only through Confrontation, not 
in limine.  Again, only those who are “certified court interpreters” hired by a court as 
“officers of the court,” serving with an oath and by stipulations of the Court Interpreters 
Act,
96
 can be truly regarded as “impartial,” as they are paid neither by the prosecutor 
nor the defendant, certified or otherwise officially qualified, sworn in every time, and 
translates before the judge and the jury, and the public gallery, passing a much higher 
muster. 
 For all the reasons stated above, the thesis concludes this section by 
summarizing that an interpreter in a police interview becomes an agent for the police 
first; and that this interpreter who has become an agent for the police cannot become a 
dual agent for the police and the suspect.  
  
C. The Interpreter Does Not Become the Suspect’s Agent: No Control, No Consent 
 In this section, the thesis will further argue that an interpreter in a police 
interview does not become the suspect’s agent for much more fundamental reasons than 
just “dual agency” conflict of interest.  They are: 1) no control, 2) no consent, and 3) a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment due process rights.  
 
1. The Suspect Has No “Control” over the Interpreter   
 The first reason is that there is no “control” (instructions, supervision, etc.) 
exercised by the suspect over the interpreter.  Because an LEP suspect can neither 
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 28 U.S. Code § 1827-Interpreters in courts of the United States. 
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understand nor assess the competence of the interpreter, not to speak of the quality or 
accuracy of the translation, the suspect practically has no control over the work of the 
interpreter. 
 An often-heard argument for the existence of control is that the suspect is 
exercising his or her control over the interpreter because the interpreter can only 
translate what the suspect speaks.  However, the interpreter is simply doing his or her 
job, upon request by the police, being paid by the police, no more or no less than a 
waiter taking a customer’s order, communicating it to the chef and owner of the 
restaurant, and bringing the ordered dish to the customer.
97
  The waiter is an employee 
of the restaurant, not an agent for the customer.  Also, rather than the suspect, the 
interpreter actually has much control over the suspect, since the suspect can never 
express himself or herself beyond the linguistic competence of and the translation 
judgment by the interpreter, as is described in the following Analogy #1. 
 Analogy #1.  “The suspect having control over the interpreter” is probably as 
fallacious as saying that “a pet dog has a complete control over the master who is taking 
him for a walk, because the master must follow the dog to wherever the dog heads for on 
the other end of the leash.”  Just as the dog can never move beyond the radius of the 
length of the leash held by his or her master, the suspect can never express himself or 
herself beyond the linguistic competence of and the translation judgment by the 
interpreter, both of which the suspect has no control over, and thus are giving the suspect 
no other choice but to rely on the interpreter blindly. 
 Also, it must be re-emphasized that remuneration and other necessary materials 
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and equipment are all provided by the police.  As has already been mentioned in 
Chapter II (this chapter), B-1, supra, one D. C. Appellate Court judge once noted, “He 
who pays the piper calls the tune,”98 and in a police interview, the suspect, especially an 
indigent LEP suspect, can never pay the piper.
99
 
 
2. The Suspect Never “Consents” to an Agency Relationship   
 The second reason is that an LEP suspect in a police interview never consents to 
an “agency relationship” with the interpreter.  First and foremost, just a mere act of 
“responding to police questions through an interpreter” does not constitute “consent” to 
an agency relationship, contrary to the commonly held “consent” argument.  The thesis 
will contend that responding to the other party through the other party’s interpreter never 
makes a party the interpreter’s co-principal automatically. 
 Normally, a two-party communication through an interpreter goes through the 
following process.  A need for communication usually arises from one of the two 
parties, and the party (Party X) who has to initiate the communication hires an 
interpreter, who most probably becomes Party X’s “agent” upon hiring.   Party X then 
goes to the other party (Party Y) with Party X’s interpreter, who will be serving Party X 
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 Ko v. United States, 694 A.2d 73 (D.C. App.1997), 83.  See fn. 88, supra. 
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 An indigent suspect often tries to rely on a friend or a family member to help him or her 
as an interpreter.  However, except for a highly emergent situation, police organizations seem to 
refrain from using those who may potentially be “biased for” the suspect, which would not satisfy 
Test 2 of the Nazemian’s 4-Tier Test (see Chapter I, C-3, supra), while they seem to find no problem 
using their own employees as interpreters, as was mentioned in Chapter II (this chapter), B, supra.  
An interesting question here is what an average response and practice of the police in the U. S. would 
be if a very wealthy LEP suspect decides to hire his own “highly qualified, professional interpreter” 
to sit with him throughout the police interview to work as his interpreter or even as a “check 
interpreter” on the “police-provided interpreter.” 
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as if the interpreter was Party X’s “Extended Mouth and Ears.”  Party X, using his own 
“Extended Mouth and Ears” initiates a verbal communication with Party Y, and Party Y 
responds to Party X who has come with the “Extended Mouth and Ears.”  Here, Party Y 
is simply commencing a verbal response to Party X in Party Y’s own native language, 
just as Party Y always does when Party Y talks to anyone who speaks the same language.  
For Party Y, the whole process is no different from ordinary daily conversation, which 
never invokes a “sudden, unconscious appointment of someone as his “agent.”100  To 
illustrate this point, the thesis will present two analogies. 
 Analogy #2: Party X with a “Hearing Aid” and a “Speaking Aid” speaks to 
Party Y.  Imagine Party X is both “Auditorily Impaired” and “Laryngectomized,” 
which necessitates him to use a “Hearing Aid” and a “Speaking Aid.”  Party X, wearing 
a “Hearing Aid” and a “Speaking Aid” initiates a verbal communication with Party Y, 
and Party Y responds to Party X.  Here, Party Y is simply commencing a verbal 
response to Party X just like Party Y always does when he speaks to anyone.  If what 
Party X heard or understood through his “Hearing Aid” and a “Speaking Aid” was 
different from what Party Y actually said, due to a mechanical trouble of his own 
“Hearing Aid” and or “Speaking Aid,” will Party Y become liable for the 
misunderstanding caused by Party X’s own mechanical trouble? 
 Analogy #3: a restaurant waiter bringing a wrong dish.  A chef and owner of a 
                                                   
 
100
 What if two parties concurrently see a need to approach the other party and talk with 
each other, e.g., bilateral negotiations between companies or countries?  In all international 
negotiations, each nation’s government brings its own interpreter, and never uses the other country’s 
interpreter “as a handy, money-saving” option.  The seeming “interpreter redundancy” usually 
functions as a “check.”  The same is true of business negotiations.  If one of the parties has more 
urgent need to approach the other, then the communication will normally commence with the 
initiating party (Party X) bringing their interpreter to Party Y, and the negotiation will take place in 
Party Y’s language, which also will most probably become the official language of their contract.  In 
this case, too, Party Y does not appoint Party X’s interpreter as Party Y’s agent, and only what was 
said and exchanged in Party Y’s language will most probably remain as an official record. 
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small restaurant has employed a waiter helping him as his employee.  The waiter is an 
agent for the chef and owner, who is the waiter’s principal.  The waiter takes an order 
from a customer and communicates it to the chef and owner, just as an “interpreter” 
functions as a “communication intermediary.”  A customer gives his order with an 
“assumption” that his order will be “accurately communicated” by the waiter to the chef 
and owner.  The waiter brings a dish which apparently was not what the customer 
ordered.  Would the customer be liable for the waiter’s error as the customer had 
already become the waiter’s “co-principal” for the reason that the customer had 
“assumed” that the waiter would take an accurate order? 
 If we use the “agent interpreter” theory’s standard, both the “Party Y” in 
Analogy #2 and “the customer” in Analogy #3 will become liable as a ‘co-principal.”  
As was written in “Vose” (the original “agent theory”), the standard stipulates that “when 
two persons who speak different languages and who cannot understand each other 
converse through an interpreter…they choose a mode of communication, they enter into 
conversation, and the words of the interpreter, which are their necessary medium of 
communication, are adopted by both, and made a part of their conversation as much as 
those which fall from their own lips.  They cannot complain if the language of the 
interpreter is taken as their own… [i]nterpretation under such circumstances is prima 
facie to be deemed correct.”101  This “Vose agency standard,” if it was really valid, 
would become applicable to almost all “interpreter-assisted” bilateral communication 
“unconditionally.” 
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 Commonwealth v. Vose, id., 394-395. 
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3. Consent to Agency Relationship: Equal to a Forced Waiver of Right against 
Verballing  
 This thesis will further argue that the suspect’s making the police interpreter his 
or her agent is equal to a forced waiver of a “right to accuracy-verified translation” of 
the suspect’s testimonial statements, which the thesis will argue is a separate, 
“non-waivable” Fifth Amendment due process right, independent of “Miranda.”  
 This “right to accuracy-verified translation” is a “separate, non-waivable” due 
process right.  The “agency theory,” which automatically assumes the suspect’s 
acceptance of the interpreter’s upcoming English translation as prima facie accurate, 
without “actual verification of the translation accuracy,” permits “potential verballing,” 
an act of “putting or forcing someone else’s words into the suspect’s mouth,” which is a 
violation of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.  The Miranda warning 
only explains the legal consequences of the “Miranda waiver,” which only applies to the 
suspect’s own, voluntary statements made in his or her own language.  The Miranda 
warning never explains the dire legal consequences of “vicarious admission” effectuated 
through FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).  Without the suspect’s “knowing and intelligent”102 
understanding of all the grave consequences of making the interpreter his or her agent 
during the police interview, the interpreter can never become the suspect’s agent.    
 Not only that, this “right to accurate translation” is a “separate, non-waivable 
right.”  The “Miranda waiver” is a waiver of “the right to silence,” which can be 
“waived” if so done “knowingly and intelligently,” whereas the “right to accurate 
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 “The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that 
he had [‘]full knowledge[’] of his [‘]legal rights[’ ] does not approach the knowing and intelligent 
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights” (emphasis added).  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), 492. 
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translation” is a “right against potential verballing,” which is a “non-waivable” right the 
Fifth Amendment guarantees.  Therefore, the police or prosecutor’s “unilateral 
presumption” of the suspect’s “consent” to an agency relationship with the police 
interpreter is no different from a “forced waiver of the suspect’s right against verballing,” 
which is a violation of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.  Ultimately, 
the only way the suspect can guard against such “potential verballing” caused by 
“potentially inaccurate translation” is through the “exclusion of evidence.”103   
 
4. FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) Will Not Pass the “Miranda” Standard 
 Furthermore, the “Miranda waiver” requires a much higher standard than what 
may be sufficient for “consent” in ordinary commercial transactions, i.e., the standard 
for “agency relationship” stipulated by the agency law.   
 The “Miranda waiver” is a “knowing and intelligent waiver required to 
relinquish constitutional rights”104 to incriminate oneself.  Because a “right against 
self-incrimination” is a foremost fundamental constitutional right, the Supreme Court 
specifically set a much higher standard than what may be acceptable in ordinary 
commercial transactions.  For example, in Miranda, even a “document signed by 
Ernesto Miranda” with a clearly printed statement of “full knowledge of his legal rights” 
did not reach the standard set forth by the Supreme Court as a “knowing and intelligent 
waiver” required to relinquish constitutional rights.105 
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 “Like the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination provision is enforced through the 
exclusion of evidence” (emphasis added).  Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law 
for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), 518.  
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 Miranda v. Arizona, id., 492.  
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 Put in this perspective, a suspect’s “unknowing and unintelligent consent” to 
forfeit a constitutional right against “potential verballing” can never pass the Supreme 
Court’s high standard set forth by Miranda,106 as any consent, if made “unknowingly” 
of all the dire legal consequences of waiving one’s Fifth Amendment rights, would 
become invalid.  Such “invalid” consents include all “unknowingly made consents,” 
such as those the police only “inferred” from the suspect’s mere expression of “relief, 
gratitude, or nodding”107 or even more explicit statements, oral or written, “consenting 
to speaking through the interpreter,” unless they were made “knowingly and 
intelligently”108 of all the grave legal consequences of becoming the interpreter’s 
principal with accompanying liability of respondeat superior, i.e., that the interpreter’s 
translated statements will be attributed to the suspect, with prima facie “translation 
accuracy.” 
 Because the suspect is not able to verify the interpreter’s translation accuracy   
throughout the entire interview, the suspect must be made to understand that he or she   
would be “writing an exorbitant blank check,” placing an enormous “blind” trust in the 
ability of a complete stranger he or she has just met. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
he had [‘]full knowledge[’] of his [‘]legal rights[’ ] does not approach the knowing and intelligent 
waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.”  Miranda v. Arizona, id., 492. 
  
 
106
 Miranda v. Arizona, id., 492.  
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 In Da Silva, the suspect gave an expression of relief “Thank God” when the interpreter 
came in and told the suspect that he spoke Spanish, and the court ruled that the interpreter became a 
co-agent for the suspect and the police because “Da Silva was plainly much relieved to have a 
translator, and, after receiving Miranda warnings from Stewart, spoke freely with Tripicchio through 
Stewart.”  United States v. Da Silva, 725 F2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983), 829, 832.  
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5. Hobson’s Choice   
 This thesis’ last argument denying the suspect’s “consent” to an agency 
relationship with a police interview interpreter is that Hobson’s choice is no choice, 
meaning that it is only an involuntary act forced by the circumstance.   
 The “Miranda waiver” is not an automatic consent to “agency relationship.”  
The suspect’s “right against potentially inaccurate translation” is a “separate, 
non-waivable” right.  When an LEP suspect consents to waiving his or her Miranda 
rights, the suspect now must respond to the interrogating police officer’s questions.  If 
the suspect cannot communicate in English, the suspect has “no other choice” but to 
speak through this interpreter procured by the police.  There is “no other way” for the 
suspect to exercise his or her “Miranda waiver,” i.e., to speak to the police officer or 
answer the police officer’s questions, than to speak through this interpreter.  The 
following analogy will attempt to illustrate the distinction between a “Miranda waiver” 
and the separate “non-waivable right to accurate translation.” 
 Analogy #4: Shylock
109
 failing to cut off one pound of flesh.  Just as it was 
impossible for the Venetian moneylender Shylock in William Shakespeare’s play to 
remove one pound of flesh only from Antonio’s body without shedding a drop of blood 
from his body,
110
 the suspect cannot exercise his or her “Miranda waiver” unless he or 
she speaks through the interpreter provided by the police.  Shylock could not execute 
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 A Venetian merchant in William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice (between 1558 
and 1598).  For the book’s publication date, see Dating Shakespeare’s Plays: A Critical Review of 
the Evidence, ed. Kevin Gilvary (Turnbridge Wells, Kent: Parapress, 2010), 137, which notes that 
The Merchant of Venice could have been written anytime between 1558 and 1598. 
 
 
110
 “This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; The words expressly are ‘a pound of 
flesh:’ Take then thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh; But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed One 
drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods [a]re, by the laws of Venice, confiscate [u]nto the state 
of Venice.”  William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (between 1558 and 1598), Act IV Scene 
I.  For the book’s publication date, see fn. 109, supra.  
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his contract because he had failed to include in his contract an additional provision 
permitting “shedding Antonio’s blood,” which he probably had thought to have been 
automatically subsumed in the provision permitting “cutting one pound of flesh,” just as 
the “agency theory” presumes that the suspect’s Miranda waiver automatically subsumes 
the suspect’s agreement to an agency relationship, or more correctly the suspect’s waiver 
of a constitutional right against “potential verballing.”     
 According to the wise judge Portia, however, “cutting one pound of flesh from 
Antonio’s body” was not automatically inclusive of “shedding Antonio’s blood”; each 
required a separate provision.  In a similar way, a “Miranda waiver” cannot 
automatically assume a “waiver of a right to accuracy-verified translation, or more 
correctly, a right against potential verballing,” unless the latter waiver is made in a 
clearly separate, knowing, and intelligent way, though it is fundamentally a 
“non-waivable” right. 
 However, in the current “agency theory” case law, these two rights are 
presumptively merged under the “Miranda” label, putting the LEP suspect in the same 
predicament as that of Antonio before the arrival of Judge Portia.  Had it not been for 
the wisdom of Portia, Antonia had not only offered one pound of his flesh to Shylock but 
also had relinquished all his blood and his life all together, with an “uninformed,” 
desperate conviction that he had “no choice.”     
 Just like Antonio before the arrival of Portia, if the suspect decides to waive his 
or her Miranda rights, the suspect has no choice but to speak through the police 
interpreter.  It is certainly true, at least theoretically, that the suspect could refuse to 
speak through this particular interpreter and ask for a different, presumably a “better,” 
interpreter. 
46 
 
 
 Nevertheless, if the suspect does not know English, there is no real, viable way 
for him or her to assess the quality of the present interpreter’s translation or its accuracy.  
In short, the only choice an LEP suspect has is Hobson’s choice.  Hobson’s choice is no 
choice, and no choice means an involuntary, forced choice.  If it was a forced choice, it 
means that the suspect never consented, willingly and voluntarily, to making the 
interpreter his or her agent. 
 
6. A Constitutional Right to Verification of Translation Accuracy   
 The thesis will conclude this chapter by re-emphasizing that the right not to be 
“verballed, i.e., forced to make a false or inaccurate confession” is a “non-waivable,” 
Fifth Amendment due process right, which the government has a constitutional duty and 
responsibility to protect.  Here, a suspect must be protected not just from being 
“unknowingly forced to consent” to the prima facie accuracy of the interpreter’s 
translation.”  Every suspect also has a constitutionally guaranteed right to “verify” the 
accuracy of the English translation of his or her original foreign-language statements 
before the translation is admitted into evidence.
111
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 “Like the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination provision is enforced through the 
exclusion of evidence” (emphasis added).  Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing 
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Chapter III 
Stop Using 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) “Agency Theory” for Interpreters 
 
 In Chapter II, the thesis demonstrated that application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or 
(D) vicarious admission based on the “agency theory” for the admission of 
interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimonial statements is unworkable for the reason that 
no agency relationship is established between the suspect and the police-supplied 
interpreter.  In this chapter, the thesis will examine the validity of the reasons why the 
U.S. courts have continued to use the “agency theory” for out-of-court interpreters and 
will contend that those reasons will no longer justify its continued use.     
 
A. FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) for Interpreters: Questionable Just Like FRE 801(d)(2)(E) 
 The doctrine of vicarious admission is based on the common law theory of 
respondeat superior, which was originally designed to protect an innocent third party in 
torts or to “facilitate enterprise”112 by assuring third parties (e.g., customers) of the 
principal’s (or a corporation’s) liability for its agents’ (i.e., their employees’) potential 
errors and misdeeds. 
 However, what we see with an “agency theory” used for admission of an 
interpreter-assisted extrajudicial testimony by FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D) is an unfortunate 
mixture of the common law of agency developed originally for civil tort litigations and
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 Judge Posner, in his criticism of “vicarious admission” doctrine used for FRE 
801(d)(2)(E) criminal co-conspirators.  United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F3d 294 (7th Cir. 1996), 
303. 
 
48 
 
 
the rules of evidence for criminal prosecution, when different standards are often applied 
for each, e.g., differences in the required standards of proof: “preponderance of evidence” 
or “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
1. Respondeat Superior Vicarious Admission for an Interpreter-Assisted LEP Suspect?   
 It seems unfair and unreasonable, therefore, to impose the same respondeat 
superior legal liability standard on an LEP criminal suspect, for whom an interpreter is 
almost always a complete stranger, and who, being linguistically and culturally 
disadvantaged, will most likely have no idea of the enormous legal consequences of 
simple, human reactions such as, just “simply nodding affirmatively” or “showing an 
expression of relief or gratitude” at the sight of an interpreter who speaks the same 
language. 
 
2. FRE 801(d)(2)(E) Co-Conspirators’ Vicarious Admission: Similar Absurdity Noted  
 Similar unreasonableness or absurdity in using the same “vicarious admission” 
principle for criminal co-conspirators by FRE 801(d)(2)(E) has been pointed out by 
Judge Posner in United States v. DiDomenico,
113
 in which he wrote, “[t]his translation 
of commercial principles of agency into the law of evidence is one of the less impressive 
examples of what Coke called the ‘artificial reason’ of the law.”114   
 Judge Boudin in United States v. Goldberg also made a similar comment by 
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 Judge Posner further notes, “[t]he concern behind the hearsay principle is with the 
reliability of evidence rather than with the facilitation of enterprise—and anyway the law of 
conspiracy is designed to discourage rather than to facilitate enterprise.”  DiDomenico, id., 303.  
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noting that “analogy” deriving from “agency law” is “(as the Advisory Committee 
noted) at best a fiction… the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is of long standing and 
makes a difficult-to-detect crime easier to prove,”115 hinting that the theory application’s 
only justification is simply its pragmatic “expedience.” 
  
B. Long-Upheld Exigent Need Cannot Keep Justifying the Use of Irrational Legal Tool 
 Absurd as it may seem, this legal tool of vicarious admission in criminal 
prosecution involving an interpreter’s hearsay issue was invented out of necessity, since 
the traditional common law hearsay rule presented too high a bar for cases involving 
LEP suspects and witnesses.
116
 
 
1. Legal Invention Motivated by Exigent Needs     
 For instance, in numerous situations, but for the only extra layer placed by the 
interpreter, the suspect’s testimony might have been completely sound, with its 
admission into evidence seeming to have better served justice.
117
  When such 
circumstances arose repeatedly, some sort of persuasive legal theory had to be invented 
urgently.   
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 See, for example, Correa v. Superior Court of Orange County, 84 4th 631 (Cal. App. 
2000), 639, ruling in favor of strict application of hearsay rules, saying “[w]e are not unsympathetic 
to the inconvenience and burden our ruling may cause non-English-speaking witnesses and victims 
who will have to personally appear at preliminary hearings to testify.” 
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statements to the defendant, it would result in a largely arbitrary distinction between the admissibility 
of statements by English and non-English speakers and between non-English speakers who bring 
their own translator and those who do not,” Nazemian, id., 527.  
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 This urgent need for some kind of legal invention or measure has existed not 
only in the U.S.; all common-law jurisdictions in the world have struggled.  As has 
been mentioned already, Australia adopted the “language conduit” theory though it has 
also been criticized as a “legal fiction.”118  The U.K. made a decision in 1958 to abide 
by strict application of hearsay doctrine
119
 with a ruling that required prosecutors to 
make sure that their interpreters could and would testify in court if and when the court 
subpoenaed them.   
 In addition, foreign language needs in criminal justice administration are 
becoming increasingly diverse.
120
  Not using the current “agent-and-conduit theory” 
may seem unrealistic and unfeasible in today’s criminal prosecution with an increasing 
linguistic diversity.
121
 
 
2. Exigent Needs Cannot Justify an Irrational Legal Invention 
 Still exigent needs cannot continue to justify the use of an irrational legal 
invention, especially in light of the fact that some U.S. courts have faithfully abided by 
the strict common-law hearsay rules.   
 Judge Campbell of Courts of Appeals of Oregon in State of Oregon v. 
                                                   
 
118
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 “California's population continues to grow in number and diversity, with many 
languages spoken in our state.”  People v. Torres, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1248, 262 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Cal. 
App. 1989), 330.  
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Letterman,
122
 for instance, after mentioning those cases that had followed the strict 
traditional hearsay rule,
123
 also chose not to use the “agency theory” but to apply other 
“hearsay exceptions” in admitting “hearsay,” by stating that “[w]ere this court to adopt 
the rule stated in…Commonwealth v. Vose, there would be ample reason for deeming the 
interpreter to be the joint agent of both Officer Laudenback and defendant… Rather than 
rest the admissibility…on an implied agency, however, we find that the testimony is 
admissible because it satisfies the two requirements common to most, if not all, of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and (2) 
necessity for use of the out-of-court statement” (emphasis added).124   
 People v. Torres, on the other hand, called such cases that strictly abided by the 
traditional hearsay rules as mentioned in Letterman “ancient…no longer withstand[ing] 
legal scrutiny” with “brusque opinions” and “little analysis of the agency theory”125 
which no longer satisfactorily responded to the increasing demand to cope with the 
growing foreign-language speaking population.
126
  Unfortunately, this is more or less 
the view that continues to remain a position shared by a majority of courts in the U.S. 
 Having discussed all the involved exigent needs that have necessitated an 
expedient legal tool, however, the thesis concludes this chapter by contending that needs, 
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no matter how exigent, cannot continue to justify the use of an irrational legal theory.
  
 
 
Chapter IV 
Make Interpreters Genuine “Conduit” for FRE 801(d)(2)(A) 
 
A. Back to Common Sense: “Conduit (Accurate and Impartial)” Interpreter  
Needed by All 
 Just a speck of imagination can help us realize the magnitude of this problem in 
a common-sense perspective. 
    
1. Putting Oneself in an Imaginary Situation: Arrested in a Foreign Country    
 Let us imagine that you have been suddenly arrested and confined in a police 
interrogation room in some faraway foreign country.  You do not know their language, 
so you can neither understand nor read any of the cryptic foreign language written or 
spoken by the police officers around you.  You cannot call your family or friends as the 
cellphone has also been confiscated (or “snatched away”) for a reason that of course you 
did not understand when one of the officers was probably shouting the reason at you.  
You are feeling outraged, confused, and frightened all at the same time.  After a long, 
long wait, finally a person who speaks your language (albeit imperfectly, with a foreign 
accent) comes in and says he will be serving as your “interpreter.”  What other choices 
would you really and realistically have now than to try to start a line of communication 
with the surrounding officers through this “interpreter”?   
 Commencing a verbal exchange through this “interpreter” is no more than “a 
drowning man catching at a straw.”  Would you ever regard this act of “commencing a 
line of communication” as an unconditional acceptance of this “interpreter” as your
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“agent’ as if writing an unconditional “blank check,” an act that forces you to waive your 
right to later “verify the accuracy of his translation,” either by questioning him or her 
directly in court or by some other “objective means of accuracy verification,” before the 
court declares you guilty?  What, for example, if you had been arrested for possession 
of an illegal drug in a country where the highest punishment for this crime is death 
penalty? 
 
2. Everyone Wants an “Accurate and Impartial (Conduit)” Interpreter, Not an “Agent”  
 Just a miniscule of imagination in an LEP suspect’s shoes would be sufficient to 
realize that what would really matter ultimately for the administration of justice in an 
interpreter-assisted police interview is “accuracy and impartiality (or ‘conduit’)” which 
are verifiable, not some strange “agency relationship” that would mysteriously vacate 
the need for such accuracy verification.  This is true not only for the suspect but also 
for the police and the prosecutor, as misadministration of justice caused by evidence of 
substandard accuracy and reliability could be equally damaging to them as well.       
 A much more difficult issue that this thesis will discuss and try to resolve in the 
upcoming chapters is “how” to verify.  “Conduit” means “accuracy” and “impartiality,” 
and verification of “accuracy” and “impartiality” inevitably requires confrontation in this 
post-Crawford era.  Still, how can “accuracy” and “impartiality” be verified, i.e., by 
confronting whom and what?  Should it be done by cross-examining the very 
interpreter who served during the police interview, or should it be done by creating some 
other “independent evidence” by, for example, recording, transcribing, and 
authenticating the interpreter’s recorded translation by a separate, independent expert 
witness?  In order to discuss this very difficult question further, the thesis will now 
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present the “interpreter’s perspective and standpoint.”   
 
B. Interpreters: Trained to Serve as a “Conduit,” to Realize FRE 801(d)(2)(A) 
 Even in a world like today’s with an ever-increasing language diversity, few 
people really seem to know what professional interpreters are, how they do their work, 
or how they are trained.
127
 
  
1. Trained to Be a “Conduit,” to Be Identical with the Original Declarant   
 Though the “role of an interpreter” itself is one of the on-going academic 
subjects in the field of interpreting studies,
128
 one thing all professionally trained 
interpreters, especially those trained for legal interpreting, can testify to would be that 
they have been trained specifically to serve as an “accurate” and “impartial” language 
“conduit.”  Interpreters are specifically trained to contemporaneously translate a 
source-language statement into a target-language statement with an “identical” meaning, 
and this is where a fundamental difference resides between “ordinary hearsay” and 
“interpreter-translated” statements.  Interpreters are trained to instantaneously 
“reproduce” the declarant’s statement in the target language, with a professional 
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knowledge of what “linguistic equivalence (identical meaning)” in “interlingual 
translation” entails.  In other words, interpreters are specifically trained to enable the 
“original declarant” in the source language to also become the “declarant” in the target 
language.  
 This is why interpreters never use the “first person, singular pronoun” to refer 
to themselves.  When interpreters use the pronoun “I,” it always refers to the original 
declarant.
129
 When interpreters wish to refer to themselves, they use the expression “the 
interpreter,” which is in the third person.  What all this training indicates is that 
interpreters are trained to enable the “original declarant” in the source language to also 
become the “declarant” in the target language, endeavoring, if it is possible, to achieve 
the realization of FRE 801(d)(2)(A), as a truly accurate and impartial language 
“conduit.” 
 Though not exactly the same but similar examples can be found among 
newscasters who have been trained to read a news script verbatim with utmost accuracy 
or live sports reporters broadcasting every single movement of the athletes on the field 
with accuracy and contemporaneity.  An interpreter is specifically trained to deliver a 
contemporaneous (instantaneous or on-the-spot) translation from the source language to 
the target language with an “identical (equivalent)” meaning.  
 
2. An Interpreter Cannot Replace the Interviewing Police Officer 
 Since the interpreter’s only job is to keep translating, back-and-forth, with 
speed and accuracy, an interpreter cannot replace the interviewing police officer.  This 
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continuous “back-and-forth” interlanguage translation with required accuracy and speed 
occupies the interpreter’s cognitive faculty completely and maximally.  Interpreters can 
do no more, because they can do no less.       
 For this reason, even if an interpreter is to be summoned for an in-court 
testimony, the testimony would have to be of completely different nature from that of a 
police officer’s.  Interpreters cannot and should not be expected to “remember,” 
“memorize,” or “record” actual statements made by the suspect for the purpose of 
testifying to them; this is specifically a job of the interviewing police officer
130
  If 
subpoenaed, the best any interpreter could possibly do is to: a) testify to one’s 
qualifications and experience; b) testify that the translation was made accurately and 
faithfully to the best of the interpreter’s ability; and c) testify, if asked, as to why and 
how a particular expression was translated in the way the interpreter chose to translate.  
Anything more than these would be far beyond the capacity of a language interpreter. 
  Thus, while everyone would need and want a “conduit (accurate and impartial)” 
interpreter, still “how” to verify such accuracy and impartiality remains a very difficult 
issue, which this thesis will try to resolve.  Before answering this question, however, 
the thesis will next demonstrate that a “conduit” interpreter for the application of FRE 
801(d)(2)(A) is indeed in harmony with the copyright law on translation as well.
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Chapter V 
“Conduit” for FRE 801(d)(2)(A): in Harmony with Copyright Law on Translation 
 
 Though interpreting (oral) and translation (written) are fundamentally two very 
different activities,
131
 they also share common attributes, the most important of which is 
that both try to achieve “interlanguage equivalence.”  “Interlanguage equivalence” 
means “identicalness (equivalence)” of the “meaning” between the source-language 
statement and the target-language statement.   
 
A. Copyright Law’s Inferences for FRE 801(d)(2)(A) Original Declarant in Translation 
 In the field of the copyright law, this “identicalness” between the 
source-language work and the target-language work is what makes a “translation” a 
“derivative” work of the “original, copyrighted” work, enabling the “original” work’s 
copyright to also “legally bind” the “translation” as a derivative work of the original.   
 Both the Berne Convention and the U.S. Copyright Act recognize “translation 
work” as a “derivative (adaptive) work” of the “original.”132  Translation is 
copyrightable independently of the “original” but only as a “derivative” work of the 
copyrighted “original” work, and the “translation work” preserves with it the right of the 
author of the “original (underlying) work.”  This copyright law for a “translation” work
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reveals some interesting inferences to support the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A) for 
an “interpreter-translated English-language statement” of the “original declarant’s 
foreign-language statement.” 
  
1. Original Work’s Copyright in Translation: “Original Declarant” in Translated 
Statement   
 The copyright law on the “original (underlying) work’s copyright” in translation 
(the “derivative” of the “original”) stipulates as follows.  Translation as a derivative 
work requires a permission from the original work’s copyright owner.  When 
completed, the translation itself becomes copyrightable on its own, but this new 
copyright in the translation “covers only the additions, changes, or other new material 
appearing for the first time” in the translation and “does not extend to any preexisting 
material.”133  At the same time, the original work’s copyright does not become 
extended by the creation of its translation, so if and when the original work’s copyright 
expires, the original (underlying) work enters the public domain, which means that the 
elements in the translation that are the “pre-existing material” of the “original” also enter 
the public domain.   
 The translation’s copyright covering “the additions, changes, or other new 
material appearing for the first time” that were independent of the original work’s 
copyright will remain effective even after the original work enters the public domain, but 
of course this “translation’s independent copyright” only protects what the translator 
newly “added” or “changed,” not what the original work had as a “preexisting material” 
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that the original work’s copyright protected. 
 This thesis contends that the original work’s copyright that continues to exist in 
its translation is identical to the continued existence of the “original declarant” in a 
translated statement, with all the “protectible elements” of the “original” statement made 
by the “original” declarant remaining perfectly intact in its translation. 
  
2. Protectible and Unprotectible “Elements” in the “Original Work” 
 Then, what exactly are the “protectible elements” and “unprotectible elements” 
in the “original work”?  One of the most important principles of the copyright law is 
that the law protects only “expressions of ideas,” not “ideas or facts.”134  Then, what 
elements of the “original” become “protectible” or “unprotectible,” and how can we sort 
them out?  The best answer ever to this question was given by Judge Leaned Hand in 
the form of what is called an “abstraction test” which he demonstrated in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp.
135
  He described the process as follows. 
  “[A] great number of patterns of increasing generality” appears as “more and 
more of the incident is left out” until we get “no more than the most general statement of 
what the play is about” or just its “title.”136  “[I]n this series of abstractions,” we reach a 
point where “they are no longer protected,” because “otherwise the playwright could 
prevent the use of his ‘ideas’ to which, apart from their expressions” his copyright never 
extends.
137
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 Nicholas was a case about whether or not copyright infringement had taken 
place between two plays, and Judge Learned Hand used the above “abstraction test” to 
determine the boundary between “unprotectible elements,” such as “universal concepts 
and stock characters” and more original “protectible elements.”  A similar “abstraction 
test” was carried out more recently in the same Second Circuit to determine whether an 
English economic news article had infringed on the copyright of a Japanese economic 
news article, which provides very interesting insights into the determination of “original 
declarant” in the “translated statement.”  
 
3. Nihon Keizai v. Comline: Protectible Elements of Original Work in Translation  
 The issue in Nihon Keizai v. Comline
138
 was whether the defendant (Comline)’s 
“English articles,” which the plaintiff (Nihon Keizai) alleged were merely “translations 
without the plaintiff’s permission,” infringed on the plaintiff’s copyright.  The 
defendant insisted that their English “articles” only used “facts” obtained from the 
original Japanese articles, and thus were not infringing.  In order to discern whether the 
protectible elements of the original work were detectable in the English “articles,” Judge 
Cote conducted the “abstraction test” and found the following. 
 While Comline articles were “usually shorter” and often “omit[ted] certain facts 
and information,”  Comline articles: 1) used the same “structure and organization”; 2) 
used the same “chronological and substantive grouping of facts”; 3) used the same 
“conclusions or resolutions”; 4) and often used “identical phraseology and word 
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choice.”139  Thus, Comline appropriated Nihon Keizai’s: 1) “means (manners) of 
expression,” 2) “organizational structuring,” and 3) “marshaling of facts.”140 
 Nikkei v. Comline ruling shows very interesting inferences for the determination 
of the “identicalness (conduit)” of the interpreted statement to the suspect’s original 
statement for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A).  If an interpreter not only conveys 
the “facts” accurately but also “faithfully retains” in the English translation the 
above-listed “protectible elements” of “the suspect (the original declarant)’s statement in 
the foreign language,” then the English translation can fairly be deemed “identical” to 
“the original declarant’s statement,” because the said translated statement is now deemed 
so “identical” to the suspect’s original foreign-language statement that it would even 
invoke “copyright infringement.” 
 
B. Protectible Elements of Translation’s Copyright Independent of the Original 
 Then, the next important questions are: 1) what does an interpreter’s translated 
statement has that the suspect’s original statement did not have?; and b) would this 
difference invalidate the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A)? 
 If a translation is to become copyrightable as a derivative work of the original, 
the translation must have “a certain level of creativity”141 that would constitute its own 
protectible elements.  This, of course, does not mean that a translation must become 
“different” from the original work to the extent that it no longer qualifies to be a 
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translation, e.g., turning into some other type of “adaptive” work, such as a children’s 
picture book of Charles Dickens.
142
  Here, the key factor is that a translation always 
“requires a level of choice between different alternatives.”143 
   The thesis contends that the required “creativity” in translation or interpretation 
is the “added value” by the translator or the interpreter, which entails: a) making 
accurate comprehension judgement on the source language statement from among 
numerous possible interpretation choices of its semantic and pragmatic meaning; and b) 
making the best possible choices of lexical items, syntactic structures, discourse patterns, 
etc., in the target language to create a target language rendition that is equivalent to the 
source language statement. 
   In the case of an interpreter, these linguistic judgements and choices must be 
made instantaneously, which of course requires many years of training and experience.  
Without this “added value” created by an interpreter, the target-language rendition would 
become just like a “free translation software-generated” translation, the quality of which 
is usually unacceptable, with a text so undecipherable and incomprehensible with 
mechanical misinterpretations and mischoices of words.  This is where a professionally 
trained translator or an interpreter becomes indispensable, and in an interpreter-assisted 
police interview, if the interpreter is a genuine “conduit,” such professional linguistic 
judgements and choices are the only thing that becomes added by the interpreter to the 
original declarant (the suspect)’s statements.   No more or no less.
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Chapter VI 
Police Interpreter Issues: Qualifications, Competence, and Impartiality (Bias) 
 
 In Chapter V, supra, the thesis explained that to determine whether the 
copyright on the “expressions” of the original work extends to the “expressions” used in 
a different language, and thus making it a “translation” of the original, the key factor is 
the “identicalness or sameness” in the “means (manners) of expression,”144 the 
realization of which requires truly professional expertise.  This chapter, therefore, will 
examine whether such expertise is existent in the current police interpreting in the U.S. 
 
A. Qualifications: Professional Training to Become a High Quality “Conduit” 
 The field of study that is devoted to a scientific analysis of the “same meaning” 
between two languages is called “Translation and Interpretation Studies.”  Though 
translation is usually regarded more an art than a science,
145
 this, in a sense, can be said 
about almost any professional occupation that requires high-level skills that can only be 
acquired through professional training and long-time experience, including doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, engineers, teachers, athletes, and so on.
146
  Just as the curriculum,
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training, and certification of these professionals are based on long-established theoretical 
principles in each field of science, so is and must be the training of professional 
interpreters.  The academic field that specializes in this training is the above-mentioned 
“Translation and Interpretation Studies,”147 originally a sub-field of linguistics but is 
now growing as an independent interdisciplinary study, encompassing even such fields 
as cognitive science.
148
  This academic discipline is specifically devoted to the 
scientific analysis of the “sameness” of the “meaning” in interlingual translation, and 
based on such scientific findings and theories this discipline trains professional 
interpreters. 
 Only with such professional training, an interpreter can serve in court or testify 
as an “expert witness” about the translation accuracy in question.  An adequately 
trained interpreter can make more adequate linguistic judgements and choices than 
otherwise, and render translations in the target language by: a) maintaining “style, 
register, manner of speech,” using “closest English equivalents for idiomatic expressions 
or conveying the meaning directly if no exact idiomatic expression is found,” avoiding 
“errors and misstatements.”149 
 Just as only professionally trained and legally certified doctors, and not “witch 
doctors and faith healers,”150 should be allowed to perform medical operations, only 
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professionally trained interpreters should be used at every stage of criminal justice, 
upstream or downstream.  
 
B. Interpreters in Police Interviews: Qualification Issue 
 Unfortunately, the need for using properly trained professional interpreters is 
still under-recognized in the upstream of criminal justice administration in the U.S., 
especially in police interviews, as is evidenced by the fact that even the definition of the 
“same meaning (accuracy)” in interlingual translation becomes vastly loose when it 
comes to police interviews.    
 
1. The Status Quo of Police Interview Interpreters: Untrained Interpreters   
 In United States v. Zambrana,
151
 the court ruled that “a foreign language 
translation is sufficiently accurate to assist the jury if the translation reasonably conveys 
the intent or idea of the thought spoken” (emphasis added),152 and that “a translation of 
most foreign languages to English (and vice versa) can never convey precisely and 
exactly the same idea and intent comprised in the original text” (emphasis added).153   
 In Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State,
154
 the court ruled that the police interpreter’s 
translation, which had not been “word-for-word” with many additions and omissions,155 
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were nonetheless admissible, citing State v. Sanchez-Diaz
156
 in which though 47 
translation errors were found in the videotaped police interview played for the jury,
157
 
the Minnesota Supreme Court still ruled that “the majority of the translation errors were 
minor, and none of the errors, whether minor or significant, changed the fundamental 
nature of the appellant's confession.”158 
 
2. Legislative and Judicial Failure #1: Continuous Indifference and Neglect   
 One major reason for this very unideal status quo is that the Court Interpreters 
Act in the U.S. has never been extended to cover all judicial stages, caused by a judicial 
and legislative failure or neglect, despite the fact that the U.S. was a forerunner in the 
institutionalization of “court interpreters” with an establishment of a federal certification 
system.   
 In 1970, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made a landmark ruling 
overturning a murder conviction of Rogelio Negrón, a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican in 
U.S. ex rel Negrón v. New York.
159
  The reason for the acquittal was that no interpreter 
had been provided to make Negrón “meaningfully present” during his trial, which was a 
violation of Negrón’s Sixth Amendment rights.  This ruling motivated Congress to 
legislate the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, which required all the federal courts to use 
federally certified, competent, and impartial interpreters (“certified and otherwise 
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qualified interpreters),
160
 providing a model framework for state courts subsequently. 
 However, a big problem remained.  The 1978 Act applies only to “Court” 
interpreters and has never been extended to the “upstream” criminal justice process.  
Covering only “downstream” due process rights, no additional provision was ever made 
for competent and impartial interpreters in the “upstream” stage, leaving no rules for 
interpreters for a police interview following an LEP suspect’s arrest.  This is a grave 
problem since access to an accurate and impartial interpreter at this initial stage of 
criminal proceedings is “more significant than…in court proceedings”161 as the 
information obtained at this stage will become critical evidence in trial.  Examples of 
harm caused by this absence of an adequate law extends from numerous rights 
infringements of LEP suspects,
162
 such as failed Miranda administrations, use of 
incompetent quasi interpreters, coerced confessions taking advantage of LEP suspects’ 
vulnerability caused by the linguistic barrier.
163
 
 
3. Courts Continuously Inferred “Legislative Intent” for the Law’s Absence   
 This indifference has been demonstrated not only by the legislature but also by 
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the judiciary.  In 1983, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. 
Carrillo
164
 stated the following in their ruling.   
 The Pennsylvania Law 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8701 required “qualified and trained 
interpreters (certified by the National or Local Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf or 
similar registry) for the Deaf” in interrogation and criminal proceedings, with an oath.  
However, the “Legislature has not seen fit to extend the use of an interpreter to criminal 
proceedings, specifically interrogations where a suspect has difficulty speaking or 
understanding the English language.  In light of the law covering the deaf, it is not 
presumptuous to say that the General Assembly has specifically eschewed the enactment 
of similar legislation in regard to non-English-speaking persons subject to 
interrogation.”165 
 The Carrillo court further stated that to require the use of “official, licensed 
interpreters” is impractical and unfeasible because: 1) it is costly; and also 2) waiting for 
the interpreter’s arrival may lead to a violation of the 6-hour rule in Commonwealth v. 
Davenport
166
 (inculpatory statements’ suppressibility).167  The court concluded by 
adjudicating that [police] interpreter qualifications “do not reach constitutional 
proportions,”168 and that, therefore, it was “better to let [‘]Legislature[’] deal with this 
                                                   
 
164
 Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 319 Pa. Super. 115; 465 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 1983), 
127-133.  
 
        
165
 Commonwealth v. Carrillo, id., 128. 
 
 
166
 Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1977).  
 
 
167
 The “6-hour rule” refers to the police’s post-arrest time-limit of “suppressibility of 
inculpatory statements.”  Commonwealth v. Carrillo, id., 133. 
 
 
168
 Commonwealth v. Carrillo, id., 131. 
 
70 
 
 
issue.”169 
 Similarly, in 2006 Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State
170
 repeated Pennsylvania’s 
Carrillo in their ruling, stating that the Nevada Revised Statutes stipulate qualified 
interpreter for the deaf, but not for non-English-speakers.
171
  The court stated, “We 
interpret the absence of such provisions… as the Legislature’s specific intention to 
[‘]eschew the enactment of similar legislation[’],”172 and concluded by saying that 
“police interviews need not be conducted by an independent interpreter.”173  
 
C. Interpreters in Police Interviews: Impartiality (Bias) Issue 
 The preceding section discussed the “translation accuracy” problems rampant in 
police interviews.  This section will look at another, equally problematic issue 
surrounding police interview interpreters, namely “impartiality” or “bias.”  
 
1. Interpreters Can Be Impeached for Bias 
 Though the FRE itself has no provision for “bias” impeachment, impeachment 
of witnesses is possible by Abel.
174
  If an interpreter is to be impeached, the following 
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would be relevant as possible impeachment questions.  Is this interpreter: 1) a relative 
or a close friend of either party?
175
 2) under “some sort of hold,” e.g. threat?176 3) given 
a promise of a reward e.g. monetary, financial, material etc.?
177
 4) holding a “grudge” 
against either party?
178
 5) hoping to “receive leniency in a pending criminal case”?179 
6) being paid by either party?
180
 7) “a member of an organization that is interested in the 
lawsuit”?181 8) holding a “financial interest” in the case’s outcome?182 
 
2. Paid by the Police (Directly or Indirectly): “Bias Gray Zone”   
 Among the above eight questions, perhaps the most conspicuous one would be 
the sixth question about “pay” or remuneration.  Under the current system, all 
interpreters who serve in a police interview must be paid by the police, directly or 
indirectly, which technically put them in the “gray zone.”  Interpreters who serve in 
police interviews are either: a) a “bilingual police officer” (an employee of the police) 
serving as an interpreter; or b) an outside interpreter either employed and paid by an 
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interpreting service company (which has a business contract with the police) or working 
completely as a free-lance paid directly by the police.  As has been mentioned in 
Chapter II, B-1, supra, at least one court, the D. C. Appellate Court, has clearly 
articulated, “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”183  It is an undeniable fact that there 
is always a strong financial “tie” between the police organization and a police interpreter 
in terms of: 1) “pay” in the form of a salary or a reward, and 2) potential promise of 
continued requests for the interpreting job (in the case of outside interpreters).   
 Not only that, police interpreters, whether a police employee or a non-employee, 
may also share the police department’s organizational interest, which may concern the 
seventh and eighth questions mentioned in Chapter VI (this chapter), C-1, supra.  
Usually a suspect is arrested because the police believe there is a “probable cause” that 
the suspect has committed a crime.  If the suspect does not become indicted or 
convicted, it gets added to the police’s “false arrest” log, which works negatively on the 
organizational image.
184
 
 An often-heard counterargument, of course, is that continued financial gain is 
only possible if the police become “truly satisfied” with the interpreter’s performance, 
which derives only from the interpreter’s “accurate and reliable (impartial)” translation. 
 
D. Police Officers as Interpreters: Competence (Accuracy) and Impartiality (Bias) Issues 
 Before further continuing the discussion on “bias,” it is important to address 
                                                   
 
183
 Ko v. United States, 694 A.2d 73 (D.C. App.1997), 83.  Also, see fn. 88 and fn. 98, 
supra. 
 
 
184
 It is “natural to suppose that [arresting officer serving in court as interpreter] would be 
anxious to justify his former action.”  Gonzales v. State, 372 A.2d 191 (Supreme Court of Delaware 
1977), 193. 
  
73 
 
 
that the fundamental and continuing problem in police interpreting in the U.S. resides in 
the police organizations’ continued use of their own employees as interpreters.  Though 
this is not a practice unique to the U.S.,
185
 in light of the fact that there are also other 
common-law jurisdictions in the world, such as the U.K. and Australia that practice a 
“strict rule” of using “a publicly funded independent interpreter” for “objectivity and 
impartiality” purposes,186 and also of the fact that this practice has been strongly and 
unanimously criticized by interpreting scholars and professionals in the U.S.,
187
 further 
discussion in this chapter probably merits a more focus specifically on “police officers 
serving as interpreters.” 
 
1. Common Arguments Supporting the Use of Bilingual Police Officers as Interpreters 
 Using “putatively bilingual police employees” as ad hoc interpreters has been 
and will continue to be a controversial issue, as those who criticize the practice see grave 
harm deriving from “(lack of) competence” and “(absence of) impartiality” problems.  
Still, the courts in the U.S. have consistently approved the practice.  They usually 
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present the following arguments either negating the possible existence of “bias” in police 
interpreters or justifying the practice for other reasons.   
 Perhaps the most common argument denying “bias” is that the officer, who has 
been assigned to do the interpreting work, is only serving as an impartial “language 
conduit” interpreter.188  It is often the case, however, that the only proof the police can 
offer for the asserted impartiality is the officer’s own sworn testimony that “he truly 
believes that he translated impartially.”  Accordingly, if the asserted “impartiality” is 
based on the assumed “conduit” nature of the officer’s translation, then “impartiality” 
cannot be proven until “accuracy” is verified. 
  Another frequently used argument is that using police employees more 
effectively serves exigent and urgent police needs,
189
 which is an 
“end-justifies-the-means” argument.  It is certainly true that post-arrest “custodial 
interrogation” must be conducted within 48 hours.  However, there are also other 
common-law jurisdictions in the world, such as the U.K. and Australia that practice a 
“strict rule” of using “a publicly funded independent interpreter” for “objectivity and 
impartiality” purposes, “even if a police officer or legal representative of a suspect is 
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bilingual and able to interpret.”190  As for the maximally allowed detention time, the 
pre-charge maximum in the U.K. for non-terrorist suspects is 4 days,
191
 while many 
jurisdictions in Australia use a “reasonable time” rule, the maximum of which is still 
within 24 hours in most cases.
192
 
 Another “end-justifies-the-means” argument is that police employees will be 
more readily available as an in-court witness, which is certainly true.  However, even if 
they can take the witness stand, their “translation accuracy” and “impartiality” can be 
proven only indirectly by their own self-belief and self-assertion.  
 Still another “end-justifies-the-means” argument is that using “in-house” 
bilingual officers is more cost-efficient.  It may indeed be true, as guarantee of 
accuracy (quality) usually comes with a price.  It may also be true that in almost every 
venue in our life, not just about the issues concerning indigent LEP suspects, the 
not-very-well-kept-secret is the principle that “beggars can’t be choosers.”  However, it 
is also a fact that such “cost debate” can become futilely inconclusive and often 
meaningless, as it is usually impossible to mathematically compare the benefit of 
“short-term” cost saving against the “long-tem” social benefit of improved human rights 
protection in criminal justice proceedings.  This concerns not only the U.S. but also the 
rest of the whole world, including Japan, the home country of the author of this thesis.  
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 Still even another similar cost argument is that whether the interpreter is a 
police employee or a publicly-funded interpreter, the ultimate budget source is the 
tax-payers’ money, so fundamentally there is no real difference.  It is definitely true that 
as long as the funds for providing a language interpreter come from the government, 
tax-payers ultimately bear the cost.  However, the same would become true of “court 
interpreters,” who, as “officers of the court,” are paid by each court which is supported 
by the tax-payers’ money.  Nevertheless, just like judges, court interpreters are usually 
regarded as “impartial,” abiding by the Court Interpreters Act.193 
 
2. Competence Issue   
 What then would be some of the major arguments against using police officers 
as interpreters?  The first and foremost is the competence issue, namely unclear 
qualifications and skill.  There is a huge difference between being “(putatively) 
bilingual” and being capable of providing professionally acceptable interpreting 
service,
194
 the former often resulting in an occurrence of numerous translation errors, 
both noticed or unnoticed. 
 An expected response to this, however, would be that if the problem is 
“inadequately low skill,” that can be overcome by more in-house training.195  Also 
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some argue that using outside interpreters hired by private companies does not 
automatically guarantee quality-assured service with adequate-level skill, since many 
private companies often “hire bilinguals who lack training, experience, knowledge and 
skills” either to meet the market demand or to cut costs,196 which also may very well be 
true, not only in the U.S. but also elsewhere in the world.  As long as there is no legal 
provision about required qualifications, the competence of interpreters in police 
interviews can never be guaranteed, in-house or outside. 
 
3. Bias and Coercion: Footing Shifts   
 Another major, and perhaps a more critically important argument against using 
in-house police interpreters is “bias,” and here, many interpreting specialists have 
pointed out “footing shifts,” that the interpreter’s “footing” changes between that of “an 
interrogating officer” and that of “an interpreter.”  Many research observations have 
revealed that bilingual police officers are inclined to become “partial” by subtle changes 
of “footing” while interpreting, between that of a “mere, impartial interpreter” and that 
of a “member of the interrogation team,” imposing coercion.197  
 Regarding such “bias” claims, courts have consistently required clear and 
undeniable evidence showing the existence of such “bias,” ruling that “[p]olice 
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interpreters should not be presumed biased absent a showing from the record,”198 or that 
“[i]n the absence of some evidence from which prejudice can be inferred”199 police 
officers acting as interpreters cannot be found biased . 
 
4. Double “Impartiality” Standard 
 Another strong criticism against the use of in-house police interpreters is the 
“double standard,” which is an “impartiality” standard favoring the police.  While 
“impartiality” and “conflict of interest” are clearly written in every “code of ethics” for 
“court interpreters” as “explicit warnings,” and while court interpreters are required to 
“disclose immediately if the interviewee or immediate family is known or related,”200 
the same standard is not required for police officers acting as police interpreters. 
 A possible counter-response, of course, would be that the administrative goal of 
“courts” and “police” are not exactly identical, and that police interviews are under 
exigent time pressure, while more preparation time is allowed for courts.  They might 
also argue that just because the standard is less strict, it does not necessarily follow that 
therefore police officers acting as police interpreters are actually “biased,” without 
evidence showing otherwise. 
 
E. Court Rulings on Police Interpreter Bias: Extremely Few (and Mostly Old) 
 This section will present major court rulings in the U.S. which specifically 
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addressed the in-house police interpreters’ bias, which, unfortunately, are rather few and 
often old.  Perhaps the two landmark rulings that straightforwardly addressed this issue 
are Gonzales v. State
201
 (Supreme Court of Delaware 1977) and a more recent case in 
Illinois, State v. Carmona-Olvara
202
 (Ill. App. 2005). 
 In Gonzales v. State,
203
 the officer who had arrested the defendant also served 
as an interpreter at the trial, which led to the court to rule that “[w]e hold that there is an 
inherent possibility of bias, and a violation of due process rights, whenever an arresting 
police officer is called upon to serve as the defendant’s interpreter at trial.”204  Gonzales 
also cited the following related precedents. 
 In Mislik v. State
205
 (Ind. 1896), cited in Ganzales, the arresting officer acted as 
an interpreter, but did not properly explain a guilty plea or a right to an attorney; instead 
he told the defendant to just say he was there when the theft occurred.  The Mislik court 
ruled that “[i]t may not be out of place to refer again to the impropriety of permitting an 
officer to act as interpreter for an accused person in whose arrest or detention the officer 
has actively participated.”206  
 In Bielich v. State
207
(Ind. 1920), also cited in Ganzales, the police officer did 
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not explain a guilty plea or a right to counsel properly, and the court ruled that “[t]he 
person acting as interpreter in such a case should be entirely free from any suspicion of 
interest in either the conviction or acquittal of the party accused.”208 
     McGuire v. State
209
 (Ind. 1950), still another citation in Ganzales, cited Mislik 
and Bielich, saying that it was “natural to suppose that [arresting officer serving in court 
as interpreter] would be anxious to justify his former action.”210 
 In a more recent case in Illinois, State v. Carmona-Olvara
211
 (Ill. App. 2005), 
the arresting police officer who questioned the suspect in Spanish mistranslated the 
suspect’s statement conversely.  A statement that really meant “I don’t know anything” 
was translated as “I don’t know. I just did it.”212  The court ruled, “This case involves a 
real possibility of [‘]bias or partiality[’ ] affecting the interpreter's translation of 
defendant's words.”213 
 
“Impartiality” Proof May Have to Be Subsumed into “Accuracy” Proof   
 What we can observe from these very few precedents about “bias” is that 
perhaps the only way to prove “bias” is through the resulting “biased, inaccurate 
translation” examples. 
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 The use of “bilingual police officers” or “police-hired interpreters” is never 
ideal, especially in light of the fact that other common-law jurisdictions such as the U.K. 
and Australia are practicing the use of “publicly funded independent interpreter[s].”214  
In the U.S., however, this particular “debate” remains rather “circular” and 
“inconclusive,” as was shown in Chapter VI (this chapter), D, supra. 
 Courts’ consistent (and insistent) rulings and stance show leniently generous 
standard for accuracy.  For examples, errors, no matter how numerous, do not 
constitute material harm if they are minor and peripheral, and if the officer can basically 
communicate in both languages, the conditions are met. 
 As for impartiality, courts have required tangible proof actually demonstrating 
“bias,” saying that just because the interpreter is a police officer, it does not 
automatically mean that he or she is biased, in the absence of clear proof showing actual 
“bias,” such as the arresting officer’s converse mistranslation of “I don’t know anything” 
into “I don’t know.  I just did it.”215 
 Considering all this, it might be adequate to contend that “partiality (bias)” 
verification may have to be subsumed into “accuracy” verification based on the premise 
that “bias” can cause “translation” in favor of the police, or that really tangible harm that 
can be caused by “bias” is “inaccurate translation” against the suspect’s favor.216
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Chapter VII 
Make Truly “Conduit (Accurate and Impartial)” Interpreting Possible and Verifiable 
 
 The post-Crawford Confrontation Clause requires in-court verification of 
evidence reliability through cross-examination.  In light of this, this chapter will 
discuss the best way to verify interpreters’ “conduit” translation. 
  
A. The Best Way to Verify Interpreter’s “Conduit (Accurate and Impartial)” Translation 
 The most logical solution would be to simply subpoena the very interpreter to 
be cross-examined, which even now is sometimes done in many courts when a very 
specific translation by the police interpreter has become a key issue. 
 Actually, however, that precisely shows the limitation of this current approach, 
as it is based on the old premise that “normally, no verification is necessary,” for the 
reason that the said police interpreter is an “agent” or “conduit” with “prima facie” 
accurate translation.  Still, an even more critical problem in resorting to “just 
summoning the police interpreter” is that the information obtainable from this 
interpreter’s “memory” is rather limited, as was explained in Chapter IV, B-2, supra.  
During an interview, the interpreter is completely occupied with the contemporaneous 
interpreting work, and there is no room for remembering the details of what the suspect
83 
 
 
actually stated.
217
  Interpreters’ memory mechanism just does not work that way.218  
Even with a professionally qualified interpreter, the continuous “back-and-forth” 
interlanguage translation with required accuracy and speed occupies the whole cognitive 
faculty completely and maximally, for which reason, even if an interpreter is to be 
summoned for an in-court testimony, the interpreter cannot and should not be expected 
to “remember” all the statements in both languages verbatim as if they had been 
“memorized” or “recorded,” let alone to testify to the actual “testimonial statements” to 
be admitted into evidence, which precisely is the job of an investigating police officer.
219
 
     
“Accuracy” of Translation: Difficult to Verify by Just Cross-Examining the Interpreter 
 If subpoenaed, an interpreter could at best testify only to: 1) interpreter’s 
qualifications and experience; 2) that “he or she truthfully believes” that “he or she 
translated accurately”; 3) explanations on “some” specific translation issues, as to why 
and how a particular expression was translated in the way the interpreter chose to 
translate.  
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 Why would these be insufficient?  First, “qualifications” and “experience” are 
only indirect and partial proof.  They are, of course, of valuable importance, as this 
thesis has already emphasized, since truly “high quality” performance can only be 
attained through many years of training and experience.  Unfortunately, however, this 
proposition does not work the other way.  Just because a person has had many years of 
training, this does not automatically guarantee quality performance.  Accuracy can only 
be verified through direct verification of the performance itself.   
 Second, the interpreter’s sworn testimony on his or her sincere belief in one’s 
own performance is also only an indirect, subjective proof, which still would not resolve 
the next, third question, a “specific” interpretation or translation issue.  
 “Specific issues” arise as a “discrepancy” between the police officer’s 
testimony and the defendant’s memory as a result of any one of the following causes: 1) 
the defendant said something different and the interpreter mistranslated it, still believing 
in the accuracy of the mistranslation; 2) the defendant said something different, and the 
interpreter agrees that “if that really had been what the defendant had said, yes, the 
translation would have been an error,” but the interpreter still believes that that was not 
what the defendant had said during the interview; 3) the interpreter insists that the 
translation was accurate although he now feels that the defendant may have said 
something different, and that the translation may have been inaccurate, but there is no 
way to ascertain which was true; 4) the defendant is “mis-remembering” what he had 
said, and the interpreter actually translated the defendant’s statement accurately; 5) the 
defendant, though knowing the translation was accurate, wants to change what he had 
told the police officer by simply lying; and 6) still many more possible patterns and 
combinations.  When such issues arise, how can the trier of fact verify the truth? 
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B. Recording, Transcribing, and Translation-Authenticating: Only Way That Benefits All 
 The thesis will contend that the answer to the question in the previous section is 
the introduction of digital video recording of the entire interview, accompanied by a 
transcription of the translation authenticated by a certified interpreter, which ultimately 
will benefit all the parties by better meeting their needs. 
 
1. Mandatory Digital Video-Recording of Entire Interview: Only Way That Saves All  
 The LEP suspect will be protected not only from potential verballing caused by 
inaccuracy but also from other potential coerced confessions.  The interpreter can 
concentrate on the original mission of contemporaneous, faithful translation work, and 
also will be protected from any potential false accusation of mistranslation.  As for the 
police and the prosecutor, they can better prevent crucial confession evidence from 
getting rejected due to unfortunate interpretation issues.  They can also obtain a hard 
evidential record of the suspect’s confession to guard against the suspect’s future denial.  
More importantly, they can better concentrate on questioning by being relieved from 
taking copious notes during the interview
220
 and will be protected from potential false 
accusation of coercion.    
  As for courts, the trier of fact can base their judgment on much more direct and 
tangible evidence, and higher courts will not have to waste time on an otherwise 
unnecessary plain error hearsay review made by the defense counsel who has, either 
negligently or strategically, bypassed actual translation accuracy verification.      
     In addition to all the above, the quality of police interpreters can be expected to 
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improve.
221
  Just like court interpreters, the performance of police interview interpreters 
will be exposed to the public eye much more openly, requiring them to pass a higher 
muster, and this scrutinizing process will gradually “separate the goats from the sheep,” 
enabling the public a more direct check on potential “bias” as well. 
 
2. Legislative/Judicial Failure #2: the U.S. Lagging Behind in Mandatory Recording 
 Other common-law jurisdictions have long since been practicing this as a 
regular or required procedure.
222
  In the U.K., recording has been required since the 
enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), Code E.  Ireland 
required practice by the 1997 promulgation in the Criminal Justice Act of 1984, §27.  
In Australia, recording has been required in all jurisdictions since about 1990, and in 
New Zealand, recording has been strongly recommended by the Ministry of Justice. 
 In Canada, too, recording has been strongly recommended by court rulings.  R. 
v. Richards [1997] 87 B.C.A.C. 21 (1997) ruled that “making contemporaneous 
recordings of custodial interrogations is highly desirable,”223 and R. v. Ducharme [2004] 
MBCA 29, 182 C.C.C. (3d) 243; R. v. Groat [2006] BCCA 27 stated that “failure to 
record electronically a formal police interview, when there is no good reason not to, may 
raise suspicions and present obstacles to the Crown in its efforts to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a statement given to a person in authority was voluntary.”224 
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 The following information is from: Thomas P. Sullivan, “Compendium: Electronic 
Recording of Custodial Interrogations”  (July 11, 2014: Last Update), 
www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/Download Asset. aspx?id= 33287, 260-265. 
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 In the U.S., however, as of August, 2015, recording is required by only 22 
states.
225
  Among them, only 14 States and D.C. require recording by legislation, which 
are: Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia.  In 7 States, recording is stipulated by state Supreme Court rulings, which 
are: Alaska, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.  
In addition to these states, about 1,000 individual jurisdictions practice recording by 
voluntary polices, and more than two-third populations in 4 additional states are 
protected by recording done either by policy or practice, which are: Arizona, Hawaii, 
Rhode Island, and Utah. 
 As for Federal agencies, only since 2014, recording has finally been put into 
practice but only in certain types of crime interrogations by federal agencies.
226
  The 
thesis will particularly point out that the three major immigrant states, namely California, 
Florida, and New York, are still not included in the above, and in Japan, the home 
country of the author of this thesis, is very sadly further behind all of these nations 
mentioned so far.
227
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 In Japan, recent reports of numerous brutal power abuses by law-enforcement 
interrogators prompted the Justice Ministry to set up a new advisory panel in 2011, which was to 
specifically address these problems.  However, introduction of mandatory recording has faced a 
strong opposition from the law enforcement, and currently only about 3 percent of all criminal cases, 
or only 17.2 percent of those which go to lay judge trials are being recorded.  See “Police Expand 
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3. Technology is Readily Available in the 21st Century: Just like DNA   
 The phonograph, the first recording device in history, was invented by Thomas 
Edison in 1877,
228
 twelve years after the first “agency theory” ruling and only fifteen 
years before the first “dual agency theory” ruling in the U.S.229  Since then, the  
sound-recording technology has undergone revolutionary innovations and advancement, 
just like the DNA technology, and in this 21st century, highly advanced digital video 
recording technology and devices are readily available and accessible at a significantly 
affordable cost. 
 Just like the DNA technology advancement has changed the criminal justice 
administration dramatically, recording police interviews is the only way to make a 
breakthrough in this more-than-a-century-old “hearsay” debate on an 
“interpreter-assisted” extrajudicial testimony.  The use of the recording technology has 
led to at least one acquittal of a Japanese woman after 10 years of imprisonment in 
Melbourne, Australia, which had resulted from a false conviction that was greatly due to 
inadequate interpreting.  The acquittal was realized because recordings of all judicial 
proceedings, including the very first interrogation by a law-enforcement officer at the 
airport existed.
230
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Recording of Entire Interrogations,” Japan Times, April 23, 2015. 
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 “History of the Cylinder Phonograph,” The Library of Congress, Congress.gov United 
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 In this so-called “Melbourne Case,” a long, laborious appeal to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an effort made by a team of more than 50 Japanese lawyers 
and about 10 forensic linguists and interpreting specialists finally brought about this acquittal.  For 
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 Not using such recording technology despite the increasing availability and 
accessibility of the technology and equipment is simply no longer justifiable.  Already 
in 1990, Justice David Doherty of the Supreme Court in Canada ruled that an unrecorded 
confession was inadmissible as evidence, stating, “In this day and age, where the 
technology associated with audio recording (if not video recording) is readily available, 
very reliable, relatively inexpensive and usable even by the electronically illiterate such 
as myself, it is difficult to understand why a permanent video or audio record of the 
interview process was not made”231  
 
4. Recording, Transcribing, and Authenticating the Interpreter’s Translation   
 Digital audio-visual recording technology, transcribing equipment and software, 
qualified interpreting experts, etc. to “authenticate” accuracy are more readily available 
and accessible than were in the 19th century, when the original “agency” theory was 
invented.   
 Actually, many jurisdictions are already starting to practice the use of recording, 
transcription, authentication, or making alternative translations, in a number of cases 
involving LEP suspects and or victims.  Not making full use of the already available 
means and resources, therefore, seems simply no longer acceptable.  Also, this is the 
only but also perhaps the best way to “scrutinize” police interpreters, to gradually and 
naturally weed out “incompetent” and or “biased” interpreters, by exposing their 
                                                                                                                                                      
an English article summarizing this incident, see Andrew Rule, “How a Holiday Turned into 10 Years 
Jail” (August 17, 2002) http://www. theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/16/1029114015888.html 
(Retrieved on November 26, 2015). 
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 Kirk Makin, “Unrecorded Confessions at Risk of Being Thrown Out, Judge Says,” 
Globe and Mail (May 17, 1990). 
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performance to the fact-trier’s eyes and ears, a natural way to “separate the goats from 
the sheep.” 
 
C. Mandatory “Video-Recording” as Authenticated Evidence 
 This section will discuss some of the key issues in the actual practice of 
video-recording and authentication. 
 
1. Mandatory Video-Recording: Additional Notes   
 As for the choice between “audio-recording” and “video-recording,” the thesis 
contends that “video” is strongly preferable to “audio.”  The following section will 
explain the reasons as well as “video” specific reminders. 
  First, for transcribers and translation authenticators, “video” helps to prevent 
speaker misidentification in a multi-participant interview.  Also, being able to see the 
actual speakers helps to more correctly catch otherwise near-unintelligible or 
near-inaudible utterances. 
 Second, for the triers-of-fact, “video” is definitely more helpful to understand 
the actual exchange between or among the participants with much more ease.  More 
importantly, facial expressions and other non-verbal expressions speak as much as the 
actual verbalized utterances, sometimes even more. 
 For interpreters, “video” may possibly impose more psychological pressure, but 
the real psychological pressure “threshold” is the actual introduction of the recording 
itself, so after that “audio or video” may no longer create much difference.  One 
important note is that in the case of “outside (not in-house)” interpreters, especially for 
those who belong to a relatively small “rare language” community, special camera 
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arrangement may become necessary so their faces may not appear on the screen (for 
privacy and other possibly security-related reasons).
232
  
 As for suspects, though “video” is more potentially privacy-infringing than 
“audio,” the expected benefits will significantly outweigh this drawback.  For example, 
“video” will much more strongly protect a suspect from potential physical abuse by law 
enforcement officers. 
 Interviewing officers must note that the camera-setting becomes more difficult 
with an interpreter-assisted interview.  All participants should appear on the screen, not 
just the suspect only, except the interpreter, or ideally only the interpreter’s back should 
face the camera.
233
   
 Another note for interviewing officers is that the participants’ seating positions 
greatly affect the interview; especially, the seating position of the interpreter can greatly 
influence the interviewing officer’s control over the entire interview.  The most natural 
seating position for the interpreter as a communication mediator would be between the 
interviewing officer and the suspect, but this might also make the camera positioning 
difficult.  Placing the interpreter next to the suspect and away from the interviewing 
officer may potentially increase the number of foreign-language-only exchanges 
between the suspect and the interpreter, if the interpreter does not abide by the rules 
strictly, though for the suspect this positioning will undoubtedly increase a sense of 
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 An example of such seating arrangement is shown in Chapter XII, B-3, infra, though 
this seating arrangement also created another difficult problem, which is also discussed in Chapter 
XII, B-3, infra.  
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 According to Innocent Project, “False Confessions & Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations,” id. (see fn. 225, supra), when the camera is fixed on the suspect, jurors are likely to 
disregard the interviewing officer and more likely to think that the confession was given voluntarily 
even when that was not the case. 
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security.
234
 
 One more note for interviewing officers is that at least one officer should be 
taking good notes even when the entire interview is being video-recorded because: 1) 
unexpected recording failures can always happen;
235
 and similarly, 2) the sound quality 
often turns out far from satisfactory; even an otherwise “no problem” recording may end 
up containing too many “inaudible” parts due to seating and or microphone positions or 
noises. 
   
2. Video-Recording Will Become Evidence   
 The authenticated digital recording, if admitted, will become evidence under 
FRE 901(a).  To maintain the recording’s content validity and a clear chain of custody, 
the entire interview must be recorded completely without any gaps, with clearly 
voice-recorded starting time and ending time, etc. 
 The trial judge will decide, by FRE 104(a), whether: a) to admit the 
video-recording as sufficiently authenticated evidence to be played for the jury or not; b) 
to play an audio version of the video instead of the video; c) to show only some parts of 
the video; or d) to show the transcript only, etc. 
  
D. Mandatory Production of Authenticated Translation Transcript for FRE 801(d)(2)(A) 
 Since the initial burden of proof is on the prosecutor, they will be required to 
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of-an-interpreter-during-an-interview (Retrieved on November 25, 2015).  Also, Chapter XII, B-3, 
infra, discusses the interpreting issue related to the interpreter’s seating position.  
 
 
235
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produce the transcript of the police interview with an authenticated translation.  
 
1. Mandatory Production of Authenticated Interview Transcript by the Prosecutor     
 The prosecutor must prove that the recorded live English-translation by the 
interpreter of the suspect’s original statement and the suspect’s original foreign-language 
statements are sufficiently “identical” for the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A). 
 The next question, therefore, is: who should transcribe, verify the translation 
accuracy, authenticate the completed transcript, and testify as an expert witness?  The 
thesis will contend that this must be undertaken by a “certified or otherwise qualified 
court interpreter,” who is also qualified to testify as an “expert witness.”236  This is a 
level of qualifications which no state has ever implemented for out-of-court interpreters, 
such as police interpreters, or out-of-court transcript translators, as the current case law 
interpretation of FRE 604 is that it applies only for “in court” interpreters who, under 
oath, do the interpreting work for witnesses during cross-examinations.
237
   
 The thesis advocates that this must change, as verification of video-recorded 
police interview interpreting, preparation of a “check translation,” and testifying to the 
accuracy level of the police interpreter’s performance will require truly professional 
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 FRE categorizes an “interpreter” as an “expert witness.”  FRE 604 stipulates that “an 
interpreter must be qualified and must give an oath or affirmation to make a true translation” 
(emphasis added).  Also, FRE 702 defines an “expert” as a person who is “qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and “may testify in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise” with “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” “sufficient facts 
or data,” “reliable principles and methods,” which “the expert has reliably applied to the facts of the 
case to help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 
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 A most recent ruling in the District of South Dakota, Southern Division also articulated, 
quoting numerous case laws, that although the defendant quotes FRE 604 in his motion to dismiss the 
prosecutor’s transcript for the reasons that the translator does not have proper qualifications, FRE 604 
“applies only to witness interpreters,” who “translate questions posed to and answers provided by a 
witness during examination by counsel or the court.”  United States v. Duarte-Lopez, No. 
4:15-CR-40106-KES (Dist. of S. Dakota 2015), 6.   
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expertise, as the witness must be able to explain about technical linguistic issues 
concerning the translation in question and answer the opponent’s questions that 
challenge the witness’s expertise. 
 While the use of a “certified court interpreter” may seem like an unnecessarily 
big burden, it will save time and cost in the long run.  Recent research indicates that 
when the prosecutor uses a non-qualified “bilingual” person, transcription “typically 
contains an average of 100 errors per page.”238   
 Also, if the prosecutor’s transcript is properly authenticated by an adequately 
qualified, impartial court interpreter, the chances will be higher that the defendant will 
stipulate to the prosecutor’s transcript as properly authenticated evidence that the jury 
can use thereafter, which, in turn, will eliminate unnecessary extra work and confusion 
as well as time and money being spent.
239
 
 In addition, unlike getting an interpreter for an exigent post-arrest custodial 
interview, procurement of such sufficiently qualified interpreters should not present 
impossible time pressure or difficulty to the prosecutor. 
 Last, but not least, this mandatory stipulation will indirectly pressure or 
motivate the police to use certified court interpreters for their interviews from the very 
beginning or even start training their employees for the certification examination, as that 
would greatly simplify the whole procedure since the same certified interpreter can do 
the transcribing, accuracy-verification, authentication, and the expert testimony.
240
 
                                                   
 
 
238
 Ramirez, ed., Cultural Issues, 206. 
 
 
239
 Ramirez, ed., Cultural Issues, 206. 
 
 
240
 According to Clifford S. Fishman, “Recordings, Transcripts and Translations as 
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 “Certified court interpreters” are those who have passed relevant federal or state 
interpreter certification examinations, major examples of which are: 1) The Federal 
Court Interpreter Examination, 2) The National Judiciary Interpreters and Translators 
Certification Examination, and 3) The Consortium for State Courts Interpreter 
Examination.
241
 
 
2. What Needs to Be Transcribed and Translated   
 The authenticated transcription and translation are prepared for the triers of fact.  
Therefore, the completed transcript must present: 1) the interviewing police officer(s)’s 
utterances (in English); 2) the interpreter’s oral translation of the police officer(s)’s 
utterances into the suspect’s language (from English into the suspect’s language); 3) the 
suspect’s utterances (in the suspect’s language); and 4) the interpreter’s oral translation 
of the suspect’s language into English (from the suspect’s language into English). 
 After transcribing all of the above, the authenticator (the expert witness) must 
also prepare and add to the said transcript: 5) his or her own translation of the (2) above, 
i.e. the authenticator’s “check translation” of the interpreter’s foreign-language 
translation of the officer’s statements back into English; and similarly, 6) the 
                                                                                                                                                      
a participant in a recorded conversation may later transcribe or translate the conversation,” but that 
Fishman thinks that since “a translation is opinion evidence of the transcriber/translator, there is no 
inherent reason to reject a translation prepared by a participant in the conversation,” 505.  The 
author of this thesis is of the same opinion, if the transcriber is a certified court interpreter.  The 
same, “certified court interpreter” who did the interpreting work in the police interview should be 
allowed to transcribe the interview recording, verify the translation accuracy, authenticate the 
transcription, to which he or she will testify in court.  The author, however, will note that this 
interpreter will also have to provide “written check translations” of all the live interpretations he or 
she rendered during the interview.  Please see the discussion in Chapter VII (this chapter), D-2, 
infra.   
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authenticator’s own “check translation” of the suspect’s foreign-language statements, i.e. 
(3) above, into English.  The transcript must present the above “(1) and (5)” and “(4) 
and (6)” in a way that would help the triers of fact to compare each pair clearly and 
easily. 
 Though these extra “check translations” may sound troublesome, it must be 
noted that even these two “check translations” are still all in English, only for 
English-speaking triers of fact and the English-speaking defense counsel.  From the 
LEP suspect’s point-of-view, unless (1) and (4) of the above are also “check-translated” 
into his or her language, the suspect is unable to truly verify whether the police 
interpreter was really accurate.  The thesis’ recommended procedure excluded these 
final two “check translations” for the reason that the transcript is prepared to help the 
English-speaking triers of fact and the defense counsel, who especially is responsible for 
ensuring that the suspect’s Fifth Amendment due process rights were not violated during 
the police interview.   
 Even when a certified court interpreter served in the police interview and will 
also do the transcription and authentication, all of the (1) to (6) must be done in the same 
way.  The extra “check translations” may seem redundant, but they are not.  
Contemporaneous live oral translation (interpretation) and a later “hindsight” written 
translation with more luxury of time and reference resources will inevitably differ,
242
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 “Unlike Arroyo, who was interpreting defendant’s answers in person with little time to 
consider the accuracy of his interpretations, the translator who prepared the transcript had the luxury 
of listening to the recording, multiple times if necessary, to ensure that he or she accurately translated 
defendant’s answers.”  State v. Ruben Betance-Lopez, Ill. App. 2d; 38 N.E.3d 36 (Ill. 2015), 44.  
Even with certified interpreter, the difference in the working conditions between a live interview and 
a written translation always exists.  The training that certified interpreters receive is specifically for 
acquiring strategies for rendering contemporaneous oral translation with “legally and linguistically 
acceptable accuracy,” which is a fusion of “art” and “science,” and which the interpreter will have to 
explain to the trier of fact as an expert witness.  
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though this does not immediately mean that the previously given oral translation was 
less accurate.  It will be this certified interpreter’s job as an expert witness to explain to 
the judge and the jury what kind of linguistic differences (lexical, semantic, grammatical, 
and or pragmatic), if any, exist (or do not exist) between the live version and the later, 
written translation, on which the triers of fact can base their judgement. 
 
3. Authenticated Transcription Will Become Independent “Opinion” Evidence   
 After the completion of the authenticated evidence, both the “video recording” 
and the “authenticated transcript” will become independent evidence; the “video 
recording” will become “tangible evidence,” and the “transcript” will become “opinion 
evidence.”  
      Regarding the classic question as to whether only the video recording becomes 
the evidence and the authenticated transcript is only an “aid,” the Onori243 ruling which 
determined that both the recording and the transcript can become evidence should apply. 
Especially in the case of a recording that contains foreign language exchanges, this is 
critically important because half of the actual recording will be unintelligible to the triers 
of fact, who will not be able to make any meaningful judgement without the 
authenticated transcript.    
 
4. Authentication of the Transcript   
 The same certified interpreter who transcribed the recording and prepared the 
“check translations” will also authenticate the completed transcript, which includes the 
                                                   
 
 
243
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following steps: 1) authentication of the entire transcript by verifying that there are no 
transcription errors; and 2) authentication of the interview interpreter’s live 
interpretation by verifying its accuracy or lack of it, by comparing the interview 
interpreter’s interpretation with the “check translations” prepared by the authenticator.  
 
5. Application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A) 
 What will this authenticated evidence prove to the triers of fact?  First and 
foremost, the authenticated recording and the authenticated transcript together will 
become the most crucial evidence to determine whether or not FRE 801(d)(2)(A) will 
satisfactorily apply for the admission into evidence of the defendant’s out-of-court 
testimonial statements, with the proven “identicalness (conduit)” of the police 
interpreter’s English translation with the suspect’s original statements. 
 The evidence will also enable the triers of fact to verify if the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment due process rights were sufficiently protected, not only a “right against 
verballing,” but also a right to testify in one’s own language with complete 
understanding of the questions being asked.  
  
E. Expert Testimony by the Authenticator: Certified Interpreter as an Expert Witness 
 FRE 702 defines an “expert witness” as a person who: 1) is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; 2) testifies in the form of 
an opinion or with scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; 3) testifies based 
on sufficient facts or data; and 4) applied reliable principles and methods. 
 How would this rule apply to this “certified interpreter,” who has authenticated 
the evidence (the recording and the transcript) and will now testify as an “expert 
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witness”?  First, as for “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” the 
interpreter, as an expert, has a “knowledge” of the two languages in question.  This 
knowledge entails: 1) the interpreter’s actual proficiency in the two languages, i.e. the 
expert can use the two languages proficiently;
244
 and 2) technical knowledge about the 
two languages, i.e. that the expert can discuss and explain the linguistic (e.g. lexical, 
semantic, structural, pragmatic, as well as culture-bound) features of the two languages 
and differences between them.   
 The interpreter, as an expert witness, also has a knowledge about interpreting: 
1) actual “interpreting proficiency,” i.e. inter-linguistic interpreting skill 
(contemporaneous oral translation skill); 2) technical knowledge about interpreting task 
and about its proper protocols (do’s and don’ts); and 3) technical knowledge about the 
different linguistic features between “contemporaneous oral translation” and “written 
translation,” and practical issues involved in each task—so the jury can make a properly 
informed judgement about the reliability of the “live” police interview interpretation 
without prejudice.
245
 
 What would be “facts or data” in the case of this interpreter who has 
authenticated the evidence?  The “data” would be the actual digital video-recording of 
the police interview.
246
  If a duplicate was given to the interpreter, the interpreter as a 
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witness must be able to testify that the duplicate was also provided with a proper chain 
of custody, with no missing sections. 
 Next, “reliable principles and methods” would require that the interpreter, as an 
expert witness, explain what kind of methods based on what kind of principles were 
used for the transcription and translation, for example: 1) sound player as well as 
transcription equipment and voice enhancement application software, etc.; 2) concrete 
procedures and steps, such as whether the whole transcription was completed first before 
translation, or transcription and translation were done simultaneously utterance by 
utterance, or how nearly inaudible parts were deciphered, etc.; and 3) the reference 
resources resorted to, and whether these are commonly used by other experts in the same 
field, e.g. corpus database, dictionaries, websites, as well as friends, co-workers, and 
acquaintances who speak the language,
247
 etc.; and 4) translation principles, i.e. 
technical inter-lingual interpretation and translation strategies employed for this task.   
 
Accuracy Challenge: Burden Shifts to the Defendant   
 If the above procedures are properly followed, the chances will be very high 
that the defendant will stipulate to the “translation- accuracy-verified and authenticated” 
transcript of the police interview.  If, however, the proffered “accuracy verification” 
seems to present any “reliability” issues, then according to the widely accepted standard 
procedure adjudicated in United States v. Onori
248
 is that at this point, the burden of 
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proof shifts to the defendant.  According to Onori, when the parties do not agree on the 
accuracy of the transcript presented by one party, the other party can present a contesting 
transcript and let the jury decide.
249
 
 Of course, various practical difficulties arise here.  For one, since the defense 
counsel does not understand the defendant’s native language or can communicate with 
the defendant directly, it is impossible for the defense counsel: a) to determine to what 
extent the proffered transcript and the translation are really accurate; and if there is a 
problem, b) to ascertain exactly which part, which statement, which utterance, or which 
word is inaccurate.  Also, there is always a cost problem involved, especially in the 
case of an indigent LEP suspect.  For these reasons, it seems that in most cases this is 
where the defense counsel partially gives up, faced with an insurmountable language 
barrier.  This is why the law should strictly stipulate that the prosecutor use a properly 
qualified “certified court interpreter” to undertake the whole transcription and 
accuracy-verification (“check translations”) work. 
 Unless the defense counsel submits an alternative, supposedly a more accurate 
translation and its transcript in a timely fashion, any later translation challenges will 
most likely be rejected in the current trial or on appeal.
250
  If a translation accuracy 
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issue should ever arise, therefore, the defense counsel must find a qualified interpreter 
(e.g. a certified court interpreter) immediately and request for a production of an 
alternative, more accurate version, though again the cost may become a problem.   
 As a preventive measure to avoid such possible costs, at a very early, pre-trial 
stage, the defense counsel should obtain a court order to make absolutely certain that the 
prosecutor will use a properly qualified “certified court interpreter” to undertake the 
whole task.
251
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Part Two: Forensic Linguistic Analysis 
 
Chapter VIII 
Forensic Linguistic Research Objectives 
 
 Custodial interrogations by law-enforcement officers are inherently shrouded 
from the public eye.  Upon arrest, the suspect is immediately separated from the 
outside world in a police station and asked questions for hours in confinement.  The 
exchange that takes place behind the closed doors is not, in principle, open to the public, 
unlike a court trial.  Unless the entire exchange is being video-recorded for any 
necessary future scrutiny, there is no way of perfectly proving what was or was not said, 
or what happened or did not happen behind those closed doors.     
 For this reason, as has already been mentioned in Part One of this thesis,
252
 
many common-law counties such as the U.K., Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada, have already introduced mandatory use of digital recording, while the U.S. is 
lagging behind with only 22 states having adopted this system.  As has also been 
contended in Part One,
253
 the use of this technology is not only critical but also simply 
indispensable if the nation’s criminal justice is to strictly observe its fundamental duty of 
adhering to “due process,” by ensuring the LEP suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to an 
“interpreter’s translation of verifiable accuracy.”  
 Accordingly, Part Two of this thesis will demonstrate the crucial importance of
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the use of digital recording in an interpreter-assisted police interview followed by 
verification and authentication of the translation accuracy in the form of an action 
research conducted on an authentic video-recording of a Toronto Police custodial 
interview with a Dari interpreter. 
 This forensic linguistic “action study” analysis has used a real video recording 
of a custodial police interview with a Dari interpreter that took place at the Toronto 
Police in 2008.   The 77:39-minute Toronto Police interview was submitted as a court 
exhibit not because of any interpreting issue but because of a mechanical accident that 
stopped the recording thereafter.  Thus, this would be an ideal example of a police 
interview interpreting that was found by all parties as acceptable in terms of “accuracy” 
and “impartiality,” i.e., as an ideal “conduit” model.   
 Based on the findings in the thesis’ legal analysis in Part One, the forensic 
linguistic analysis in Part Two will answer the following four main questions.  First, to 
what extent the monolingual parties (the police and the suspect) in a police interview can 
assess the interpreting accuracy and impartiality by only an indirect means without the 
actual verification of the accuracy and impartiality?  Second, what should be the 
testimony of an “expert witness” be like after having transcribed and authenticated this 
particular recording?  Third, how could the trier of fact determine the “accuracy” and 
“impartiality” from the submitted evidence: 1) the digital recording, and 2) the 
authenticated transcript?  Would just submitting the recording only make sufficient 
evidence, or would the authenticated transcript as additional evidence supply any 
significant and indispensable added verification that would help the fact-triers to make 
more informed judgement?  The fourth and the final question is: would the thesis’ 
proposed implementation be not only effective but also feasible?  If not, how could 
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they be modified to be made more feasible?
  
 
  
Chapter IX 
Review of Relevant Studies 
  
 The forensic linguistic analysis of a recording of an interpreter-assisted police 
interview conducted in this thesis is a product of several related academic disciplines, 
major ones of which are: 1) law, 2) linguistics, 3) forensic linguistics, and 4) interpreting 
and translation studies.  In order to articulate the significance of this research as well as 
to identify its position in the overall academic disciplinary context, this chapter will 
briefly explain how the above relevant fields are intertwined, and what kind of research 
has been conducted so far in each area that is directly relevant to the issue of an 
interpreter-assisted police interview. 
 
A. Law: Improved Due Process in the Upstream Criminal Justice 
 Part One of this thesis has discussed a classic as well as re-growing legal issue 
in the U.S. concerning evidential validity of as interpreter-assisted testimonial statement 
of an LEP suspect in a custodial police interview.  The thesis has criticized the 
long-established practice of using the “agency theory” in order to apply FRE 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) vicarious admission to skirt the hearsay issue and to circumvent the 
Crawford’s Confrontation Clause issue.   
 The thesis demonstrated that the lack of “agency relationship” between the 
suspect and the interpreter invalidated the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(C) or (D), and 
more importantly that the imposition of such agency relationship on the suspect was 
nothing but a violation of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment due process right against
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potential “verballing.”  The thesis then proposed a clear re-separation of the “agency 
theory” from the “conduit theory” and advocated the “authenticated conduit theory” with 
the introduction of mandatory digital video recording and accuracy verification by a 
certified court interpreter who will also serve as an expert witness based on FRE 702.
254
  
The thesis argued that, by passing this advocated, much higher muster, the authenticated 
“conduit” translation will enable the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A), instead of FRE 
801(d)(2)(C) or (D) vicarious admission.    
 
B. Linguistics 
 Linguistics as a modern, scientific study of language was most probably 
launched by Ferdinand de Saussure,
255
 whose work greatly influenced the development 
of this new academic discipline in Europe and the United States in the 20th century.  
Linguistics has now become a firmly established academic discipline, encompassing 
numerous fields and subfields, from more traditional areas such as phonetics, phonology, 
morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, speech acts, etc., to more applied areas such 
discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, language acquisition, etc.  More 
recent development includes such new sub-fields as forensic linguistics or interpreting 
and translation studies. 
 Three main linguistic theoretical frameworks that will serve as a basis for this 
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thesis’ analysis of the police interview recording are: 1) pragmatics, i.e., “pragmatic” 
interpretation of the source language and reformulation of the same, “pragmatic” 
meaning in the target language; 2) a sociolinguistic discourse analytical tool created by 
Erving Goffman,
256
 a Canadian-born American sociologist, who contended that a 
discourse participant normally takes on one of the following three roles: “animator,” 
“principal,” and “author”;257 and 3) conversation analysis, another sociolinguistic 
sub-field which analyzes patterns of conversations in various social and linguistic 
contexts.  The following sections in this chapter will explain each one of these three in 
more detail.  
 
1. Pragmatics   
 The first theoretical framework, pragmatics, is a field in linguistics that looks at 
the “meaning” of an utterance “in context,” as opposed to as an “isolated” lexical, 
syntactic, or semantic unit, by focusing on the “functions” or “functional meaning” of an 
utterance.   
 This method of linguistic analysis was originally developed by such linguists as 
John Langshaw Austin, a British linguistic philosopher who established the theory of 
“speech acts,” which focuses on what the speaker (interlocutor) intends to convey 
(illocutionary act) to produce the intended result (perlocutionary act),
258
 John R. Searle, 
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an American philosopher, who further refined the speech act theory,
259
 or Paul Grice, a 
British linguistic philosopher, who established the theory of “co-operative principle” and 
“conversation implicature,” for a pragmatic analysis of a conversation.260 
 What is a “pragmatic meaning,” as opposed to a meaning of a word or words in 
an “isolated” lexical, syntactic, or semantic unit?  As a very simple example, since we 
are talking so much about the meaning of “meaning,” let us take up an example of the 
word “mean.”  What would be our immediate response, if we were asked, “What does 
the word ‘mean’ mean in English?”  We would probably say that it is impossible to 
answer such a question as the word “mean” as one “isolated” lexical item can mean 
many different things depending on how it is used in a sentence.   
 Even in a sentence, depending on each syntactic structure, it could become an 
adjective, a verb, or a noun, each then having a whole list of possibly different meanings.  
Thus, put in a sentence like “I was mean,” syntactically the word “mean” is recognized 
as an adjective, as opposed to a verb or even a noun, as there is no determiner such as an 
article “a” or “the” at the beginning, or no plural marker “s” at the end of the word 
“mean,” like “I was (only) a means (to an end).”   
 Yet, as an adjective, the word “mean” in “I was mean” could still have 
semantically different meanings, e.g., 1) unkind, cruel, or bad-tempered, 2) ungenerous 
or stingy, or even 3) of low social status.  We would need more contextual clues to 
determine the semantic meaning, e.g. just a few more words added, like “I was mean to 
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you.”  Then, most probably the word “mean” would semantically mean “unkind.”  
This is as much as “meaning” can go in an “isolated” sentence, with its lexical, syntactic, 
and semantic meaning.   
 However, when this sentence, “I was mean to you,” is used in a real, live 
discourse with more surrounding context and the right tone of voice, the pragmatic 
meaning and its language function may become more like an “admission of fault,” 
“regret,” or even an “apology.”  Similarly, the word “mean” in a sentence “I mean it” is 
syntactically used as a verb which semantically would most probably mean “to intend to 
express” in this one isolated sentence.  However, suppose this sentence is now 
combined with the first sentence as something like, “I was mean to you.  I really mean 
it.”  Then the pragmatic meaning of the second sentence would become more like a 
“reassurance” of the immediately preceding “apology.”   
 Such “pragmatic” meaning plays one of the key roles when interpreters do 
contemporaneous, oral translation work from the source language to the target language 
to achieve the same, “equivalent meaning” as will be explained further in Chapter IX 
(this chapter), D-1, infra.  For now, however, let us imagine that an English sentence, “I 
was mean to you.  I really mean it,” was translated into a foreign language as, “I should 
have been more kind.  I apologize sincerely.”   
 This translation is definitely not “literal,” but might possibly serve as one of the 
most appropriate translations with an accurate interpretation of the source language 
utterance’s “pragmatic,” intended meaning, given the right context.  This becomes an 
even more crucial, interpreter’s on-the-spot translation judgment point, especially when 
the “literal” translation that the target language allows would only “literally” mean 
something like, “I acted in an ill-natured manner to you.  It is my genuine intention to 
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make this statement.” 
    
2. Goffman’s “Animator,” “Principal,” and “Author”   
 According to Goffman, a participant in a live discourse normally takes on one 
of the following three roles: “animator,” “principal,” and “author.”261  These three 
categories have been used as an analytical tool in a number of recent interpreting 
research works which examined different roles played by interpreters or, more exactly, 
their “shifts in footing” during the interpreting work.262   
 The first one, “animator,” is the “sounding box” or the “talking 
machine…engaged in acoustic activity,”263 a role typically played by newscasters who 
must read the given news script verbatim or live radio sports broadcasters describing 
every single movement of the athletes on the field with accuracy and contemporaneity, 
as was already mentioned in Part One, Chapter IV, B-1, supra.  The thesis will regard 
this “animator” role as the closest to the most rigid, traditional notion of a “language 
conduit” interpreter. 
 The second one, “principal” is one “whose position is established by the words 
that are spoken…whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the 
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words say.”264  Goffman uses an example in which a newscaster who, while reading a 
news script, spots an error, which, if it appeared in a quotation of a written work, could 
be simply taken care of by the use of “sic.”  Since doing so is impossible in a live 
broadcast, a very commonly used tactic is a quick “interjected connective” such as “UP 
states.”265  Similarly, the newscaster who feels unsure about the pronunciation of the 
name just read aloud may quickly insert, “if I pronounced that correctly,”266 as a 
safeguard.   
 These are both instances in which the newscaster momentarily steps out of the 
original role of the “animator” into the “real self,” which Goffman calls “principal.”  
The thesis considers this “principal” role as the closest to an interpreter who makes his 
or her own statement in order to confirm, clarify, or correct, momentarily stepping out of 
the original “invisible” role of a “conduit.”     
 The last one, “author,” is the one who selects “the sentiments that are being 
expressed and the words in which they are encoded.”267  Traditionally, newscasters 
have been strictly prohibited from adding their own personal opinions to the scripted, 
plain news contents.  While newscasters in more recent “news-like” programs often 
express or reveal their own opinions, they still must draw a clear distinction between the 
reported facts and their personal opinions if they do express them on air.  This thesis 
deems this “author” role as the closest to what an interpreter does when he or she 
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intentionally adds, omits, reduces, or alters the content, which is basically a clear 
deviation from the “prescribed conduit” role but is also done sometimes for a clear 
purpose. 
 
3. Conversation Analysis   
 Conversation analysis, another sub-field of sociolinguistics, was originally 
developed by an American sociologist Harvey Sacks, who, together with Emanuel 
Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, tried to delineate organizational patterns observed in 
various conversations, including such factors as “turn-taking.”268  This basic theoretical 
concept was used by Georgina Heydon, an Australian forensic linguist, in her seminal 
work of critical discourse analysis, The Language of Police Interviewing: A Critical 
Analysis,
269
 which was an analysis of monolingual police interviews.  The approach 
used here has provided a hint to this thesis in developing a strategy for an analytical 
classification of the “verbal exchange cycle patterns” of an interview discourse 
conducted by three participants (the interviewing police officer, the suspect, and the 
interpreter) in an interpreter-assisted police interview. 
 
C. Forensic Linguistics 
 Forensic linguistics, another recently developing subfield of linguistics, is 
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actually only two decades old,
270
 although many of their jobs, which are now conducted 
based more on the state-of-the-art science and technology, have long been performed by 
various traditional “experts,” e.g., the handwriting experts who were called to serve in 
the 1932 kidnapping case of the then twenty-month-old baby of the renowned aviator 
Charles Lindbergh, all of whom “unanimously” agreed that all the letters had been 
written by the same person, who, originally of German nationality, had lived in the U.S. 
for some years.
271
 
 This newly growing field of forensic linguistics encompasses almost all areas of 
applied linguistics where “law” and “language” intersect, from such traditional areas as 
an analysis of various legal discourses, both written and oral, for evidential purposes, 
including voice recognition work by expert phoneticians, to more recent areas such as 
detecting copyright or trademark infringements.
272
  The critical discourse analysis work 
of monolingual police interviews by Georgina Heydon mentioned in Chapter IX (this 
chapter), B-3, supra,
273
 is also one example of such forensic linguistic work.   
 When interpreting and translation specialists conduct a similar analytical work 
on an interpreter-assisted police interview discourse, the approach and standpoint often 
become similar to those of a forensic linguist.  This thesis has conducted an analysis of 
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the interpreter-assisted Toronto Police interview from each standpoint of those who 
become directly involved at each stage of criminal justice process, from upstream all the 
way downstream: 1) the interviewing police officer, the suspect, and the interpreter; 1) 
the prosecutor and the defense counsel; 3) a certified court interpreter who would be 
asked to transcribe, verify the translation, authenticate the transcript, and serve as an 
expert witness; and 4) the judge and the jury in a more downstream stage of fact-trying.  
In so doing, the thesis has employed typical “quantitative” and “qualitative” data 
analysis methods used in a forensic linguistic research. 
 
D. Interpreting and Translation Studies 
 Finally, let us look at Interpreting and Translation Studies.  Although this is 
also another newly evolving interdisciplinary sub-field of linguistics, as was mentioned 
in Part One, Chapter VI, A, supra, the analysis of “inter-lingual equivalence” in any 
work of “translation” dates all the way back most probably to the very moment when 
different civilizations using different languages began to intersect, first in oral 
communication
274
 and then in written forms. 
 
1. “Word-for-Word” versus “Sense-for-Sense.”   
 In fact, the classic debate on “fidelity” versus “transparency” can be traced even 
back to 395 A.D., when St. Jerome, the then leading biblical translator, clearly stated “I 
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render not word-for-word, but sense-for-sense” as “word-for-word” produced nothing 
but “absurd translation.”275   
 Anyone who studies inter-lingual translation immediately gets caught in this 
classic dichotomic dilemma between “being faithful to the original, source language” 
and “being clear, natural, and readily understandable in the target language,” but quickly 
learns that “accurate or faithfully equivalent” translation never means achieving a target 
text which is identical to the source text at “all levels of the language hierarchy,” namely 
at all of the “lexical, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic” levels, which is “largely 
unattainable.”276 
 Especially in oral, interpreting work, as opposed to written translation work, 
interpreters are always faced with “time pressure” in delivering contemporaneous 
translation back-and-forth to the interlocutors of the given dialogic oral discourse, which 
requires that these participants immediately understand what the other party has “meant.”  
Naturally, the most important criterion of “equivalence” which every interpreted 
rendition must meet becomes that of “pragmatic” equivalence,277 which is an equivalent 
of grasping “sense,” using the terminology coined by Danica Seleskovitch, a pioneering 
French conference interpreting practitioner and scholar.
278
    
 Even professionals in the legal community, if they have had abundant 
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experience working with interpreters, know that “accuracy is not synonymous with 
literalism” (emphasis added).279  The fact that inter-lingual “equivalence”280 is 
achieved not by mechanical, “bottom-up, word-for-word” rendition but only by 
“top-down, pragmatic” rendition is a widely shared understanding among experienced 
interpreting professionals.  In other words, once the intended meaning or the pragmatic 
meaning of the source language utterance is accurately comprehended, experienced 
interpreters immediately think of how they should re-formulate this very meaning in the 
target language in the same situational context.
281
  
 
2. Faithful Translation of the “Intended Meaning”   
 Just because this “non-word-for-word” is the premise about the nature of 
translation work, it does not have to cause immediate alarm for “betrayal.”  The NAJIT 
homepage also states clearly that “[s]ome judges and attorneys have a mistaken belief 
that an interpreter renders court proceedings word for word, but this is impossible since 
there is not a one-to-one correspondence between words or concepts in different 
languages,” and that “[r]ather than word for word, then, interpreters render meaning by 
reproducing the full content of the ideas being expressed,” concluding that 
“[i]nterpreters do not interpret words; they interpret concepts.”282  This, of course, 
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never means that interpreters will add, omit, reduce, or alter the content.  On the 
contrary, the code of ethics strictly stipulates that an interpreter interpret everything, 
“while preserving the tone and register of the original discourse,”283 which becomes of 
crucial importance in a police interview of evidence gathering work. 
 Thus, “accurate” comprehension of the source language utterance denotes 
“accurate” interpretation of its “intended meaning,” which interpreters will immediately 
re-formulate into a target-language utterance which has the same “pragmatic” meaning, 
and in so doing, interpreters try to preserve the same tone and register of the source 
language utterance, with no addition, omission, reduction, or alteration.  This requires 
rigorous professional training, as has been repeatedly emphasized by all professionals in 
this field, including the author of this thesis. 
 
3. Forensic Analysis of Interpreter-Assisted Legal Discourse   
 Unfortunately, however, there is very little public awareness about the pathetic 
lack of truly qualified interpreters in this initial, upstream criminal justice process, i.e. a 
custodial police interview, as has also been emphasized by many professionals and the 
author of this thesis.  As Sandra Hale quotes Smirnov in her book, “Sadly enough, it is 
not the life of an interpreter, but that of his client that may become a price paid for a 
poor rendition.”284 
 In order to advocate such importance as well as to raise public awareness 
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concerning the problems surrounding “legal interpreting,” many legal interpreting 
professionals have been conducting various forensic linguistic researches in recent years.  
Some of the landmark works include The Bilingual Courtroom, published in 2002 by 
Susan Berk-Seligson,
285
 an American interpreting scholar, which is a thorough 
ethnographic description of various actual roles played by court interpreters, based on 
the total 114-hour tape recordings of court proceedings at nine different courthouses.  
The 2004 publication, Discourse of Court Interpreters, by Sandra Hale,
286
 an Australian 
interpreting scholar, is also a similarly significant comprehensive research, which is a 
mixed-method research on court interpreting discourse and interpreters conducted to 
discover various effects and influences on court proceedings resulting from their 
interpreting work.    
 The above-mentioned books, however, are both on “court interpreters” in 
“down-stream” criminal justice process.  Similar researches on “police interpreters” in 
“upstream” criminal justice process, in contrast, have been significantly scarce,287 
reflecting the “non-public” nature of police interviews as opposed to the “public” nature 
of court trials.   
 Still, there have been several significant contributions made in this field so far.  
Cecilia Wadensjö, in her 1999 paper titled “Telephone Interpreting & the 
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Synchronization of Talk in Social Interaction,”288 analyzed two police interview 
recordings, comparing on-site interview interpreting with telephone interview 
interpreting.  Also, there are two major books specifically focusing on police 
interpreting issues.  One is Coerced Confessions: The Discourse of Bilingual Police 
Interrogations by Susan Berk-Seligson,
289
 who conducted another vast research to 
demonstrate critically serious quality and impartiality issues of police officers used as ad 
hoc interpreters.  The other one is Interpreter-Mediated Police Interviews: A 
Discourse-Pragmatic Approach by Ikuko Nakane,
290
 in which the author analyzed 
several recordings of Australian police interviews of Japanese suspects by sorting out 
different roles played by the interpreters who showed various footing shifts, using the 
analytical tool of “animator,” “principal,” and “author” roles theorized by Erving 
Goffman.
291
 
 
4. Where This Thesis’ Forensic-Linguistic Research Will Hopefully Stand   
 In light of the current paucity of research on authentic police interview 
interpreting, this research has attempted to make a contribution by sharing both 
quantitative and qualitative research results in the form of forensic linguistic analysis.  
In addition, by conducting a research on an authentic interview recording submitted as a 
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court exhibit, the thesis hopes to demonstrate, in the form of an action research, if and 
how the participants at each stage of the criminal justice process can determine the true 
“conduit” nature (“accuracy” and “impartiality”) of the interpreting work, while 
assessing the need and feasibility of the “verification” of such “conduit” nature through 
the introduction of mandatory recording and authentication.
  
 
 
Chapter X 
Used Data and Methodology 
 
 The data used for the forensic-linguistic analysis of this thesis is a 77:39-minute 
video recording of a Toronto Police interview of an Afghan immigrant murder suspect, 
which was conducted with a Dari interpreter on March 19, 2008.
292
 
 
A. Background of the Data: Toronto Police Interview with a Dari Interpreter 
 Unlike court trials, police interviews are basically non-public and inaccessible.  
Though digital recording of police interviews is already in practice in many 
common-law countries such as the U.K., Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
in 22 states of the United States, as has been mentioned repeatedly,
293
 not all of them are 
actually played in court, let alone made more publically accessible, e.g., via internet 
postings, etc.  Still, video clips of authentic police interviews are increasingly 
appearing on the internet, after having been submitted as exhibits in trials, having been 
actually played publically in court, and thus having entered the public domain. 
 
1. Acquisition of Raw Data   
 Nevertheless, the ones with an interpreter are extremely rare, perhaps for the 
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purpose of protecting the interpreters’ identity.  This recording, which the author of the 
thesis finally found after many months of search on the Internet, was also one of such 
extremely rare video clips posted on YouTube by Financial Times on October 19, 2012, 
after having been submitted as an exhibit in a Toronto trial that took place in 2012.  It 
was submitted as an exhibit not because of any interpreter-or-interpretation-related 
issues but because of a technical accident that had stopped the recording after the first 
77:39 minutes.   
 
2. Reasons for the Data Selection   
 The author of the thesis decided to use this “unedited, first 77:39 minutes of the 
Toronto police interview” as the data for the thesis’ forensic linguistic analysis for the 
following three reasons.   
 First, since the recording is already in the public domain, its use, especially for 
an academic research, presented no copyright or ethical issue, which the author also 
confirmed both with: 1) Financial Post/National Post/canada.com, and 2) the Toronto 
Police Service, before commencing the analysis.   
 Second, since there were no “interpreting accuracy or impartiality” issues 
concerning the first 77:39 minutes that survived the technical accident, this recording 
can be regarded as an example of police interview interpreting that perfectly satisfied the 
“conduit” standards of the then Ontario Superior Court of Justice.   
 Third, Dari, the suspect’s native language, is a completely “foreign and 
undecipherable” language for the author, just as most foreign languages are for 
interviewing police officers as well as for the triers of fact in interpreter-assisted trials.  
On one hand this undecipherability would naturally present many challenges in the 
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actual research, which it certainly did.  On the other hand, however, it would enable the 
author to also conduct the research from the standpoint of an ordinary, mono-lingual 
interviewer or a fact-trier, as one type of an action research.  
   
B. Method of Analysis 
 The first question the thesis addressed was: to what extent the monolingual 
parties (the police and the suspect) in a police interview can judge the interpreting 
accuracy and impartiality by only an indirect means without the actual verification of the 
accuracy and impartiality? 
 
1. First Stage: Transcription and ELAN 
 To answer this question, the author began the work by first transcribing the 
entire interview, line by line, directly from the raw YouTube recording.  This was a 
long, time-consuming work, taking a total of approximately 25 hours, starting from June 
25 to July 5, 2015.  After its completion, the author then used a transcription software 
named ELAN, an audio-visual transcription software made available for free by a Dutch 
research institute.
294
  Though ELAN in the version used by the author did not “enhance” 
the quality of the recorded voice itself, it had a speed control function which greatly 
helped to confirm the details of otherwise inaudible sections.  
 In addition, the use of this software was imperative for the actual physical data 
collection, such as: 1) each utterance length, and 2) the pause length before each 
utterance.  ELAN transformed these physical sound data into numerical data, which 
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were also readily downloadable onto an EXCEL spreadsheet for statistical analyses.
295
   
 One thing that must be noted, however, is that the process of measuring the 
length of every single pause and utterance of all the speakers for the entire 77.39-minute 
recording was an endlessly long and laborious process.  Every one of the 1,283 total 
utterances and 1,283 total pauses, thus a total of 2,566 units, had to be measured 
manually scrolling and clicking a mouse on the soundwave diagram screen.  On the 
average, it took nearly one hour to process one minute amount of data, so the entire 
work took close to 80 hours.  Since the obtained data was very valuable, it was worth 
the time, but in the future, it would greatly help such research work if more 
technological improvement is made with relevant new software to ease such data 
processing work.   
 While recording the utterance data on the ELAN screen, the author also noticed 
very interesting “discourse pattern cycles,” which seemed to be closely related to what 
Georgina Heydon mentioned in her book about the “turn-taking” in a discourse like 
police interview in which there is a clear power imbalance,
296
 which will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
297
 
 
2. Indirect “Accuracy” and “Impartiality” Assessment by the Police Officer   
 The initial transcript had only English sentences written down, which are: 1) the 
utterances of the interviewing police officer, and 2) the English translations of the 
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suspect’s statements rendered by the interpreter.   
 This would be as much as an interviewing police officer, a prosecutor, the 
defense counsel, and the triers of fact can possibly understand through the accessible 
information given in English only.  Actually, however, there are two additional 
discourses: 3) the interpreter’s translation of the officer’s questions into Dari, and 4) the 
suspect’s original statements made in Dari.  Nevertheless, for average English speakers, 
they are usually perceived simply as unintelligible human voices.  
 At this stage, the average English speaking participant can only indirectly 
assess the “accuracy” and “impartiality” of the interpreter probably by the following 
means or data: 1) the coherence of the correspondence between the questions asked and 
the answers returned; 2) the number of extra exchanges (extra round-trip exchanges in 
Dari between the interpreter and the suspect) before the completion of each 
question-and-answer cycle; 3) the total number of each participant’s utterances; and 4) 
comparison of utterance time-length between the original statement and the interpreted 
rendition 
 
3. Indirect “Accuracy” and “Impartiality” Assessment by the Suspect   
 From the suspect’s viewpoint, the clues for indirect “accuracy” and 
“impartiality” assessment become more limited, which probably are: 1) the coherent 
succession and logical development of the questions being asked by the interviewing 
police officer; 2) the repetition of the same questions; 3) the number of extra exchanges 
(extra round-trip exchanges in English between the interpreter and the police officer) 
which were not translated to the suspect; 4) the total number of each participant’s 
utterances; and 5) comparison of utterance time-length between the original statement 
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and the interpreted rendition. 
 
4. Indirect “Accuracy” and “Impartiality” Assessment by English-Speaking Fact-Triers  
 For the prosecutor, the defense counsel, the judge, and the jury, the extent of 
possible indirect assessment of “accuracy” and “impartiality” through the use of the 
video recording only is basically the same as that of the interviewing police officer, 
although by watching and listening to the video, the fact-triers may also be able to 
observe: 1) the interpreter’s role shift in English, i.e., animator, principal, and author 
roles based on Goffman’s 1981 analysis model;298 2) comparison of pause length, 
especially how quickly and proficiently the interpreter’s each rendition is presented; and 
3) the overall impression of the interpreter and the image of the suspect created through 
the interpreter’s translations of the suspect’s statements. 
 Regarding this interpreter’s role shift or footing shift described by Goffman,299 
Nakane contends that interpreters in police interviews should always remain in the 
“animator” role, which is the only acceptable role in line with the “code of ethics.”300  
Nakane mentions that though the “principal” role is often observed in making “repairs,” 
ideally such repairs should also be made within the role of an “animator.”301  Further, 
Nakane states that the “author” role clearly deviates from the “code of ethics,” but that 
interpreters also shift to this role to supply what they judge to be critical cultural 
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information to prevent miscommunication or to ensure effective communication.
302
      
 The thesis will use the same analytical tool of “animator, principal, and author” 
created by Erving Goffman,
303
 especially to find out “to what extent” and “how if ever” 
the interpreter played the role of “principal” and “author.”  This will determine the 
actual “conduit” boundaries found acceptable by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 
2012. 
 
5. Second Stage: 22-Hour Accuracy Verification Marathon with a Dari-Japanese 
Interpreter   
 The second question the thesis asked was: what would be the testimony of an 
“expert witness” who has transcribed and authenticated this recording?  The next stage, 
therefore, was to actually “verify” the “accuracy” of all the statements made in Dari: 1) 
the interpreter’s translations of the interviewing officer’s statements into Dari; and 2) the 
suspect’s original statements in Dari. 
 This was not as easy as had been originally envisaged.  For one thing, the 
number of Dari interpreters who could serve as a “check interpreter” for this research 
was extremely limited, even in the entire Tokyo area, where the author of this thesis 
resides.  Dari is considered to be a dialect of Farsi (Persian), and as in the case of most 
“minor” or “rare” languages, this was a task only a native speaker of Dari (or Farsi, who 
could understand Dari as a “semi” native language) could handle.  The author contacted 
one of the interpreting service agencies in Tokyo that specializes in minor or rare 
languages and hired a Dari interpreter, a native speaker of Farsi (Persian) who also 
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worked as a Dari interpreter. 
 Initially, the author had expected this work to be completed in one or two 
sessions of 4 hours each at maximum (approximately a total of 8 hours).  The total 
number of the interpreter’s utterances in Dari was 305, and that of the suspect was 346, 
their total combined time amounting to only 30.5 minutes.  Since the original recording, 
including the interpreter’s back-and-forth translations, was 77:39 minutes, the author’s 
original projection did not seem particularly unreasonable. 
 As it turned out, however, the total required time exceeded 22 hours, which 
began on July 17, 2015 and lasted till August 27, 2015 on five separate sessions.  There 
are several possible reasons for this.  One is the recording quality, and the second is the 
participants’ speaking style, especially that of the suspect.  The interpreter was having 
an especially difficult time figuring out the suspect’s utterances, which also contained 
more “provincial” expressions and speech style,304 which still might have been easier if 
the interpreter had been able to translate sitting directly next to the suspect in the same 
room, which was not the case.  This required a number of repetitive replays of the same 
section.
305
  The third is the translation into Japanese.  Though the interpreter had over 
ten years of experience doing a wide range of interpreting and translation work between 
Farsi/Dari and Japanese, including work with the Japanese police, the prosecutor, the 
court, as well as various mass media in Japan, still translating into one’s non-native 
language (Japanese) was a bigger challenge than the other way, which required 
numerous confirmations of the meaning of the translated statements between the author 
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and the interpreter.  The fourth and the final reason is also on the part of the author, 
who needed to ask additional questions about each expression and various nuances, 
confirming them using several Dari-English dictionaries.
306
 
 The entire 22-hour-long verification session was also recorded.  The author 
then translated into English the check interpreter’s recorded oral translations from Dari 
to Japanese, which was directly typed into the transcript.  This re-translation process 
took at least another 22 hours, just to re-play the recording.   
 To summarize the process, the Dari-Japanese check interpreter orally translated 
all of the Dari statements in the original Toronto Police recording into Japanese, all of 
which were digitally recorded by the author then and there.  The total recording time 
amounted to over 22 hours.  The author then translated and typed into the transcript the 
interpreter’s recorded Japanese translations into English.  The reason for this complex, 
relay translation was due to the fact that there was no Dari-English interpreter in the 
Tokyo area at the time of this research.             
 
6. “Accuracy” and “Impartiality” Verification by an “Interpreting Expert Witness”  
 Though laborious, this second “accuracy verification” revealed a number of 
new discoveries and enabled access to otherwise unavailable data, which would become 
possible only when a recording of a bilingual police interview is verified and 
authenticated.  This included: 1) confirmation of the content of extra roundtrips made 
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in Dari between the suspect and the interpreter; 2) verification of the interpreter’s 
translation accuracy, i.e., verification of what exactly was not quite accurate, 
clarification of uncertain points, and comparison of unconfirmed impressions with 
verified facts. 
 
7. “Accuracy” and “Impartiality” Determination by the Triers of Fact 
 The final question the thesis addressed was: how could the triers of fact 
determine the “accuracy” and “impartiality” from: 1) the digital recording, and 2) the 
authenticated transcript, both as evidence?  Though the thesis can only speculate from 
their point of view, the author of the thesis will try to assess which factors in the 
proffered evidence might play a significant role in making such determinations.  The 
thesis will then make a final analysis on whether an access to such an authenticated, 
check interpreter’s translation transcript as an extra piece of evidence would be truly 
helpful and valuable, instead of just being superfluous or insignificant.
  
 
 
Chapter XI 
Results and Analyses 1: From Interview Participants’ Standpoint 
 
 The following is a brief summary of the case’s background extracted from R v. 
Khairi, 2012 ONSC 5549. 
 
A. R v. Khairi, 2012 ONSC: Basic Facts of the Case 
 The incident happened in the afternoon of March 18, 2008.  At 1:50 p.m., the 
suspect, putatively 61 years old, called 911, requested a Hindi or Farsi interpreter, and 
reported the murder of his wife that had occurred at his Etobicoke apartment in Toronto, 
Canada.
307
  During the telephone exchange that took place in Hindi, 911 arguably 
found that in fact the suspect himself had murdered his own wife, which later became 
one point of dispute during the custodial interrogation by the Toronto Police that 
ensued.
308
  The police arrived at the scene and arrested the suspect at 2:18 p.m., after 
giving the Canadian police caution in English, which, the police observed the suspect 
most probably did not understand due to the language issue.
309
 
 
1. Language Issue and Interpreter   
 The suspect was then taken into custody, after having been booked in with the 
aid from a Hindi-speaking officer, who tried to explain the rights to the suspect, which
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did not turn out to be successful, either.
310
   
 The Toronto Police were not able to determine which language the suspect 
really spoke, thinking initially that it was Hindi, for the reason that Hindi was the first 
language the suspect requested on the 911 call.
311
  It was not until past midnight on that 
same day, after another unsuccessful attempt with a Hindi interpreter, that the police 
finally found that the suspect’s native language was Dari.312  A professional Dari 
interpreter, who was employed by an interpreting service company, was finally 
summoned and began his work at around 1:00 a.m. midnight.
313
  The interpreter first 
served on a thirty-minute-long, three-party telephone talk with the suspect and the duty 
counsel, who, through the interpreter, explained to the suspect his rights, after which the 
police began the interpreter-assisted interview at 2:50 a.m.
314
 
 
2. Recording Accident and Interpreter’s “Will-Say Statement”   
 When the interview ended at 6:10 a.m., the two interviewing officers discovered 
that the recording had stopped after 77:39 minutes, only covering the first one-third of 
the interview which had lasted more than three hours, despite the fact that the suspect 
finally confessed during the latter part of the interview.
315
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 In order to rescue the situation as much as possible, the police officers asked the 
interpreter to prepare a “will-say statement” and to later testify in court.  They asked 
the interpreter to write an “arms-length” account of what he remembered as having been 
said during the interview.
316
 
 The interpreter felt very “uncomfortable” about complying to this request at 
first, as he believed that giving a testimony for the police would “compromise” what he 
believed to be the interpreter’s role, which had to be always “impartial.”  After 
discussing this with his employer, however, who “reassured” him that doing this would 
not be “inappropriate,” the interpreter finally consented, several days later, to prepare 
such a statement and to testify in court for the police.
317
    
 
3. The Recorded Interview Content   
 The interview, the recording of which stopped after the first 77:39 minutes, is 
clearly divided into the following five parts (with each allotted time) : a) the 
introductory recording start routine (02:13 minutes); b) the administration of the 
Canadian police caution (17:37 minutes); c) questions about the suspect’s prescriptions 
(14:63 minutes); d) the suspect’s past traffic accident (17 minutes); and e) the 
interrogation about the murder (26:26 minutes).  Since the actual interview itself started 
from 02:13 minutes after the start of the recording, the thesis has looked at the following 
four main scenes as the subject of the analysis, as in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Interview Scene Breakdown  
 Scene 1 Scene 2 Scene 3 Scene 4 
Topic Police Caution Prescriptions Traffic Accident Murder 
Time 
(minutes) 
17:37 minutes 14:63 minutes 17 minutes 26:26 minutes 
 
B. Facts Perceived from Monolingual Interview Participants’ Standpoint 
 Monolingual participants in a police interview, i.e., the police officer and the 
suspect, have only limited information to base their real-time judgement on as to 
whether their statements are “accurately” translated with no intentional or unintentional 
“distortions.”  The first set of facts and data shown in this section, therefore, will try to 
delineate how and to what extent such monolingual participants could make an 
assessment with the given limitations. 
   
1. Total Number of Utterances and Their Breakdown   
 In a more ordinary conversation, what we usually expect is a natural turn-taking 
among the participants,
318
 which we also expect to be distributed more or less equally 
among them, though of course some people often become more “talkative” than others if 
not “monopolizing.”  In a more institutionalized discourse, such as an interview, a press 
conference, or a cross-examination in court, however, such basic rules of conversation 
change greatly to serve each institutional objective.  A police interview or interrogation 
is one typical example.   
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 We should, therefore, begin with the total number of utterances made by each 
interlocutor.   Table 2 below shows the total number of utterances per interlocutor: 1) 
the police officer’s English utterances; 2) the interpreter’s translations from English to 
Dari; 3) the suspect’s utterances in Dari; 4) the interpreter’s translations from Dari to 
English; and 5) the interpreter’s own utterances in English,319 which are also shown in a 
graph in the following Chart 1.
320
 
 
Table 2: Total Utterance Breakdown (1,283 Total Utterances) 
 
 
Police 
Officer 
Interpreter 
into Dari 
Suspect Interpreter 
into Eng. 
Interpreter 
Own Eng. 
Total 
Utterances 284 305 346 304 44 1,283 
 
Chart 1: Total Utterance Breakdown (1,283 Total Utterances)   
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 An immediate question that arises is: why are there number discrepancies 
between: 1) the police officer’s utterances in English and the interpreter’s utterances 
(translations) in Dari; and 2) the suspect’s utterances in Dari and the interpreter’s 
translations of them in English?  The interpreter made 21 (=305 minus 284) extra 
utterances in Dari, which may not have been translations.   Similarly, the interpreter 
may not have translated 42 (=346 minus 304) utterances made by the suspect.  In 
addition, the interpreter made 44 English utterances of his own. 
 It would seem that the interpreter’s additional utterances in Dari were probably 
the result of “extra round-trip exchanges” with the suspect, which, however, cannot be 
verified unless and until the interpreter’s utterances in Dari and the suspect’s utterances 
in Dari are both “check-translated” back into English.      
 
2. Extra Monolingual Round-Trips   
 Such utterance number discrepancies are usually sensed by the participants as a 
possible occurrence of “extra monolingual round-trips,” i.e. extra verbal exchanges 
between the interpreter and one of the parties, excluding the other.   
 If the interpreter moves on without sharing the information with the excluded 
party, what might have been a completely harmless exchange could start spawning seeds 
of distrust on the part of the excluded party.  Without the help of the interpreter, it is 
impossible for a monolingual participant to find out real-time as to what has been said.  
Therefore, this thesis examined these “monolingual round-trips” (in Dari and English) 
that seemed to have taken place during the interview, which, however, was only made 
possible later with the help of the “check interpreter,” not at this first stage of indirect 
observations from the standpoint of “monolingual participants.”   
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 Before discussing these findings, therefore, let us quickly look at another, 
similarly basic factor which is also perceived often by monolingual participants: the time 
spent for each utterance. 
 
3. Total Time Spoken and Per Utterance Time Correlation   
 “Longer or shorter time” used for the target-language translation in comparison 
with the time spent for the original, source-language utterance is also another, very 
common source of frustration and suspicion in an interpreter-assisted discourse.  This is 
exactly what Bob Harris (played by Bill Murray) was trying to express in the 2003 Sofia 
Coppola film Lost in Translation, when he repeatedly asked his interpreter, “Is that 
everything?  It seems that he said quite a bit more than that,” after the interpreter’s 
extremely skimpy translation.
321
   
 Also, in Ko v. U.S., a case in which “interpreter bias” became an issue, the 
ruling noted that when the defense counsel began cross-examining one of the witnesses, 
he noticed that the witness was “saying an awful lot for what we’re getting back in 
English.”322  Let us, therefore, look at the total time spent for each discourse in Chart 2 
below, to see if there are any unusual discrepancies. 
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Chart 2: Total Time in Seconds (Utterances and Pauses) 
 
 
 Chart 2 shows the total amount of time (in seconds) used by each interlocutor: 
the total time spent for both the utterances (shown in black) and the pauses (shown in 
gray) before each utterance.  The chart seems to show a fairly good balance between 
each corresponding discourse pair.   
 The suspect spent the largest amount of total time (1,124.79 total seconds) with 
the accompanying translation by the interpreter (into English), spending the second 
largest time amount, nearly the same total time of 1,111.03 seconds.  The police officer 
used 631.053 seconds, only a little more than half of the suspect’s total time, meaning 
that the suspect spoke nearly twice the amount of time spent by the interviewing police 
officer.  The time spent for the accompanying translations by the interpreter (into Dari) 
was 705.072 seconds, slightly more than that for the original English utterances made by 
the police officer.   
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 Chart 2, however, only shows the total sum only, so from this chart alone, we 
cannot determine exactly if the interpreter’s each rendition was faithfully close to each 
matching source language utterance in terms of the time length. 
 For this reason, the thesis has also conducted a correlation coefficient test to see 
if every pair of an original utterance and its translation in the entire recording had spent a 
“statistically similar” time amount.  This verification work was also made possible only 
after all the utterances in Dari in the recording were “check-translated” by the “check 
interpreter,” because sorting out “correctly matching pair” for each utterance was an 
impossible task when one understood only one of the two languages.  After identifying 
correctly corresponding utterance pairs for both English-Dari translations (244 pairs) 
and Dari-English translations (286 pairs), the data was processed.  Chart 3-1 below 
shows the correlation coefficient between the “police officer’s utterance time in English” 
and the “interpreter’s translation time of those utterances into Dari,” which shows a 
“very high” correlation (R=0.81). 
 
   Chart 3-1: Police Officer’s Utterance Time and Interpreter’s Translation Time     
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 Similarly, Chart 3-2 below shows the correlation coefficient between the 
“suspect’s utterance time in Dari” and the “interpreter’s translation time of those 
utterances into English,” which also shows a “moderately high” correlation (R=0.67). 
 
     Chart 3-2: Suspect’s Utterance Time and Interpreter’s Translation Time 
         
 
 Therefore, if we look at the “time” factor only, or “equivalence in terms of the 
rendition time” only, the results seem to indicate that this interpreter was quite proficient 
and reliable. 
 
4. Average Pause Time   
 Chart 2, supra, also revealed something very interesting as well as crucially 
important: the total amount of pause time spent by each interlocutor.  It seems that the 
interpreter spent significantly less total amount of pause time than the other two 
speakers. 
 Still, Chart 2 shows the total sum only.  Therefore, in order to get a more 
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accurate picture, let us now look at the “average” pause time of each interlocutor in each 
discourse.  Chart 4 below shows the average pause time of each interlocutor.  
Although there are three participants, the average pause time was measured for each one 
of the following 5 discourses: 1) police officer, 2) interpreter (speaking in Dari or 
translation into Dari), 3) suspect, 4) interpreter (translation into English), and 5) 
interpreter’s own (speaking in English). 
 
     Chart 4: Average Pause Time in Seconds      
      
 
 Chart 4 shows a very interesting result.  On the average, the interviewing 
police officer paused the longest before making each statement, which was longer than 
one second (1.14 seconds).  Also, the interpreter’s translations, both into Dari and into 
English were rendered with the shortest pause at the beginning of each rendition: 0.504 
second from English into Dari, and 0.428 second from Dari into English.  Though this 
is not the purpose of this thesis, such extreme contemporaneity verified here would seem 
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to very easily support even the application of FRE 803(1) “Present Sense Impression” 
for a “hearsay exception.”323 
 Of course, the only ironical “fly in the ointment” in using FRE 803(1) “Present 
Sense Impression” for interpreters’ extrajudicial translations is that the main rationale for 
this rule, which is that the statement was made within too short a time for the declarant 
to fabricate anything untrue, or more simply the “no-time-to-think” rationale, does not 
quite apply for interpreting work, which is one of the most “mentally demanding” 
activities, requiring maximum cognitive concentration. 
 Another interesting thing that can be observed from Chart 4 is that the same 
interpreter paused a much longer time when making his own statements in English, even 
longer than the suspect.  The suspect in this interview usually paused only a 
surprisingly short time, which may have been a result of the fact that many of his short 
responses were simple “nodding” responses in Dari, which was “baleh,”324 which, of 
course, was another fact that was only verified later by the “check translation.”  
Another reason for the suspect’s very short average pause time might have been that the 
                                                   
 
323
  Though not a mainstream, there have been some jurisdictions in the U.S. which have 
applied FRE 803(1) “Present Sense Impression” to use a “hearsay exception” for interpreter-assisted 
out-of-court testimonies, e.g., New Jersey Division of Child Protection Permanency v. H.A. and M.A., 
N.J. Super. Unpub. (2015), 16-17.  Also see, G. Michael Fenner, “Privileges, Hearsay, and Other 
Matters,”  Creighton Law Review 30 (1996): 812, “a simultaneous translation would fit under the 
first exception in Rule 803, the present sense impression”; David F. Binder, Hearsay Handbook, 4th., 
2013-2014 ed., (Danvers, MA: Thomson Reuters, 2013), 880, “[i]f an interpreter makes a 
contemporaneous translation of spoken words, the interpreter’s reporting of what he hears should 
qualify for exception from the hearsay rule as present sense impressions.  It is no different in 
principle from a sports broadcaster’s contemporaneous reporting of what he sees taking place on the 
ball field.”  It is very interesting that this note by Binder describes exactly the same thing as what 
Goffman described as a characteristic of an “animator” or a “sound box.”  See Chapter IX, B-2, 
supra.   
   
 
324
 Out of the suspect’s total 346 utterances, 54 were this simple nodding response 
“baleh.”   
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suspect made numerous interruptions throughout the interview.
325
 
 
5. Pause Time and Interpreting Proficiency   
 The core difference between interpreting work and written translation work 
resides in the crucial “time” factor.  Interpreters are always under an “enormous” time 
pressure, which also means that this pause length or the time lag between the end of the 
source-language statement and the start of its translation signifies the general proficiency 
level of an interpreter, the ultimate of which is the skill to perform the so-called 
“whispering (or chuchotage in French),” a live, on-spot “simultaneous” oral translation. 
 Therefore, from a purely forensic linguistic standpoint, the data on this 
interpreter’s pause time in comparison with the other interview participants’ as well as 
that of the interpreter himself’s own utterances in English merits another statistical test 
to determine the “significance” of its brevity.  The thesis, thus, conducted the following 
four sets of “pause time comparison” t-Test: 1) the police officer and the interpreter’s 
translation into Dari; 2) the suspect and the interpreter’s translation into English; 3) the 
interpreter’s translation into Dari and the interpreter’s translation into English; and 4) the 
interpreter’s translation into English and the interpreter’s own utterances in English.  
Each comparison test is accompanied by histogram charts which visually demonstrate 
the pause patterns of each interlocutor.  The horizontal axis shows the pause length in 
seconds, and the vertical axis shows the number of pauses made. 
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 The suspect made a total of 14 interruptions during the recorded part of the interview.  
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Chart 5-1: Police Officer and Interpreter’s Translation into Dari: Significant Difference 
 
 
Chart 5-2: Suspect and Interpreter’s Translation into English: Significant Difference 
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Chart 5-3: Interpreter into Dari and Interpreter into English: No Significant Difference 
 
 
Chart 5-4: Interpreter into English and Interpreter’s Own in English: Significant 
Difference 
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 Thus, the results shown in these four charts above indicate that the interpreter’s 
pause time in his translation renditions was significantly shorter than that of all the other 
participants, including the interpreter’s own statements made in English.  Also, this 
interpreter demonstrated a highly stable proficiency in his interpreting delivery in both 
language directions.  He rendered a total of 609 translations back and forth with an 
average 0.5 second pause time from English into Dari and 0.428 second pause time from 
Dari into English during the entire 77.39 minutes without taking one single break.  
Regarding the “speed” and “fluency” of the interpreting proficiency, therefore, this 
interpreter seems to have demonstrated a sufficiently acceptable skill level. 
  
C. Question-and-Answer Turn-Taking Cycle Patterns 
 As was mentioned in Chapter X, B-1, supra, while transcribing the utterance 
data on ELAN, the author noticed an interesting turn-taking cycle patterns, which 
appeared on the ELAN screen like the following Chart 6.  
Chart 6: Police Interview Turn-Taking Cycle Patterns on ELAN 
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 The 10 horizontal tiers shown below the soundwave diagram screen are, from 
top to bottom, in the order of: 1) police officer’s pause; 2) police officer’s utterance; 3) 
interpreter’ (into Dari) pause; 4) interpreter’s (into Dari) utterance; 5) suspect’s pause; 6) 
suspect’s utterance; 7) interpreter’s (into English) pause; and 8) interpreter’s (into 
English) utterance.  The two extra tiers at the very bottom are: 9) interpreter’s (own 
statement) pause; and 10) interpreter (own statement) utterance.   
 
1. Police Officer’s Institutional Power in Interview Discourse   
 In a police discourse, whether assisted by an interpreter or not, the interviewing 
police officer has an institutional power to steer and control its direction, a point also 
mentioned by Georgina Heydon in her critical discourse analysis of monolingual police 
interviews, as was already mentioned, supra.
326
   This has been visually and visibly 
corroborated in the above turn-taking patterns that have emerged on the ELAN screen.  
Each cycle always begins with the interviewing police officer who initiates the next 
question.  In an interpreter-assisted interview, an extra turn is added both before and 
after the suspect’s response, and then each cycle is completed, waiting for the start of a 
next new cycle initiated again by the interviewing police officer. 
 
2. Police Interview Turn-Taking Cycles: Confirmable or Unconfirmable   
 One of the key questions this thesis has asked is to what extent monolingual 
participants in a police discourse can assess the accuracy and impartiality of the 
interpreter.  From the standpoint of the police officer, this is done only indirectly by 
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 Heydon, The Language of Police Interviewing, 94.  Also, see Chapter IX, B-3, and 
Chapter X, B-1. 
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listening to the response returned in a four-step question-and-answer cycle, which 
proceeds in the order of: 1) the police officer’s question; 2) the interpreter’s translation 
into Dari; 3) the suspect’s response; and 4) the interpreter’s translation back into English.  
The following are examples of this four-step question-and-answer cycle.  At this stage, 
the utterances in Dari are marked as “XXX,” as for the English-speaking police officer, 
they are basically unintelligible.  Discourse Clip 1 is an example of a relatively smooth 
exchange. 
 
Discourse Clip 1: Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle 
P104: 
ID109: 
S099:   
IE075:  
And what is this for? 
XXX? 
XXX. 
For my brain, for my psychotic. 
 
 This Full 4-Step Question-and-Answer Cycle provides an indirect safeguard, as 
even if the returned response does not seem to “click” with perfect correspondence, the 
police officer can still confirm it with the next question, though as to why the returned 
question did not match the question remains unknown; i.e., the police officer cannot 
confirm if it was the interpreter’s translation problem or the suspect’s logicality problem, 
as in Discourse Clip 2. 
 
Discourse Clip 2: Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle 
P085:    
ID084: 
S066: 
IE048: 
Do you take this medicine every day? 
XXX?  
XXX.  
For the last one year, I’ve been taking this. 
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 Since the officer’s question and the suspect’s answer did not quite match, the 
police officer immediately asked the same question again in Discourse Clip 3, which, 
this time, received the answer he wanted.  
 
Discourse Clip 3: Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle 
P086:    
ID085:   
S067:  
IE049:  
Every day? 
XXX? 
XXX.         
Yes, every day. 
 
 Though troublesome, this “Full 4-Step Question-and-Answer Cycle” still 
provides the questioner with an opportunity to ascertain the probable success or failure 
of each question-and-answer cycle.  Unfortunately, however, not all police interview 
turn-taking cycles proceed in this pattern.  Look at the next three cycle patterns shown 
in Discourse Clip 4, Discourse Clip 5, and Discourse Clip 6. 
 
Discourse Clip 4: 2-Step Unilateral 
P068:    
ID069: 
It is his…your right, 
XXX, 
P069:   
ID070:   
not to talk to me. 
XXX. 
 
 In Discourse Clip 4, which the author has named “2-Step Unilateral,” the 
suspect does not necessarily have to and thus usually does not respond, so the above two 
“2-step Unilateral” cycles took place back-to-back very quickly, without the officer 
ascertaining the suspect’s understanding of what he has just conveyed to the suspect. 
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 Now let us look at the next “3-Step Untranslated,” which actually is a variation 
of the above “2-Step Unilateral.”  Again, the Dari utterances are marked “XXX,” so the 
interviewing officer has no way of finding what is being said.  In each of the three 
successive “3-Step Untranslated” exchange in Discourse Clip 5, the second utterance is 
the interpreter’s translation into Dari, followed by the suspect’s utterance, which, 
however, does not get translated back to the officer.  The officer can only speculate 
what the suspect has possibly said which the interpreter either thought did not require 
translation or just missed translating.  
 
Discourse Clip 5: 3-Step Untranslated 
P059: 
ID:062: 
S:047 
but because he…, you were in a police station, 
XXX, 
XXX. 
P060:   
ID063:   
S048: 
and you have been arrested, 
XXX, 
XXX. 
P061:   
ID064:  
S049:  
for murder, 
XXX, 
XXX. 
 
 In each of the above three successive cycles, the suspect made an utterance, but 
the interpreter did not translate it, and the officer also simply moved on without waiting 
for it to be translated.  The only reason this is permissible would be because the nature 
of the exchange was basically the same as “2-Step Unilateral” in Discourse Clip 4, 
meaning that the suspect did not really have to respond but did so, which neither for the 
officer nor for the interpreter was very important, and thus went untranslated.  
 In addition to the above three turn-taking cycle patterns, a fourth pattern, 
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though not very frequent, has also been observed in this video recording, as is shown in 
Discourse Clip 6 , In this pattern, the suspect interrupts the police officer, so the police 
officer’s utterance, which was to start the next new cycle, simply disappears, never 
getting translated. 
 
Discourse Clip 6: Officer Interrupted by Suspect 
P032:    
S021:  
IE014: 
Some of the…  <interrupted by the suspect> 
XXX.    
I told them I don’t know any other language, and I know only Dari.  They 
keep (sic) saying that (sic) Hindi, Hindi.  I said, “No, I don’t know any 
Hindi.” 
 
D. Ratio of Confirmable, Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle 
 Of the total 284 utterances made by the police officer, 27 were simple nodding 
affirmations or responses to the interpreter’s own statements.  The thesis has classified 
the remaining 257 “police-officer-initiated” discourse cycles into the following four 
patterns as is shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Turn-Taking Cycle Patterns 
  Turn-Taking Order Total number Ratio (%) 
Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle  PO-ID-S-IE 178 69.26 
3-Step Untranslated  PO-ID-S 17 6.62 
2-Step Unilateral  PO-ID 54 21.01 
Officer Interrupted by S  PO-S-IE 8 3.11 
 
 Needless to say each of these four “basic” pattern categories encompasses a 
number of variations.  For example, a turn-taking cycle in the order of 
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“PO-ID-S-IE-S-IE,” in which the suspect’s response was made in two separate 
utterances, each followed by a separate English translation, is categorized as a variation 
of “Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle.”  Similarly, a more deviated variation like the one in 
Discourse Clip 7 is still categorized as a variation of “Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle.”  
 
Discourse Clip 7: “PO-I” Categorized as Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle  
P159:    
I032: 
Peer Mohammad? 
Yes. 
 
 Here, the interpreter happened to answer the officer’s question himself, 
skipping the in-between “ID-S” part.  Still, the officer got a response to his question, 
and the officer still has the option of asking the same question again just to ascertain that 
the suspect, not the interpreter, answers it this time with the same response.  Therefore, 
the above “PO-I” in Discourse Clip 7 can be safely categorized as a variation of “Full 
4-Step Q-and-A Cycle.”   
 In contrast, a turn-taking sequence “PO-ID-PO-ID-S-IE” is not categorized as 
one “Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle.”  It must be divided into: “2-Step Unilateral” (PO-ID), 
and “Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle” (PO-ID-S-IE), as is shown in Discourse Clip 8.  
 
Discourse Clip 8: “PO-ID-PO-ID-S-IE” as 2-Step Unilateral and Full 4-Step Q-and-A   
P238: 
ID259: 
Today,  
Today, 
P239: 
ID260: 
S288: 
IE249: 
did you go out?   
did you go out? 
From where? 
From where? 
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 The criteria for such pattern categorization are all based on whether or not the 
police officer has a way of ascertaining successful communication of his message to the 
suspect by listening to the translated response that is returned to him before making his 
next utterance that starts a new cycle.  In Discourse Clip 8, although P238 (“Today,”) 
and P239 (“did you go out?”) were originally one sentence, by dividing it into two and 
letting the interpreter translate the first part before continuing the rest of the sentence, 
the officer has become unable to ascertain if his first utterance was successfully 
communicated before making his next utterance.  The following Discourse Clip 9 
shows a similar example, in which the first three cycles are “2-Step Unilateral” and only 
the last one becomes a “Full 4-Step Q-and-A.” 
 
Discourse Clip 9: “PO-ID-PO-ID-PO-ID-S-IE” 
P070:  
ID071:  
But the highest court in our country, 
But the court in our country, 
P071:  
ID072: 
the Supreme Court of Canada,  
the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest court in Canada, 
P072:  
ID073:  
tells me, as the investigator,  
tells me, 
P073:  
ID074:  
S053:  
IE038:  
that I can ask you any question that I believe is relative.  
that I have a right to ask any questions that are related to this incident. 
If my lawyer tells me to talk, I will talk. 
If my lawyer allows me to say or talk, I will do that. 
 
 The data in Table 3 has been projected into the following Chart 7. As the chart 
indicates, the ratio of the confirmable, Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle constitutes the largest 
percentage of the total, 69.26%, which seems to indicate that in nearly 7 out of every 10 
exchanges, the police officer had a means to confirm if the communication was 
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successful or not.  At the same time, however, the figures also indicate that in nearly 
30% of all the exchanges, the best the police officer could do was just to assume or trust 
that his message was properly communicated to the suspect by the interpreter who was 
sent by a private company which had a business contract with the Toronto Police.  
 
Chart 7: Ratio of Confirmable, Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle
 
 
1. Pragmatic Functions of Each Cycle Pattern   
 The Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle exchanges are usually: information-gathering 
questions (yes/no questions and wh-questions) and challenges (confrontations or leading 
questions), whereas both 3-Step Untranslated and 2-Step Unilateral are generally: 
commands, notifications, confirmations, and affirmations, which do not always require 
responses.   
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2. Pragmatic Functions by Scenes   
 In Table 1, supra, the thesis showed that this interview was divided into four 
scenes: 1) police caution, 2) prescriptions, 3) traffic accident, and 4) murder.  As is 
shown in Chart 8 below, 2-Step Unilateral and 3-Step Untranslated patterns appear 
predominantly in the first “police caution” scene, in which the police officer’s 
institutional duty is to “notify” the suspect of his rights, though with an LEP suspect, 
ensuring his understanding through the interpreter was not easy, which is why it took as 
much as 17.37 minutes.   
 In contrast, Full 4-Step-Q-and-A Cycle pattern appears primarily in the fourth 
“murder interrogation” scene, the most critical of all the four scenes, in which 86 out of 
the total 108 (17+2+86+3) cycles, or about 79.6% of all the exchange cycles in this 
murder interrogation scene were in the Full 4-Step-Q-and-A Cycle pattern.  This, 
however, is only natural as the one and the only goal of this fourth, “murder 
interrogation” scene was to obtain the suspect’s voluntary confession about the murder 
that he had allegedly committed, by asking a number of leading and confrontational 
questions one after another. 
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Chart 8: Turn-Taking Cycle Patterns by Four Interview Scenes 
 
 
E. Monolingual Extra Round-Trips within Each Cycle 
 In Chapter XI (this chapter), B-2, supra, this thesis mentioned that the 
inter-lingual discrepancy in the total number of utterances with each language pair 
strongly suggests the occurrence of extra round-trips conducted between the interpreter 
and one of the two parties in only one language.  This, of course, is against the code of 
ethics, and such behavior can very quickly spawn seeds of distrust on the excluded party.   
 In a real job, however, the interpreter must also confirm or clarify any 
ambiguities with each speaker’s statement before rendering its translation.  Therefore, 
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asking such clarification questions is inevitable as well as essential.  The question is 
“how” this is done, so the interpreter does not lose the parties’ trust.  The most 
commonly employed manner is to “excuse oneself” or “quickly explain” why this needs 
to be asked, immediately before or after this verbal act 
 The difficulty in assessing the appropriateness of the interpreter’s behavior in 
this respect resides in the fact that only those who know both languages perfectly can 
understand what kind of information was actually exchanged.  In this research, too, the 
author of the thesis was completely excluded from all the Dari exchanges in the 
recording until all of them were “translated” by the “check interpreter.”  Till then, the 
only thing monolingual English speakers or audience could possibly do is to simply just 
guess what they may be saying. 
 These extra round-trips can range from a relatively simple one extra round-trip 
like the one in Discourse Clip 10-1 to a more complex, consecutive multiple (e.g. double 
or triple) extra round-trips as is shown in Discourse Clip 11-1 or often a combination of 
several of them interspersed in one discourse cycle like Discourse Clip 12-1.  In these 
discourse clips below, the utterances in Dari are shown as “XXX,” as for monolingual 
English speakers they remain unintelligible until they are check-translated back into 
English. 
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Discourse Clip 10-1: One Extra Round-Trip 
P215:    
ID233:  
S264:  
ID234: 
S265: 
IE228:  
<looking at the suspect>  So he gets angry? 
XXX?    
XXX? 
XXX? 
XXX. 
I just can’t think. 
 
Discourse Clip 11-1: Two Consecutive Extra Round-Trips 
P183:    
ID199:  
S224: 
ID200: 
S225: 
ID201: 
S226: 
IE192:  
My officers tell me that you ate earlier. 
XXX. 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX.   
At 2:00 p.m., or two o’clock p.m., they brought something in the paper.   
I eat that.  I ate that.  
 
Discourse Clip 12-1: Several Interspersed Extra Round-Trips 
P051:    
ID052:  
S036: 
I002: 
P052: 
I003: 
ID053: 
S037: 
IE029: 
ID054: 
S038: 
IE030:
  
“retain” means to “hire a lawyer.” 
XXX. 
XXX. 
<to the police officer>  Excuse me, 
Yes? 
I don’t want to…, 
XXX? 
XXX. 
Earlier, you said that tomorrow when we go to the court, 
“OK,”  <to the suspect>  XXX,  
<leaning towards the interpreter, as if to ensure his understanding>  XXX. 
there would be a lawyer present, and also a person who could (sic) 
interpret, who could (sic) know my language, would be present tomorrow. 
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 In all of the above three examples, each discourse cycle that started with the 
police officer’s utterance does get completed at the end with the interpreter’s translation 
into English.  The problem with these extra round-trips, however, is that it always feels 
that there has been “a lot more” than what was finally translated in English.  To warrant 
such “wary feelings,” this thesis has measured the actual “time discrepancy” shown in 
Discourse Clip 11-2. 
 
Discourse Clip 11-2: Two Consecutive Extra Round-Trips (Time Discrepancy Measured) 
P183:    
ID199:  
S224: 
ID200: 
S225: 
ID201: 
S226: 
IE192:  
My officers tell me that you ate earlier. 
XXX. 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX.  (Total time spent for all of these six “XXX”s: 36.418 seconds) 
At 2:00 p.m., or two o’clock p.m., they brought something in the paper.   
I eat that.  I ate that.  (IE192 Rendition Time: 7.474 seconds)  
 
 As Discourse Clip 11-2 above shows, this “lot more” actually lasted for 36.418 
seconds while the final English translation was only 7.474 seconds, just about 1/5 of 
what has been exchanged in Dari, requiring a lot of patience on the officer.
327
  Ideally, 
such extra round-trips should never take place, and court interpreters’ code of ethics also 
prohibits, in principle, such verbal behavior.  Even for the purpose of clarification, the 
basic rule is that the interpreter should let the parties do the figuring out, instead of doing 
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 As was mentioned in Chapter XI (this chapter), B-3, supra as well as in fnn. 321 and 
322, this time discrepancy between the original utterance and the rendered translation, e.g., the 
former having been 5 times longer than what the interpreter finally rendered in translation is a very 
common source of frustration and suspicion on the excluded party. 
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it on one’s own.   
 In actual interpreting work, however, such extra round-trips inevitably pop up, 
usually “meant well” as a “quick” confirmation or clarification to better facilitate the 
communication.  What an interpreter can do in such cases, as a courtesy to the excluded 
party, is to give a quick “excuse” or “explanation” before or after such round-trips to 
gain the excluded party’s patience, just as this interpreter did in Discourse Clips 13-1 
and 13-2 below.  
 
Discourse Clip 13-1: Extra Round-Trips with an Advance Excuse 
P0180:    
ID195:  
S219: 
 
IE187: 
 
I037: 
ID196: 
S220: 
IE188: 
Because of something that happened at your home. 
XXX. 
<looking down very uncomfortably for a moment, moving his legs slightly>  
XXX.  
I don’t know the…, the…incident.  All I said is, come on, come here, come 
on in, that is er…,  
<to the police officer>  Excuse me,      
<to the suspect>  XXX?    
XXX. 
Come on in and watch, see what happened, or what was the matter.  
 
Discourse Clip 13-2: Extra Round-Trips with an Explanation at the End 
P096:    
ID097:  
S082: 
ID200: 
S225: 
ID201: 
S084: 
I013: 
 
And what happens if you don’t take your stomach medication? 
XXX? 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX. 
XXX. 
XXX.   
Just on a correction, I asked what’s the word “nafgh bad,” so he explained 
“gas.” 
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S085: 
IE061: 
P097: 
Gas. 
If I don’t take that, gas will be produced, 
Yes. 
 
1. Extra Round-Trips in Dari   
 Of the total 258 exchange cycles initiated by the police officer, 27 cycles, or 
10.5% of them, contained one or more extra round-trip exchanges between the 
interpreter and the suspect.  Table 4 below shows the breakdown by the four scenes. 
 Some cycles contained more than one of such round-trips, so the total number 
of extra “round trips” became 36.  Out of this total 36 round trips, 19 of them were 
“one extra round-trip” without excuse; 5 of them were “one extra round-trip” with 
excuse; 7 of them were “two consecutive extra round-trips” without excuse; 3 of them 
were “two consecutive extra round-trips” with excuse; and the remaining 2 were “three 
or more consecutive extra round-trips” with excuse.    Cycles containing separate 
(interspersed), multiple round-trips are marked as “1+/cycle,” and each cycle is shown in 
a separate row with all the included round-trips, right beneath the top row of each scene, 
below each broken line. 
 As is clear from the Table 4 below, out of the total 36 extra round trips, 10 
round trips (5+3+2) were accompanied by an excuse or explanation by the interpreter, 
such as “Excuse me,” or “Excuse me, I have to go back again,” while the remaining 26 
(19+7) did not.. 
 Although the total of 26 extra round-trips without an excuse or explanation is a 
slight deviation from the most strictly interpreted code of ethics, in both of the 2 “three 
or more consecutive round-trips” and in 4 out of 5 (1+1+3) “cycles with separate, 
multiple round-trips,” the interpreter did provide an excuse or explanation.   
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Table 4: Extra Round Trips in Dari with or without Excuse or Explanation Given 
 
Scenes 
1 (Con- 
secutive) 
Rnd/ 
cycle 
1  
Rnd 
1  
Rnd 
2  
Rnds 
2  
Rnds 
3+  
Rnds 
3+  
Rnds 
Total 
Cycles 
w/Round 
Trips  
1+ (Sep- 
arate, 
Multiple 
Rnds/ 
cycle 
Excuse/ 
Explanation 
with- 
out 
with with- 
out 
with with- 
out 
with  
Police 
caution 
1/cycle 2      3  
4 
1+/cycle 1 1     1 
Pre- 
scrip- 
tions 
1/cycle 1 1 4 1   7  
8 1+/cycle 1   1   1 
Car 
Acci- 
dent 
1/cycle 1 1     2  
 
5 
1+/cycle 3     1  
3 1+/cycle 3      
1+/cycle 3     1 
Murder 1/cycle 4 2 3 1   10 10 
1+/cycle       0 
Total 
Round 
Trips 
 19 5 7 3 0 2    27/258    
   Cycles 
36  
Total 
 
 Also, the largest number took place during the fourth “murder interrogation” 
scene with a total of 10 cycles containing either one extra or two consecutive extra 
round-trips, which, if these round trips were made to clarify or confirm the suspect’s 
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statements, may mean that the interpreter was being extra cautious about not 
mistranslating anything, which could only be verified with the help of a “check 
interpreter,” as will be shown in the next chapter.  
 Before ending this chapter, however, let us look at one more important point 
concerning these extra monolingual round-trips.  For English-speaking parties and 
fact-triers, these extra round-trips in recorded police interviews usually stand out 
conspicuously as they are given in a foreign language (and thus unintelligible).  What 
tends to be forgotten is that the same is also happening to the suspect during the same 
interview whenever the interviewing police officer and the interpreter conduct a verbal 
exchange in English that does not get translated into the suspect’s language. 
 
2. Extra Round-Trips in English    
 Let us, therefore, look at the same “extra round-trip” issue from the suspect’s 
standpoint.  In this particular interview, too, such exchanges, or “extra round-trips in 
English,” did take place, as shown below in Table 5.   
 
Table 5: Extra Round Trips in English with or without Excuse or Explanation Given 
  Extra Round Trips Total 
Excuse/Explanation without with  
 
 
Scenes 
police caution 3 0 3 
prescriptions 4 1 5 
car accident 1 1 2 
murder 2 1 3 
TOTAL 10 3 13 
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 For English-speakers, extra round trips that take place in English may not seem 
as disturbing or even noticeable as those that take place in an unintelligible foreign 
language, but as is shown above, a total of 13 extra round-trips took place in English, out 
of which only 3 were accompanied by an excuse (e.g. “Excuse me”) or an apology (e.g. 
“I’m sorry”). 
 Just to get a feel of what this may sound like, let us first look at the following 
Discourse Clips 14-1 and 14-2 below. 
 
Discourse Clip 14-1: Extra Round-Trips in English Excluding the Suspect 
S171: 
IE140: 
I027:    
 
P141: 
I028: 
 
P142: 
I209: 
IE141: 
XXX. 
After they took me to the hospital, at one o’clock, they give me… 
Er…, something like glucose, glucose “liquidicadance” (sic), so 
it’s…what’s that called…er… 
What does he call? 
“Serum.”  <<The suspect also repeats the word “serum” in the 
background.>> 
Yeah, that’s fine. 
Yes, “serum”…, <finally remembering> intravenous!     
So, they gave me the intravenous. 
 
 The above exchange may not sound particularly disturbing to English-speaking 
audience who listen to this recording, as except for the first utterance by S171, which 
was immediately translated into English, the entire exchange that followed is in English 
and clearly shows what the problem was.  If, however, the situation was the other way 
round, the entire discourse in the suspect’s shoes would sound like Discourse Clip 14-2. 
The English utterances, which the suspect does not understand, are marked as “XXX.” 
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Discourse Clip 14-2: English Extra Round-Trips Switched to Dari 
S171: 
IE140: 
I027:    
P141: 
I028: 
 
P142: 
I209: 
IE141: 
After that, they gave me a “serum” and after that nothing else. 
XXX. 
XXX…, XXX…XXX…XXX… 
XXX? 
“Serum.”  <<The suspect also repeats the word “serum” in the 
background.>> 
XXX. 
XXX, “serum”…, XXX!   
XXX. 
 
 Watching the video, English-speaking fact-triers might notice that in Discourse 
Clip 14-1, when the interpreter was thinking aloud, responding to the police officer in 
Line I028, saying “Serum,” the suspect kept looking back and forth at both the police 
officer and the interpreter, listening intently to get a hint as to what was being exchanged, 
and repeated the Dari word “serum” in the background, gesturing also with his hands a 
shape of an intravenous drip bottle in an effort to help his interpreter.   
 Having to resort to such a gesture simply shows the enormous language barrier 
an LEP suspect regularly undergoes, and for this particular suspect, this interpreter who 
finally arrived past midnight was the only means of communication with those who 
would be indicting him for murder.  He would do all he could to ensure that this 
interpreter translated everything accurately, though he could only do this indirectly or 
even non-verbally. 
  
F. Summary 
 This chapter presented forensic linguistic research results and analyses of the 
Dari-interpreter-assisted Toronto Police interview from interview participants’ 
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standpoint.  The main question here was to what extent and how these monolingual 
participants can assess “accuracy” and “impartiality” of the interpreter’s translation 
through indirect means. 
 The discrepancy in the total number of utterances (PO: 284, ID: 305, S: 346, IE: 
304, I: 44) immediately implied the existence of monolingual extra round-trips.  By a 
simple calculation, such extra round-trips in Dari appeared in 10.5% or 27 out of the 
total 257 discourse cycles initiated by the police officer.  Out of 27, only 10 were 
accompanied by an excuse or explanation.  As for extra round-trips in English, there 
were 13 such exchanges, out of which only 3 were accompanied by similar signals. 
 As one way for the police officer to assess successful communication, the thesis 
analyzed 4 turn-taking cycle patterns, each starting with the police officer: 2-Step 
Unilateral (PO-ID); 3-Step Untranslated (PO-ID-S); Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle 
(PO-ID-S-IE); and Officer Interrupted by Suspect (PO-S-IE).  Of these 4 patterns, the 
only one that permits a chance for the officer to confirm successful communication is 
Full 4-Step Q-and-A Cycle (PO-ID-S-IE), which accounted for 69.26% of the total 257 
cycles. 
 Two other factors that may help the participants to even indirectly assess the 
interpreter’s competence are: pause time (how quickly the translation arrives following 
the source-language utterance) and time correlation between the source-language 
utterance and its translation in the target language in each translation pair.  Regarding 
the pause time, the interpreter for this particular interview demonstrated an extremely 
high proficiency of an average 0.5 second pause time from English to Dari and 0.428 
second pause time from Dari into English. 
 As for the source-language and target-language translation pair time correlation, 
168 
 
 
the result also showed a very high correlation between the officer’s English utterance 
and the interpreter’s translation into Dari (R=0.81) and moderately high correlation 
between the suspect’s Dari utterance and the interpreter’s translation into English 
(R=0.67). 
 Though the results so far do not seem to contradict the fact that this is a police 
interview interpreting performance that perfectly satisfied the “conduit” standards of the 
then Ontario Superior Court of Justice, these are only as far as “indirect means” can go 
in terms of “conduit verification.”  Anything more, anything further that can truly 
convince (or dissuade) the fact-triers requires a check interpreter’s authenticated 
translation of the entire interview
  
 
 
Chapter XII 
Results and Analyses 2: Expert Witness’s Standpoint 
 
 In Chapter XI, the thesis tried to present facts and their analyses from the 
monolingual participants’ standpoint, who can only indirectly assess the interpreter’s 
accuracy and impartiality from the limited available clues.  This chapter will shift the 
standpoint to that of an expert witness, who is able to: 1) verify the accuracy of the 
interview interpreter’s translation, 2) fill in all the missing information that had taken 
place in the foreign language, and 3) assess the general credibility or reliability of the 
interpreter.   
 
A. Impartiality Issue 1: Footing Shifts 
 In Section E of the previous chapter (Chapter XI), we saw how “monolingual” 
extra round-trips can start spawning distrust on the excluded party.  Such behavior of 
the interpreter is not just annoying from an excluded party’s subjective viewpoint.  
From an objective standpoint, too, it could be regarded as a sign of partiality.  
 
1. Interpreter’s Footing Shifts in English 
 In all of the extra “round-trips” between the interpreter and the police officer 
shown in Table 5 in Chapter XI, E-2, the interpreter was making statements in English 
which were not translations of the suspect’s statements made in Dari.  In other words, 
the interpreter was making his own statements, expressing his ideas.  The code of 
ethics strictly limits such behavior only to absolutely necessary situations, e.g., to clarify
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an ambiguity that may lead to a mistranslation. 
 In this recording, the interpreter made a total of 44 statements of his own in 
English to communicate with the police officer.  In such situations, the interpreter is 
making a so-called “footing shift,” taking on a different role from the most strictly 
defined “conduit” role.  Using Goffman’s terminology, the interpreter is becoming 
either a “principal” or even an “author,” instead of remaining in the prescribed “animator” 
role.
328
   
 The thesis already noted one study on “interpreter-mediated police interviews” 
conducted by Nakane, who used Goffman’s analytical tool,329 in which she stated that 
interpreters in police interviews should always remain in the “animator” role; that while 
the “principal” role is often observed in making “repairs,” ideally such repairs should 
also be made within the role of an “animator”; and that while the “author” role clearly 
deviates from the “code of ethics,” interpreters also shift to this role to supply what they 
judge to be critical cultural information to prevent miscommunication or to ensure 
effective communication. 
 With these existing studies’ observations in mind, the author of this thesis also 
conducted a similar analysis on this interpreter’s roles shifts.  Out of 44 total statements, 
42 were in the “principal” category, and only 2 were in the “author” category.  First, let 
us look at Chart 9 below, which shows the breakdown of “principal” category based on 
their pragmatic functions. 
 
                                                   
 
328
 See Chapter IX, B-2, supra, for Goffman’s theory on “animator,” principal,” and 
“author.”  
 
 
329
 See Chapter IX, D-4, and fnn. 290, 291, supra. 
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Chart 9: Breakdown of 42 “Principal” Role Utterances 
 
 
 The two largest numbers were found in “explanation,” typically to explain 
about the aforementioned “extra round-trips” afterwards, and in obtaining “permission” 
before making such extra round-trips, as in the following two examples, Discourse Clip 
15 and Discourse Clip 16. 
 
Discourse Clip 15: “Principal” Role to Explain 
P096: 
ID097: 
S082: 
ID098:  
S083: 
ID099: 
S084: 
 
I013: 
And what happens if you don’t take your stomach medication? 
What happens if you don’t take your stomach medicine? 
I will get “nafgh bad.” 
What is “nafgh bad”? 
“Nafgh bad” is “gaaz (gas).” 
Ah… 
“Nafgh bad (gas)” is produced and it hurts my stomach, and it also comes 
to my head [to cause a headache].  
Just on a correction, I asked what’s the word “nafgh bad,” so he explained 
“gas.” 
17 
9 
7 
6 
3 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Explanation Request for
Permission
Apology Question Interjection
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 Here, after the two extra round-trips in Dari, which were necessary for the 
interpreter to confirm the meaning of “nafgh bad,” a rather old Dari word to refer to the 
“bloating of a stomach caused by gas,” the interpreter quickly explained to the police 
officer what kind of exchange had taken place in Dari.  In the next, Discourse Clip 16, 
the interpreter excuses himself in advance before making similar extra round-trips for a 
clarification purpose. 
 
Discourse Clip 16: “Principal” Role to Request Permission 
P196:  
ID212:  
You told the, you told the operator, through the interpreter, 
You told the operator through the interpreter, 
P197: 
ID213: 
S237: 
 
 
 
IE202: 
I038: 
P198: 
ID214: 
S238: 
ID215: 
S239: 
IE203: 
S240: 
IE204: 
that you spoke Hindi. 
that you spoke Hindi. 
<making a long statement>  I only told him, “You come.”  I know just a 
little Hindi only.  If I knew Hindi, why would I be here all night?   If I 
did, why would I ask for a lawyer?  < to the interpreter>  If I knew 
Hindi, why would you be here, why would I be relying on you now? 
I told him to...er,  
<to the police officer>  Excuse me, I have to go back again.  
Please. 
I’m sorry. 
Yes. 
What I understood was…,  <interrupted by the suspect> 
I said if I knew Hindi, 
If I knew Hindi properly, 
I would have said everything I wanted to say. 
I would have said, I would have told them all of everything. 
 
 In scene 4 (Murder Interrogation), the exchange became more intense, and the 
suspect often burbled away a lot of things in one chunk.  In a more traditional, 
conference-style consecutive interpreting, this would be nothing unusual.  A speaker 
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often talks for a relatively long while, during which an interpreter takes notes, and when 
the speaker finally pauses, the interpreter translates everything in an equivalent detail. 
 In contrast, police interview interpreting or cross-examination interpreting, 
which is a “dialogue-style” discourse and not a speech, is almost always conducted in a 
much shorter-span, “sentence-by-sentence” turn-taking style.330  For this reason, many 
interpreters just keep translating without taking notes.  Therefore, there is an unwritten 
understanding among the participants that they must pause for the interpreter before 
their sentences become very long.  However, when the participants become engrossed, 
like the suspect here, they start babbling many sentences in one shot.  The interpreter 
here needed to sort things out before translating, so he asked for permission from the 
interviewing police officer before doing it. 
 All the other “explanation” and “request for permission” statements were like 
the examples shown above.  Seven “Apology” statements were made when the 
interpreter became a little stuck in coming up with the right translation, and 6 “Question” 
utterances were made to clarify the meaning of the police officer’s statements, 3 of them 
appeared during the first “Police Caution” scene, which will be discussed in Chapter XII 
(this chapter), E-1 , infra.   
 How about the “author” role?  The research identified 2 statements used in this 
“author” role, as shown in Discourse Clip 17. 
  
Discourse Clip 17: “Author” Role to Provide Cultural Information 
P114:        
ID122: 
And what else happens? 
What happens after that?   
                                                   
 
330
  In the field of interpreting studies, this dialogue-style interpreting is often referred to 
as “liaison interpreting,” “community interpreting,” or “escort interpreting.”   
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S112: 
 
IE089: 
I018: 
 
P115: 
I019: 
IE090: 
After that, I drink “doogh,” and if I can sleep, I sleep.  If I can’t sleep, 
I don’t sleep. 
Then I just make a glass of a…   
It’s a kind of drink called “doogh.”  It’s made of yogurt.  So just put 
water in, and shake it to mix it together.      
Yes. 
That’s called “doogh.”   
So I just make one of that and eat, drink it. 
   
 This was in the second, “Prescriptions” scene, in which the suspect was 
explaining several prescriptions that he had been taking.  Here, the most important one 
for the interviewing police officer was the one for his “head (or brain),” perhaps because 
this could be a potential “insanity defense.”  The suspect kept saying that his stomach 
problem affected his “thinking,” for which he was getting a prescription from a doctor 
who travelled to India twice a year.
331
   
 Not getting much more than this, the officer asked what kind of symptoms 
appeared if he did not take this medicine, and the suspect explained what he normally 
did to mitigate the symptoms that appeared.  “Doogh,” according to the 
“check-interpreter” for this research, is a very common, traditional yogurt-flavor drink 
for people in Afghanistan, but for those who were unfamiliar, a quick cultural note like 
this may be justified for the purpose of saving additional complicated exchanges 
between the officer and the suspect.   
 The above Line I018 and Line I019 were the only two “author” role statements 
made by the interpreter.  Along with the 42 “principal” role statements, therefore, it 
would be fair to say that all of these “English-language footing shifts” were made for 
                                                   
 
331
 See the suspect’s utterances (S103-S107) in the Complete Annotated Transcript in 
Appendix 1. 
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justifiable reasons.  
 
2. Interpreter’s Footing Shifts in Dari 
 Similar footing shifts in Dari are impossible to identify for the English-speaking 
police officer and English-speaking fact-triers, unless they are provided with a complete 
“check translation,” without which they can only guess about the potential footing shifts 
by the interpreter in all the extra round-trips made in Dari. 
 Table 4 in Chapter XI, E-1, supra, showed a total of 36 such extra round-trips in 
Dari, only 10 of which were accompanied by an excuse or an explanation.  With or 
without an excuse or explanation, a monolingual round-trip exchange in Dari means that 
the interpreter is talking directly with the suspect, confirming, clarifying, or asking for 
information, instead of letting the police officer do such confirmation or clarification 
work himself. 
 Also, in Chapter XI, B-1, supra, it was shown that the police officer made a 
total of 284 utterances, while the interpreter made 305 utterances in Dari.  In the first 
paragraph of Chapter XI, D, supra, the thesis stated that out of those 284 utterances 
made by the police officer, 27 were simple nods and responses to the interpreter’s own 
statements made in English.
332
  Therefore, by a simple calculation of 
“305-(284-27)=48,” we can immediately guess that at least those extra 48 utterances in 
Dari made by the interpreter were “direct exchanges” with the suspect, perhaps for the 
purpose of confirmation or clarification.  Without a complete “check translation,” 
however, we have no way of finding out what was actually said in what kind of manner. 
 These speculations, which again can easily lead to suspicion and misgivings, 
                                                   
 
332
 See the first sentence in Chapter XI-D, supra. 
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can only be transformed into objectively confirmed facts, only by the check-interpreter’s 
translation.  For instance, let us look at the following Discourse Clip 18-1. 
 
Discourse Clip 18-1: Interpreter’s Direct Talk with Suspect: Before “Check Translation” 
I025: 
P140: 
I026: 
ID154: 
S168: 
ID155:  
S169: 
ID156: 
S170: 
ID157: 
S171: 
IE140: 
I have to ask him because I don’t want to…say…something wrong…, 
Please. 
To the best of my ability..,  
<to the suspect, touching his char’s armrest>  XXX, … 
XXX? 
XXX? 
XXX.  
Er, XXX?  
XXX. 
“OK,” XXX? 
XXX. 
After they took me to the hospital, at one o’clock, they give (sic) me… 
 
 Clearly, the interpreter is talking to the suspect directly, asking some important 
questions, making a clear role shift and becoming a direct, “visible” participant.  If a 
discourse like this was left uncovered with as many as four consecutive extra round-trips 
in a foreign language (in Dari in this case), the general impression on the part of the 
linguistically excluded may remain negative.  However, what if this section is verified 
as follows?    
 
Discourse Clip 18-2: Interpreter’s Direct Talk with Suspect: After “Check Translation” 
I025: 
P140: 
I026: 
ID154: 
I have to ask him because I don’t want to…say…something wrong…, 
Please. 
To the best of my ability..,  
<to the suspect, touching his char’s armrest>  Excuse me, … 
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S168: 
ID155:  
 
S169: 
ID156: 
 
S170: 
ID157: 
S171: 
IE140: 
“Baleh (Yes).” 
Could you… speak in short sentences one by one, so I won’t mistranslate 
what you say or add something you didn’t say? 
Sure, sure, I understand.  
Er, they took you to the hospital around one o’clock in the morning.  
After that?  
They took me to the hospital around one o’clock. 
“OK,” After that? 
After that, they gave me a “serum” and after that nothing else. 
After they took me to the hospital, at one o’clock, they give (sic) me… 
       
 Suddenly, the impression of the interpreter improves dramatically into someone 
trying to fulfill his mission to the best of his ability as sincerely as possible.  The 
interpreter’s footing did shift, speaking in a manner that is not very desirable.  However, 
access to an authenticated “check translation” can also dispel otherwise unnecessary 
distrust. 
 The three Discourse Clips we saw in Chapter XI, E, supra, as examples of such 
monolingual extra round-trips in Dari, can also be verified as follows only with a check 
translation as are shown below: “Discourse Clip 10-1: One Extra Round-Trip” and 
“Discourse Clip 10-2: Verified One Extra Round-Trip”; “Discourse Clip 11-1: Two 
Consecutive Extra Round-Trips” and “Discourse Clip 11-3: Verified Two Consecutive 
Extra Round-Trips”; and “Discourse Clip 12-1: Several Interspersed Extra Round-Trips” 
and “Discourse Clip 12-2: Verified Several Interspersed Extra Round-Trips.” 
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Discourse Clip 10-1: One Extra Round-Trip 
P215:    
ID233:  
S264:  
ID234: 
S265: 
IE228:  
<looking at the suspect>  So he gets angry? 
XXX?    
XXX? 
XXX? 
XXX. 
I just can’t think. 
 
Discourse Clip 10-2: Verified One Extra Round-Trip 
P215:    
ID233:  
S264:  
ID234: 
S265: 
IE228:  
<looking at the suspect>  So he gets angry? 
Then you get angry? 
What? 
Then you get angry? 
My “fekr (thinking)” gets bad. 
I just can’t think. 
 
Discourse Clip 11-1: Two Consecutive Extra Round-Trips 
P183:    
ID199:  
S224: 
ID200: 
S225: 
ID201: 
S226: 
IE192:  
My officers tell me that you ate earlier. 
XXX. 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX. 
XXX? 
XXX.   
At 2:00 p.m., or two o’clock p.m., they brought something in the paper.   
I eat that.  I ate that.  
 
Discourse Clip 11-3: Verified Two Consecutive Extra Round-Trips 
P183:    
ID199:  
S224: 
 
My officers tell me that you ate earlier. 
My officers told me that you ate earlier. 
At around two or three o’clock, they brought me a small bun of this size 
and a glass of juice. 
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ID200: 
S225: 
ID201: 
S226: 
 
IE192:  
Two in the morning or two in the afternoon? 
In the morning, morning. 
What time did you eat supper?  What did they bring? 
Three or three-thirty or four.  I didn’t have a watch at that time.  I ate 
two slices of bread wrapped in paper.  I don’t know what was inside. 
At 2:00 p.m., or two o’clock p.m., they brought something in the paper.   
I eat that.  I ate that.  
 
Discourse Clip 12-1: Several Interspersed Extra Round-Trips 
P051:    
ID052:  
S036: 
I002: 
P052: 
I003: 
ID053: 
S037: 
IE029: 
ID054: 
S038: 
IE030:
  
“retain” means to “hire a lawyer.” 
XXX. 
XXX. 
<to the police officer>  Excuse me, 
Yes? 
I don’t want to…, 
XXX? 
XXX. 
Earlier, you said that tomorrow when we go to the court, 
“OK,”  <to the suspect>  XXX,  
<leaning towards the interpreter, as if to ensure his understanding>  XXX. 
there would be a lawyer present, and also a person who could (sic) 
interpret, who could (sic) know my language, would be present tomorrow. 
 
Discourse Clip 12-2: Verified Several Interspersed Extra Round-Trips 
P051:    
ID052:   
S036: 
 
 
 
I002: 
P052: 
I003: 
“retain” means to “hire a lawyer.” 
“Retain,” to get a lawyer means you hire a lawyer. 
To hire a lawyer, you told me earlier, means that a lawyer will come.  I’m 
not very literate.  A Dari interpreter will also come.  The Dari interpreter 
will ask me questions, and I will respond, and the interpreter will tell this to 
the lawyer. 
<to the police officer>  Excuse me, 
Yes? 
I don’t want to…, 
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ID053: 
S037: 
 
IE029: 
ID054: 
S038: 
 
 
 
IE030:
  
<to the suspect>  Could you repeat from the beginning?    
Already, before this interview, you came, and my lawyer also came.  I’m 
not very literate, …    
Earlier, you said that tomorrow when we go to the court, 
“OK,”  <to the suspect>  When we go to the court,   
<leaning towards the interpreter, as if to ensure his understanding>  
Earlier you told me that when we go to the court tomorrow, a lawyer will 
come, and a person who understands my language, the Dari language, will 
also come.  
there would be a lawyer present, and also a person who could (sic) 
interpret, who could (sic) know my language, would be present tomorrow. 
 
 Only with these verified “check-translations” prepared by an expert witness 
who authenticated these translations, the triers of fact can, for the first time, begin to 
determine the “reliability” (accuracy and impartiality) of the interpreter’s translation.  
Before discussing these “accuracy” issues, let us look at one more important point 
concerning “impartiality” issue. 
  
B. Impartiality Issue 2: Use of Pronouns 
 In an interpreter-assisted discourse, changes in the “use of pronouns” often 
reveal subtle role shifts and power shifts, which provide indirect clues to assess 
“impartiality.”  Let us, therefore, examine the participants’ pronoun use in detail.   
 In Chapter IV, B-1, supra, the thesis noted that an interpreter who abides by the 
code of ethics must address himself or herself as “the interpreter,” not by the pronoun “I,” 
as “I” is used to denote the original speakers.333  The interpreter in this police interview 
abided by this rule faithfully, as can be seen in Discourse Clip 19. 
                                                   
 
333
 As was noted in fn. 129, this first person, singular pronoun “I,” is referred to as “the 
alien I.”  
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Discourse Clip 19: Interpreter Addressing Himself as “The Interpreter”  
P045: 
ID045: 
S031: 
ID046: 
S032: 
IE025: 
S033: 
 
IE026: 
The officer told you you have the right to retain and instruct counsel. 
The officer told you that you have a right to have a lawyer, 
“Baleh (Yes).” 
to consult him. 
Yes, he said, and… 
Yes, yes, he said that. 
<continuing>  Already, before this interview, you came, and I talked 
with my lawyer. 
Yes, when my lawyer spoke to me, when you, he’s pointing to the 
interpreter, when you came in, and he talked to me.   
 
 In this Discourse Clip 19, notice that the suspect in Line S033 uses “you” to 
directly address the “interpreter,” not the “police officer.”334  However, the interpreter is 
not allowed to change this “you” to “me,” as doing so is against the rule.  Still, if he 
uses the word “you,” the police officer may think it refers to him.  Therefore, the 
interpreter phrased it as “you, he’s pointing to the interpreter.” 
 Now, let us look at other pronouns.  In English, the interpreter addressed the 
suspect as “he” only 3 times, and they were not in translations but on the three occasions 
when he stepped aside into the “principal” role talking to the police officer (I006, I022, 
and I025).
335
  In contrast, the police officer used “he” to refer to the suspect 21 times 
throughout the whole interview.  Such pronoun use reveals a “subtle power shift” in the 
interview room, which subconsciously influences the psychology of the participants, 
which will be discussed below.  The following Table 6 shows the breakdown of such 
                                                   
 
 
334
 Such pronoun use confusion is very common, especially among those who are not used 
to using an interpreter and thus not used to treating the interpreter as an “invisible” person who 
should not be addressed directly as “you.”  “You” must always refer to the other party, not to the 
interpreter. 
 
 
335
 See the Complete Annotated Transcript in Appendix 1. 
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“undesirable use of pronouns” by speakers in each scene, from which we can make 
important inferences. 
  
Table 6: Use of “Third Person” (Indirect Speech) and Suspect’s Using “You” for 
Interpreter   
Scenes 
 
Police Officer Interpreter 
(English) 
Interpreter 
(Dari) 
Suspect 
 
 
“he”  
for “suspect” 
“he”  
for “suspect” 
“he”  
for “officer” 
“you”  
for “interpreter” 
Police Caution 12 1 0 8 
Prescriptions 3 0 1 0 
Traffic 
Accident 
1 2 0 1 
Murder 5 0 7 7 
 21 3 8 16 
 
1. Police Officer’s Use of “He”   
 The police officer used “he” to refer to the “suspect” 12 times during the first 
17:37 minutes of “Police Caution,” examples of which are shown in Discourse Clip 20. 
 
Discourse Clip 20: Police Officer Using “He” for the Suspect  
P007: I know that he spoke to a lawyer, and I…, that is a private conversation, 
and not something that I want to discuss with him at this point. 
P010: that he has had a conversation with his lawyer. 
P011: It is his right, 
P014: Does he understand this?  
P016: Just so he knows that I’m a policeman. 
P020: As I said before, it is his right not to answer my questions.  
P046: And does he understand what that means? 
P057: “To instruct” means that it is his right to give direction to his lawyer. 
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 In this first “Police Caution” scene, the interviewing police officer tried to 
re-administer the Canadian police caution, almost 12 hours after the suspect’s arrest, for 
the reason that the previous attempts by other officers seemed to have failed due to the 
language barrier.  It was close to 3:00 a.m., and as he tried to re-administer this caution, 
the suspect kept interrupting
336
 repeatedly, saying, “Please talk to my lawyer,” or “I 
cannot say anything until my lawyer is here.”337  
 In the meantime the police officer had to explain the whole “police caution” 
package, which were: 1) that the video recording was set as a safeguard; 2) that he and 
his partner were Toronto Police detectives; 3) that the interpreter was from an 
independent company, neither a policeman nor a lawyer; 4) that whatever the suspect 
had said to other police officers prior to this interview, i.e., before the administration of 
this police caution, all that former talking should not influence his testimonies from now 
on; 5) that to “retain and instruct counsel” meant to “hire” an attorney and give 
instructions to this attorney; 6) that if the suspect could not afford a lawyer, the Canadian 
government would pay for one, 7) that the suspect had a right not to answer his 
questions; but 8) that the Supreme Court of Canada had given the police a permission to 
ask any questions the police deemed were relevant. 
 Normally, the police caution is a highly unilateral discourse, in which the police 
officer makes “notifications” and “confirmations.”  We have already seen in Chart 8 in 
                                                   
 
336
 The data reveals that the suspect made 5 interruptions during this first “police caution 
scene.”  As a comparison, the suspect made 2 interruptions in the second scene, 1 in the third scene, 
and 5 in the fourth “murder interrogation” scene. 
 
 
337
 The suspect kept repeating that he did not wish to talk without his lawyer about 10 
times during this 17:37-minute “Police Caution” scene, which was of no avail as the rule in Canada is 
that the police can ask the suspect any questions they deem relevant without the presence of his 
lawyer, although the suspect does not have to answer them if he does not wish to do so. 
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Chapter XI, D-2, supra, that the “2-Step Unilateral” cycle pattern had the largest share 
in this “Police Caution” scene, accounting for nearly 41 percent (30 out of 73 total).  
However, we can also see that “Full 4-step Q-and-A” cycle also constituted 36 percent 
(26 out of 73 total), and “3-Step Untranslated” accounted for 19 percent (14 out of 73 
total).  In other words, for the interviewing police officer, things were moving not so 
“unilaterally smoothly” as they normally would in a monolingual interview.  Let us 
once again look at Chart 8, which was shown in Chapter XI, D-2, supra.    
  
Chart 8: Turn-Taking Cycle Patterns by Four Interview Scenes 
 
 
 Sandra Hale, an Australian interpreting scholar, contends in The Discourse of 
Police
Caution
Prescriptions
Traffic
Accident
Murder
2-Step Unilateral 30 3 4 17
3-Step Untranslated 14 1 0 2
Full 4-Step Q-and-A 26 37 29 86
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Court Interpreting that in court, counsel as well as the judge resort or switch to a “third 
person” to refer to the defendant when they lose control of the communication.338  By 
using “he (or she),” they can shift the burden to the interpreter of making what they want 
to make happen, as well as save their own face in case things fail, by making it seem like 
the failure was really the interpreter’s fault.  Also, by addressing the defendant by the 
“third person,” they can exclude the defendant from the on-going discourse, denoting 
that “the witness who does not speak English can only be included if counsel so desires 
it.”339 
 Likewise, in this interview, too, by repeating to the interpreter such sentences as 
“Does he understand this?” using the “third person singular he” to refer to the suspect, 
the interviewing police officer might have been shifting some of the burden to the 
interpreter, though we can also observe that the officer also kept trying to correct himself 
consciously thereafter, like “And does he, do you understand that?” making sure that he 
addressed the suspect using the “second person you.”    
 In fact, as the interview went on, we can also observe that the interviewing 
officer kept trying to establish a much closer, better “rapport” with the suspect, by 
always addressing him by the “second person you,” while keeping as much eye contact 
as possible.  It was, if fact, the suspect who kept trying to exclude the interviewing 
officer by using the “second person you” to address the interpreter, instead of the 
interviewing police officer, which also troubled the interpreter.    
 
                                                   
 
338
 Sandra Beatriz Hale, The Discourse of Court Interpreting: Discourse Practices of the 
Law, the Witness, and the Interpreter (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), 191-192. 
 
 
339
 Hale, The Discourse of Court Interpreting, 191. 
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2. Suspect Addressing the Interpreter as “You”   
 The “check translation” has revealed that the suspect used the pronoun “you” a 
total of 16 times throughout the entire recording, and in fact all of them referred to the 
interpreter, not the police officer, one example of which was already shown in Discourse 
Clip 19, supra.  In this example, the interpreter noticed that “you” referred to himself 
and thus added “he’s pointing to the interpreter,” to prevent a confusion.  During the 
same “police caution” scene, the suspect used the pronoun “you” 8 times, all of which 
actually referred to the “interpreter,” and the interpreter also translated this pronoun as 
“you” 6 times, not knowing for sure if this “you” referred to the police officer or the 
interpreter himself, except for the above one example in which the interpreter added 
“he’s pointing to the interpreter.”  The truth was that the suspect’s pronoun “you” 
always and consistently referred to the interpreter till the end of the recording. 
 The interpreter, probably sensing this, chose to simply drop the word “you” in 
the English translation thereafter all the way into the fourth “murder interrogation” scene, 
in which this problem resurfaced as a confusion as is shown in Discourse Clip 21. 
 
Discourse Clip 21: Confusion Caused by the Misuse of “You” 
P228: 
ID249: 
S280: 
 
IE241: 
S281: 
 
IE242: 
P229: 
ID250: 
You know she was killed today in your apartment. 
Do you know she was killed in your apartment? 
Earlier, “goftin (plural you)” told me that without my lawyer, I should 
not talk. 
You told me that until… 
<looking at the interpreter>  Why do you do it like this?  Do you 
know if my lawyer will come?  When he comes, I will talk. 
You told me that till my lawyer’s not (sic) here, don’t talk. 
I told him that?  
Did I say that? 
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S282: 
IE243: 
P230: 
ID251: 
P231: 
S283: 
ID252: 
S284: 
 
ID253: 
IE244: 
P232: 
IE245: 
P233: 
 
ID254 
S285: 
IE246: 
P234: 
ID255: 
S286: 
IE247: 
On the telephone you told me. 
On the telephone you told me. 
We never spoke on the telephone. 
I didn’t talk… 
You and I never spoke on… 
That’s right.  That’s right. 
You and I never… 
That’s right.  That’s right.  Someone told me the police can only take 
your finger prints and take your picture… 
<to pause the suspect>  “OK,” 
The person who spoke to me on the phone, 
Yes. 
He told me that only the police could take your fingerprints, 
<putting up his hand to stop the interpreter>  OK, stop, please.  This is 
the conversation with the lawyer, yes?  
Is this what you talked about with your lawyer? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
<shaking his head>  That’s, that’s private. 
That’s private.  It’s your own confidential content. 
I don’ know.    
I don’t know. 
 
 As the interrogation became increasing charged about the murder of the 
suspect’s wife, the suspect kept repeating that he (the suspect) did not want to answer 
any questions until his lawyer came.  The suspect also kept asking the interpreter if he 
(the suspect) really had to answer all these questions, which was translated into English, 
and to which the officer kept responding that it was up to the suspect to decide whether 
to talk or not, and the officer kept asking the same questions.  Thus came Line S280, 
“Earlier, ‘goftin (plural you)’ told me that without my lawyer, I should not talk.”  Here, 
the plural “you” referred to the interpreter and the duty counsel, who, with the suspect, 
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were all connected to a three-party telephone conference that had taken place an hour 
before this interview started, after which the suspect was introduced to this interviewing 
police officer for the first time when the interview began.
340
   
 The suspect continued in Line S281, “Why do you do it like this?  Do you 
know if my lawyer will come?  When he comes, I will talk,” now starting to blame the 
interpreter for not protecting him from the interrogating police officer.  For the suspect, 
the counsel’s telephone advice that “the suspect did not have to answer any questions,” 
which the interpreter had translated for him also over the telephone, was no different 
from the interpreter himself telling the suspect the same thing.  Because of this, the 
suspect started blaming the interpreter.   
 The interpreter, noticing this misunderstanding on the part of the 61-year old 
non-English speaking immigrant from the same home country, still had to translate the 
sentence to the police officer, who naturally became puzzled and asked back in Line 
P229, “I told him that?” which the interpreter conveyed to the suspect as “Did I say that?” 
in Line ID250, knowing that the suspect would still identify this “I” with the interpreter, 
and not the police officer.  The suspect replied in Line S282, “On the telephone you 
told me,” using “you” again to refer to the interpreter and the counsel.  However, this, 
translated back to the police officer, must have sounded moronic as he had neither met 
the suspect nor talked with him on the phone until the start of the interview, so he 
responded, “We never spoke on the telephone,” in Line P230. 
 At this point, the suspect realized the miscommunication and began to explain 
what he had heard from “the person” on the telephone, which was translated back to the 
officer by the interpreter, at which point the officer finally realized that the suspect was 
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 R v. Khairi, 2012 ONSC 5549, [59, 61]. 
189 
 
 
talking about what the counsel had advised him during the telephone conference and 
immediately reacted in a strong voice to “stop” the interpreter. 
 This big frustration for everyone took place because the suspect kept using “you” 
to refer to the interpreter and never addressed the interviewing police officer directly.  
The suspect was seated between the officer and the interpreter but was always looking at 
the interpreter, talking directly to the interpreter as a real “visible” fellow from the same 
home country, while excluding the officer as much as possible by building a 
psychological defense wall between the officer and himself. 
 
3. Seating Position and Pronoun Use   
 In Chapter VII, C-1, supra, the thesis mentioned potential problems that may 
arise by placing an interpreter away from the interviewing officer, instead of placing him 
or her between the officer and the suspect.   
 In this interview, too, as can be seen in Chart 10, the interpreter is seated on the 
far right with only his knees appearing on the screen, right next to the suspect and away 
from the main interviewing officer who is shown in the middle.  This was done most 
probably to protect the interpreter’s identity, but with accompanying sacrifices as we 
have seen.  The interpreter’s seating position logistics, therefore, will remain as an 
issue in introducing digital video recording in interpreter-assisted police interviews.   
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  Chart 10: Interpreter Seating Position Logistics 
   
 
4. Interpreter Using “He” for the Police Officer’ s “I”   
 In Table 6, supra, we can also notice that in the fourth “Murder Interrogation” 
scene, the interpreter began using the third person “he” more frequently to translate “I” 
of the police officer’s statements, using “indirect speech.”   The major reason for this 
was most probably “distancing,” which, according to Hale,341 is a footing shift that 
occurs when the interpreter tries to “distance” himself or herself momentarily in 
translating a sensitive or unpleasant matter.  Though this is also against the code of 
ethics, it may have been inevitable, especially when the suspect kept using “you” to 
directly address the interpreter, often in an accusatory tone. 
 Another reason might have been a tinge of “sympathy” toward his fellow 
                                                   
 
341
 Sandra Beatriz Hale, The Discourse of Court Interpreting, 191.  Here, Hale mentions 
an example of a court interpreter who deliberately used the “third person” to “distant” herself in 
translating a sensitive subject in a war crime trial and another example of a court interpreter who 
switched to the “third person” in translating a curse word in a statement.  
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countryman who was being “badgered” despite his repeated response that he did not 
want to answer without his lawyer, which was mentioned more than twenty times during 
this last 26-minute “Murder Interrogation” scene.  This may also be substantiated by 
the fact that, according to the Dari “check interpreter” in Tokyo who helped the author 
with the check translation, the interpreter frequently used a “not so polite” third-person 
pronoun for, “he said,”342 in translating the police officer’s statement using an “indirect 
speech.” 
 While an interpreter must always remain impartial, these slight footing shifts, 
often reflected in the pronoun use discussed in this section, are also undeniably 
occurring phenomena.  The Dari interpreter who helped the author with the check 
translation, who has more than ten years’ experience as a legal interpreter in Tokyo, 
stated that such feelings as those mentioned above, if they had really occurred with this 
interpreter during this police interview, are in a way natural and inevitable and not to be 
strongly blamed as long as the rendered translations are accurate. 
 
C. Accuracy Issue 1: Accuracy Assessment 
 The next question, therefore, is: were all the translations really accurate?  As 
has been mentioned, this recording was submitted as an exhibit not because of any 
translation issues but because of the recording accident that had occurred.  This means 
that for the then Ontario Superior Court of Justice, this interpreter passed the muster as 
an accurate and impartial “conduit” interpreter.  The recording was also played during 
the trial for the jury, but without a check translation. 
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  The check interpreter mentioned that the interpreter frequently used the expression “in 
mighe,” which sounded more like “this guy said,” to refer to the interrogating officer, while a more 
polite expression “in agha (this person said)” was never used.    
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 In this research, each Dari utterance was re-translated and carefully compared 
by the author with the help of the aforementioned Dari interpreter in Tokyo, the whole 
process taking more than 22 hours to check the 77:39-minute recording. 
 “Accuracy,” as we have seen in Part One of this thesis, is the most critical factor 
in determining the reliability of an interpreter’s work.  It is of such paramount 
importance as would even subsume the determination of impartiality.
343
  We have also 
seen, however, that courts in the U.S. have usually held much more lenient accuracy 
standards for “police interpreters” than those for “court interpreters” for various reasons 
discussed in Chapter VI, supra.    
 Keeping in mind that constant exigency accompanied by an absence of relevant 
legislation could very easily create a hotbed of substandard due process protection, the 
thesis has examined the interpreting “accuracy” of the 2008 Toronto Police interview to 
see whether any unacceptable reductions, omissions, additions, alterations, had occurred. 
 
1. Interpreting Accuracy Statistical Results   
 The following Table 7 shows the number of “accurate” and “inaccurate” 
renditions and the accuracy rate in each one of the 4 scenes. 
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 See Chapter VI, E, supra.  
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Table 7: Translation Accuracy Verification Results 
Scene Re- 
duc- 
tions 
Omis- 
sions 
Addi- 
tions 
Alter- 
a- 
tions 
Accu- 
rate 
Rendi- 
tions 
Total 
Ren- 
di- 
tions 
Accu- 
racy 
Rate 
(%) 
Confirma- 
tions, 
Explana- 
tions, etc. 
Eng- 
lish 
Dari 
1:E-D  0 0 0 0 71 71 100%  
7 
 
4 1:D-E 1 3 0 3 32 39 82% 
2:E-D 0 0 0 0 41 41 100%  
14 
 
16 2:D-E 0 2 0 0 59 61 97% 
3:E-D 0 0 0 0 31 31 100%  
14 
 
20 3:D-E 3 5 0 3 66 77 86% 
4:E-D 0 0 0 0 108 108 100%  
9 
 
14 4:D-E 1 5 1 3 117 127 91% 
 
To- 
tal 
 5 15 1 9 525 555 95% 44 54 
E-D 0 0 0 0 251 251 100%   
D-E 5 15 1 9 274 304 90% 
(Scenes: 1: police caution; 2: prescriptions; 3: car accident; 4: murder) 
(E-D: from English to Dari; D-E: from Dari to English) 
 
 During the entire 77:39-minute recording, the interpreter made a total of 653 
utterances, out of which 348 were in English and 305 were in Dari.  Out of these 348 
English utterances, 44 were not translations from Dari but were the interpreter’s own 
statements made in English.  The content analysis of these 44 statements were already 
made in Chapter XII (this chapter), A-1, supra, using Goffman’s terminology, “principal” 
and “author,”344 which discovered that they were, for the most part, “direct exchanges” 
with the police officer for the purpose of “explanations,” “requests for permission to 
make confirmation with the suspect,” “apologies about an extra pause time,” or 
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 Goffman, Forms of Talk, 144.  Also, see Chapter IX, B-2, supra. 
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“questions for the police officer.”  The second right column in Table 7 above shows a 
more detailed breakdown of those 44 English utterances by the interpreter by each scene.  
 Also, in Chapter XII (this chapter), A-2, supra, it was mentioned that the police 
officer made a total of 284 utterances, 27 of which were simple nods and responses to 
the interpreter’s own statements made in English,345 while the interpreter made 305 
utterances in Dari.  This means that by a simple calculation of “305-(284-27) =48,” we 
were able to guess that at least those extra 48 utterances in Dari by the interpreter were 
“direct exchanges” with the suspect, perhaps for the purpose of confirmation or 
clarification.   
 A complete “check translation” finally corroborates that this, in fact, was an 
accurate speculation.  As is also shown in Table 7, out of the 305 total utterances made 
by the interpreter in Dari, only 251 (=71+41+31+108) were actual “translations of the 
police officer’s English statements into Dari,” and the remaining 54 utterances in Dari 
were “direct exchanges” with the suspect, a further breakdown of which is shown in the 
far right column.  For English-speaking fact-triers, this 54 out of the 305, or nearly 
18% of the total utterances in the foreign language which do not sound like actual 
translations, may easily become a source of suspicion, a “potential distrust of reliability” 
which only a “check translation” can dispel, by showing that all of these 54 extra 
utterances in Dari were “necessary” to confirm the suspect’s unclear or verbose 
statements or to re-explain the officer’s question in order to ensure an accurate 
communication. 
 By conducting a detailed “translation accuracy” verification, the author of the 
thesis has validated that in total, 95% of all the renditions, both English to Dari and Dari 
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 See the first sentence in Chapter XI-D, supra. 
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to English, were “accurate.”  The breakdown by “translation direction” shows that out 
of the total 555 renditions, 251 out of 251, or 100% of English-Dari translations, and 
274 out of 304, or 90% of Dari-English translations were “accurate.”   
 The reasons for this discrepancy by “translation direction” are probably as 
follows.  First, as in most police interviews but particularly in this one, the interviewing 
police officer spoke much more clearly and coherently with carefully premediated and 
phrased questions, which, for any interpreters, are much easier to translate.  Second, 
conversely, suspects in a police interview may, for various reasons, speak in a not so 
clear, organized way in responding to an interrogating officer’s questions.  This 
particular suspect also spoke in a rather “disorganized” discourse style, suddenly rattling 
away, often with little coherence or cohesion, making the job extra difficult for the 
interpreter.  The third possible reason is that though the interpreter, who was apparently 
a native speaker of Dari, demonstrated a very high English proficiency as a “non-native 
speaker,” still translating into one’s non-native language usually poses more challenge 
than the other way, though it has advantages as well.
346
    
 Having mentioned these, though these percentage figures above look 
sufficiently high, in order to delineate the “conduit” boundaries accepted by the then 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, let us further examine what kind of “inaccurate” 
translations had occurred.   
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 In the interpreting industry, the interpreter’s native language is called “A language” and 
the non-native language into which the interpreter translates is called “B language.”  While many 
international conferences prefer interpreters translating from “B language” to “A language,” such 
luxury does not exist in court interpreting, let alone in police interpreting.  Also, interpreters of “rare” 
or “minor” languages always have to interpret “both ways.”  In police interpreting, especially, 
suspects of a “rare” dialect of a “minor” language are never uncommon, in which case, interpreting 
work is usually impossible unless the interpreter is a native-speaker of the suspect’s language.  In 
this respect, the suspect in this police interview, in the author’s opinion, was extremely fortunate.   
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2.  Accuracy Assessment Criteria  
 The NAJIT defines accuracy as follows.  The translation must: 1) conserve all 
the elements of the original message; 2) accommodate the syntactic and semantic 
patterns of the target language; 3) make the rendition sound natural in the target 
language; 4) not distort the original message through addition, omission, explanation, 
paraphrasing; and 5) convey all hedges, false starts and repetitions.
347
  
 The NAJIT, however, also mentions that “[s]ome judges and attorneys have a 
mistaken belief that an interpreter renders court proceedings word for word, but this is 
impossible since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between words or concepts in 
different languages,” and that “[r]ather than word for word, then, interpreters render 
meaning by reproducing the full content of the ideas being expressed,” concluding that 
“[i]nterpreters do not interpret words; they interpret concepts.”348 
 Keeping the above seemingly “ambivalent” definitions of “accuracy” in mind, 
this thesis, as was already discussed in Chapter IX, D-2, supra, has based its “accuracy” 
determination primarily on the “pragmatic meaning” of each rendition, as is shown in 
Table 8 below. 
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 “Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibilities,” NAJIT (National Association of 
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators), http://www.najit.org/certification/profession.php. 
 
 
 
348
 “Frequently Asked Questions about Court and Legal Interpreting and Translating,” 
National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, 
http://www.najit.org/certification/faq.php#techniques. 
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Table 8: Accuracy Determination Criteria 
Category Criteria 
Reduction The overall “pragmatic”349 meaning is retained, but many details have 
been dropped to make the rendition a mere “summary” of the original 
which was much longer.  
Omission The “pragmatic” meaning has been distorted by an omission of one or 
more critical elements of “propositional” or “semantic” meaning. 
Addition The “pragmatic” meaning has been distorted by an addition of one or 
more critical elements of “propositional” or “semantic” meaning. 
Alteration The “pragmatic” meaning has been distorted by an alteration (an 
omission replaced by an addition, or an omission and an addition taking 
place concurrently in a single rendition) of one or more critical elements 
of “propositional” or “semantic” meaning. 
 
 
D. Accuracy Issue 2: Accuracy Check on Reductions, Omissions, Additions, and 
Alterations 
 Let us look at each category criteria with examples. 
 
1. Reductions   
 As has been mentioned above, the suspect in this interview tended to rattle away, 
often with little cohesion.  This presented an enormous difficulty for the interpreter 
who was translating without taking notes.  Whenever a confirmation or repetition was 
necessary, the interpreter did stop and asked the suspect for clarification or repetition, 
with or without the police officer’s permission, though reproducing all the details was 
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 For the definition of “pragmatic meaning,” please see the discussion in Chapter IX, B-1, 
supra. 
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never easy, which led to “reductions” or “omissions.”  First, let us look at an example 
of a reduction in the following Discourse Clips 22. 
   
Discourse Clip 22: Reduction 
P243: 
ID264: 
S294: 
 
 
 
 
IE255:  
Before the police? 
Before the police came? 
<nodding first, and then continuing in a strong pitch>  Before the police 
arrived.  The police were late.  The police were very, very late.  The 
police did not want to come [to my house].  The police were scared that 
maybe I had something.  I told them I didn’t have anything 
[dangerous], so “come and find out.” 
Before the arrival of the police….the police were scared.  They came 
very, very late, and I told them, come on, there’s nothing with me.   
 
 As is explained in “Reduction 5” in the “Complete Annotated Transcript of 
Dari-Interpreter-Assisted Toronto Police Interview” in Appendix 1, the details in S294 
describing how the police seemed to be acting right before the suspect’s arrest (“The 
police did not want to come [to my house].  The police were scared that maybe I had 
something.  I told them I didn’t have anything (dangerous), so ‘come and find out.’”) 
were reduced in IE255, though the overall pragmatic meaning in the context was 
retained. 
 
2. Omissions  
 “Reduction” and “omission” are similar in that in both certain elements of the 
source-language utterance become deleted, so where to draw the line is not always 
clear-cut.  One criterion is that while “reduction,” just like a “summary,” basically 
retains the main points or the “pragmatic” meaning of the source-language utterance, 
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“omission” distorts them by deleting one or more critical or indispensable elements of 
the “propositional” or “semantic” meaning of the original utterance, as in shown in 
Discourse Clips 23.   
 
Discourse Clip 23: Omission 
S176: 
 
 
IE145:  
 
 
S177: 
IE146: 
S178: 
IE147:  
I couldn’t speak the language, but there was an Indian there, so I asked 
him to translate what they were saying so I would know what I should 
do. 
I couldn’t speak English, so there was an Indian.  I asked him to go 
with me to see what they were saying, so…  <interrupted by the 
suspect> 
He had a patient, too.  His small daughter was ill. 
They also had a patient there, (OM9) 
Beside me. 
beside me. 
   
 As was also explained in “Omission 9” in the “Annotated Transcript” in 
Appendix 1, “His small daughter was ill” in S177 was omitted from IE146, thus making 
the meaning of “they” in “[t]hey also had a patient there” unclear (the Indian man’s 
family or the hospital?).  While this detail may not have been very important, such 
judgment is for the fact-triers to make, so interpreters must try to retain all the details 
constituting the given facts.  In almost all interpreting work, an “omission” is probably 
one of the most common inaccuracy factors, and in this interview, too the largest number 
was observed in this “omission” category, totaling to 15.   
 The interpreter in this interview often tried to “recover” such omissions by 
making the previously mentioned “extra round-trips” with the suspect in Dari, though all 
were not always recovered.  If an omission was “recovered” in such subsequent 
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exchanges, it was not counted as one in this research.  Only those omissions which 
remained “unrecovered” in the immediately adjacent exchanges were counted as 
“omissions.”   
 
3. Additions  
 In contrast to these “omissions,” only one “addition” was observed in this 
particular interview as is shown in Discourse Clip 24.  
 
Discourse Clip 24: Addition 
P181:  
ID197: 
S221: 
IE189: 
S222: 
IE190:  
And what was the matter?  (4S 102) 
What was the matter? 
I don’t know very much without…  My head aches, and my brain is not 
well. 
I cannot say anything without my lawyer.  Right now, I’m fainting.   
As I said before, I’m not feeling well and feel like fainting. 
I’m getting the sweat, and also I’m fainting. 
 
 As is also explained in “Addition 1” in Appendix 1, infra, in S221, there was no 
word after “without,” but in IE189 the word “my lawyer” was added after “without,” 
most probably by an inference made by the interpreter.
350
   
 
4. Alterations   
 An alteration is a change or distortion of the pragmatic meaning of the original 
utterance caused, usually, by a lack of knowledge about the interlingual equivalence or a 
                                                   
 
350
 The check-interpreter the author hired for this research played this section numerous 
times but was not able to hear the word “lawyer” in the original Dari utterance made by the suspect.  
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lack of translation skill.  It also happens as a result of misunderstanding or a simple 
error.  Though many were minor, a few alterations in this interview seemed critical, as 
are shown in the following Discourse Clips 25-1 and 25-2.  
 
Discourse Clip 25-1: Alternation 1 
P220: 
ID239: 
S269: 
IE232: 
S270: 
IE233:  
And what happened? 
And what happened? 
I don’t remember. 
I don’t know…that incident. 
I told you, without my lawyer, I can’t say anything! 
Until my lawyer’s not (sic) here, I can’t say anything.   
 
Discourse Clip 25-2: Alternation 2 
P266: 
ID285: 
S324: 
 
IE284:  
And do you remember what time your oldest son got out? 
Do you remember what time your eldest son left home? 
No, I don’t remember well.  This “vaghe (accident/incident)” was very 
“ghavi (forceful/powerful).”  I don’t remember at all. 
No, I don’t remember, from this incident, maybe 15 or 20 minutes 
earlier. 
 
 Discourse Clip 25-1 and Discourse Clip 25-2 are mirror opposite examples of 
how the interpreter “altered” the original meaning by the word choice in the target 
language rendition.  In both discourses, the suspect was adamantly insisting that: 1) he 
knew nothing about what the police officer was telling him to talk about, and 2) he did 
not want to talk without his lawyer.   
 In Discourse Clip 25-1, the police officer kept asking “And what happened?” 
(Line A220).  While the suspect only responded “I don’t remember (Line S269),” the 
interpreter translated it as “I don’ know…that incident.”  The word “incident” used 
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with “that,” a pronoun functioning as a definite determiner, could have been 
significantly damaging for the suspect if his testimony had been the only evidence the 
police had, as this usage “that incident” in English implies the speaker’s “knowledge” 
about “what specific incident” was being questioned about.  
 Discourse Clip 25-2 shows an opposite phenomenon.  The suspect finally 
started using an expression indirectly hinting his knowledge about “the incident” by 
choosing the word “vaghe (accident/incident)” and even using an adjective “ghavi 
(forceful/powerful).”  This time, however, the interpreter not only omitted this critical 
adjective “ghavi (forceful/powerful),” but also added something the suspect had not said, 
which was “maybe 15 or 20 minutes earlier,” probably influenced by what the 
interpreter had heard the suspect mention earlier in Line S293, which was, “My son left 
home about 15 or 20 minutes earlier.”   Still, it is even mysterious as to why such an 
addition and an omission took place simultaneously, altering the meaning of the original 
utterance. 
 
5. Total of 32 Utterances in Goffman’s “Author” Role: “95.1% Conduit”   
 How would the above results translate into Goffman’s “author” role?  In 
Chapter IX, B-2, supra, the thesis mentioned that the “author” role is the closest to what 
an interpreter does when he or she intentionally adds, omits, reduces or alters the content, 
which is basically a clear deviation from the “prescribed conduit” role, though 
sometimes it must be done for a clear purpose. 
 As was shown in Discourse Clip 17 in Chapter XII (this chapter), A-1, supra, 
the interpreter made 2 English utterances in an “author” role, but they seem to have been 
made for a clear, justifiable purpose.  In addition, however, as was shown in Table 7 in 
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Chapter XII (this chapter), C-1, supra, the interpreter made a total of 30 inaccurate 
translations (5 reductions, 15 omissions, 1 addition, and 9 alterations, all from Dari to 
English).  Obviously, many of them were made inevitably or inadvertently but still 
were based on the interpreter’s on-the-spot “authorship” judgement, because if the 
interpreter really felt uncertain, he could have always confirmed or clarified, as he did 
with other renditions, in order to prevent what turned out to be “inaccurate” translations.   
 Thus, if we apply a most strict standard, these 32 utterances (2 in English as the 
interpreter’s own utterances and 30 in the form of Dari to English translations) would 
have to be categorized as those which fall into the “author" role defined by Goffman.  
These 32 utterances made in the “author” role, which is a clear deviation from the 
“prescribed conduit” role, constituted 4.9% of the total 653 utterances the interpreter 
made during the entire recorded interview.  Conversely, this interpreting work which 
the then Ontario Superior Court of Justice deemed as a satisfactorily “conduit” 
performance has been corroborated as “95.1% conduit” interpreting, based on most strict 
assessment criteria.  
 
E. Accuracy Issue 3: Translation Difficulties 
 In this interview, the interpreter faced several translation difficulties.  Though 
each one was handled in the best possible way, the following should be mentioned. 
 
1. Police Caution   
 The first major translation difficulty took place with the following police cation 
as can be seen in Discourse Clip 26. 
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Discourse Clip 26: Police Caution: Before “Check Translation” 
P062: 
 
ID065:  
S050: 
…and other officers, other than my partner and myself, have spoken to 
you, 
XXX. 
<nodding a couple of times>  XXX.  
P063: 
 
I005: 
I don’t want, anything they have said to you, to make you think, that you 
need to talk to me. 
<to the police officer>  Ah…, I don’t understand this word… 
P064: 
 
 
I006: 
 
I don’t want anything that the officers have said to him to make him 
think that he needs to talk to me, to influence him to talk to me.  I don’t 
want that to happen. 
<to the police officer>  OK, so whatever other officers told you…, ah 
whatever other officers spoken (sic) to him doesn’t mean that you are, 
you have told him?  So, I don’t understand this part.  
P065: 
 
ID066: 
P066: 
I007: 
ID067: 
S051: 
P067: 
ID068: 
S052: 
IE037: 
<moving forward in his chair>   The other officers that had contact 
with you here, 
XXX. 
I don’t want that contact, that talking, 
OK, 
XXX.  
<nodding>  XXX. 
to make you think that you need to talk to me. 
XXX. 
XXX. 
I will talk, but since my lawyer’s not here, how can I talk? 
 
 As has already been mentioned in Chapter XI, D-2, and Chapter XII (this 
chapter), B-1, supra, the primary pragmatic functions of this “Police Caution” scene are 
“notifications” and “confirmations,” which are conducted in “2-Step Unilateral” 
turn-taking.  The first part of Discourse Clip 26 shows that the interpreter was having 
an obvious difficulty understanding the fundamental logic of this police caution even 
after the second, paraphrased sentence from the officer, which shows in his confirmation 
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question in Line I006, “OK, so whatever other officers told you…, ah whatever other 
officers spoken (sic) to him doesn’t mean that you are, you have told him?  So, I don’t 
understand this part.”  Clearly, he was not getting it yet.   
 The third time, the officer moves forward in his chair and chunks the sentence 
into three parts, which the interpreter starts translating.  At the end, we hear the suspect 
responding, “I will talk, but since my lawyer’s not here, how can I talk?”  Just by 
listening to the recording only, however, there is no way of ascertaining if this crucial 
part of the police caution was correctly translated and communicated to the suspect. 
 “Incomprehensibility” of the police caution discourse is a notorious problem, 
which becomes compounded when it has to be translated to an LEP suspect.  Therefore, 
many police officers with good intentions chunk the caution into short segments and 
present them bit by bit, thinking that doing so would make the interpreting work easier.  
However, doing this often makes the problem even worse far from helping it.
351
  
Especially, had this particular part had to be translated into a language which has a 
completely different syntactic structure, e.g., a language with a predicate-verb coming at 
the end of a sentence, like Japanese, the translation may have become a disaster unless 
the interpreter had been sufficiently familiar with the logic structure of the police caution.  
For instance, Line A066, “I don’t want that contact, that talking,” may very easily 
become mistranslated as a separate independent sentence, unless the interpreter is legally 
and linguistically proficient enough to recognize that the “object” of the verb “want” 
will be followed by a “to-infinitive complement.” 
 Whether a caution was correctly translated can only be verified through a check 
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 Hale also points out the problem of chunking the police caution in Sandra Beatriz Hale, 
Community Interpreting (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 77. 
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translation like the following Discourse Clip 27. 
   
Discourse Clip 27: Police Caution: After “Check Translation” 
P062: 
ID065:  
S050: 
…and other officers, other than my partner and myself, have spoken to 
you, 
Other officers, except me and my partner, have spoken with you. 
<nodding a couple of times>  “Baleh (Yes).”  
P063: 
 
I005: 
I don’t want, anything they have said to you, to make you think, that you 
need to talk to me. 
<to the police officer>  Ah…, I don’t understand this word… 
P064: 
 
 
I006: 
 
 
I don’t want anything that the officers have said to him to make him 
think that he needs to talk to me, to influence him to talk to me.  I don’t 
want that to happen. 
<to the police officer>  OK, so whatever other officers told you…, ah 
whatever other officers spoken (sic) to him doesn’t mean that you are, 
you have told him?  So, I don’t understand this part.    
P065: 
 
ID066: 
A066: 
I007: 
ID067: 
S051: 
P067: 
ID068: 
S052: 
IE037:  
<moving forward in his chair>   The other officers that had contact 
with you here, 
The other officers have spoken with you here. 
I don’t want that contact, that talking, 
OK, 
The talk that they had with you,  
<nodding>  “Baleh (Yes).” 
to make you think that you need to talk to me. 
does not require you to tell me the same as what you told them. 
I will talk, but I said without my lawyer I don’t know what to say. 
I will talk, but since my lawyer’s not here, how can I talk? 
 
 The check translation in Discourse Clip 27 shows that in fact the police caution 
was accurately conveyed.  The translation is in a slightly different syntactic and 
semantic structure, so it is definitely not a “word-for-word” translation, but the 
pragmatic meaning of the translation accurately renders the logic structure of the police 
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officer’s original statement. 
 
2. Finding Lexical Equivalence 
 The next translation problem was caused by a typical interlingual “conceptual 
vacuum” as is shown in Discourse Clip 28. 
 
Discourse Clip 28: Difference between “Medicine” and “Medication”? 
P075: 
ID076: 
 
S055: 
After you spoke to your lawyer, 
<reaching for a bottle of water placed on the floor and getting a quick 
sip> XXX, 
XXX. 
P076: 
ID077: 
S056: 
IE040: 
you asked for some medicine. 
<putting the bottle back on the floor>  XXX. 
XXX.  
Yes. 
P077: 
I008: 
P078: 
I009: 
ID078: 
S057: 
ID079: 
S058: 
I010: 
A079: 
I011: 
A080: 
I012:  
When you came to the police station, 
<interrupting the police officer>  Let me correct that, please. 
I’m sorry? 
Because, because I said something different.  
<to the suspect>   XXX, 
XXX. 
<to the suspect>   XXX? 
XXX. 
OK, I’ve just corrected, because I said, “You asked for medication,” 
Instead of “medicine”? 
Yes. 
OK, perhaps medication is a better term. 
XXX, yes. 
 
 After listening to Discourse Clip 28, an average English-speaking fact-trier 
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would probably wonder, first of all, what the difference would be between “medicine” 
and “medication” that forced the interpreter to make such an immediate correction, and 
secondly, whether an equivalent of whatever fine distinction that exists in English also 
exists in Dari. 
 These questions, too, can only be answered by looking at the check translation, 
which provides the following information as in Discourse Clip 29. 
 
Discourse Clip 29: Difference between “Medicine” and “Medication”: Check 
Translation 
P075: 
ID076: 
 
S055: 
After you spoke to your lawyer, 
<reaching for a bottle of water placed on the floor and getting a quick 
sip>  After you spoke with your lawyer, 
“Baleh (Yes).” 
P076: 
ID077: 
 
S056: 
IE040: 
you asked for some medicine. 
<putting the bottle back on the floor>  You asked for “dava 
(medicine).” 
“Baleh (Yes).” 
Yes. 
P077: 
I008: 
P078: 
I009: 
ID078: 
S057: 
ID079: 
S058: 
I010: 
A079: 
I011: 
A080: 
I012:  
When you came to the police station, 
<interrupting the police officer>  Let me correct that, please. 
I’m sorry? 
Because, because I said something different.  
<to the suspect>   When you talked to your lawyer, 
“Baleh (Yes).” 
<to the suspect>   did you asked for “davayet (your medicine)”? 
Yes, “davabejeman (my medicine).” 
OK, I’ve just corrected, because I said, “You asked for medication,” 
Instead of “medicine”? 
Yes. 
OK, perhaps medication is a better term. 
“Dava (medicine),” yes. 
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 Discourse Clip 29 shows both the answers to the two questions mentioned 
above and a possible new problem.  First, it seems that in Dari, the word medicine 
“dava (medicine)” is inflected with a possessive suffix and becomes “davayet (your 
medicine)” or “davabejeman (my medicine).”  When the suspect was arrested and 
taken to the police station, he had most probably left “his medicine (prescriptions)” at 
home which needed to be brought to where he was being detained.  The first translation 
“dava (medicine),” however, refers to “medicine in general,” so the first sentence may 
have sounded as if the suspect, after being detained, began to feel sick and so asked the 
police if they had any medicine that he could take. 
 Finding this much, the interpreter’s explanation using “medicine” and 
“medication” seems to make a lot of sense, except that in a hurried exchange, the 
interpreter seems to have gotten the two words the other way round.  He should be 
using the word “medication” to refer to the suspect’s prescriptions, not “medicine,” but 
unfortunately it seems that he ended up getting them the other way round. 
 
F. Accuracy Issue 4: Register and Style 
 In addition to the above translation-specific accuracy issues, “Canon 1. 
Accuracy” of the NAJIT Code of Ethics also stipulates that the “register, style, and tone 
of the source language” must also be retained.352  Regarding this aspect of accuracy, the 
following has been observed in this particular police interview. 
 Speaking in or translating into English, the interpreter in this interview sounded 
rather “polite” or “well-mannered” to the author of this thesis.  This was mainly due to 
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 “Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibilities,” NAJIT (National Association of 
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators), http://www.najit.org/certification/profession.php. 
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the general tone and the register of his English.  For example, look at the following two 
discourse clips, Discourse Clips 30 and 31. 
 
Discourse Clip 30: Addition of “Sir” 
P006: 
 
ID006: 
S003: 
IE002: 
…to protect any question that…we have said something we have not 
said. 
We will record any questions that we will ask. 
<turning to the interpreter>  I must ask my lawyer. 
Should talk to my lawyer, Sir. 
 
 Notice that in Line IE002 the interpreter added a politeness marking address 
“sir” at the end of his translation given to the interviewing police officer.  The “check 
interpreter” verified, however, that the suspect’s original rendition “I must ask my 
lawyer (Line S003)” did not sound particularly polite, or even sounded rather “blunt.”  
Similarly, look at the use of the expression “allow me to” in the following Discourse 
Clip 31.   
 
Discourse Clip 31: “Allow Me To” 
P133: 
ID137: 
S125: 
 
IE102: 
And you have a sore leg. 
You have a sore leg. 
Yes, please give me a little time.  I will explain the accident more 
completely and accurately. 
Please allow me to explain this traffic accident. 
  
  This exchange took place at the beginning of the third “Past Car Accident” 
scene.  When the police officer mentioned the suspect’s past involvement in a car 
accident, the suspect suddenly became eager to speak.  In Line S125, the suspect said 
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“I will explain the accident more completely and accurately,” which, according to the 
“check interpreter,” sounded more like “I will give you a more detailed, complete 
version of the account,” which was nothing like a polite request for permission.  
However, note that the interpreter’s translation of this statement in Line IE102 sounded 
like a much more polite and formal request for permission starting with “Please allow 
me to.” 
 This “more polite” register in the interpreter’s “English” renditions had 
originally given the author of the thesis a rather “favorable” initial image about the 
suspect, an elderly male immigrant who, though not literate, had due manners and 
common sense.  According to the “check interpreter,” however, the suspect’s speaking 
style, tone, and register gave her the impression that he was rather “unpolished and 
unrefined,” not showing very many signs of “properly taught manners,” and sounded 
quite “rural and provincial.” 
 This was an illuminating discovery also accompanied by another finding 
already mentioned in Chapter XII (this chapter), B-4, supra, that the interpreter 
frequently used a “not so polite” third person pronoun353 in translating the police 
officer’s statement into Dari for the suspect, using indirect speech. 
 On the point of “register and style” therefore, the interpreter in this interview 
did not always provide a strictly “equivalent” rendition, though from an interpreter 
training standpoint, retention of such “register and style” in police or court interpreting 
requires a much higher skill than in an average “conference interpreting” job, as in the 
latter most speakers come from a much more “socio-linguistically homogeneous” group 
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 As was mentioned in fn. 342, the interpreter frequently used the expression “in mighe,” 
which sounded more like “this guy said,” to refer to the interrogating officer, while a more polite 
expression “in agha (this person said)” was never used.   
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of an “educated class” and speak with similar language register and style. 
 That having been said, however, the above-mentioned register gap between 
English and Dari, accompanied by the interpreter’s particular choice of the third-person 
pronoun to refer to the police officer, may not help create a perfectly impartial 
impression, though as was already mentioned in Chapter XII (this chapter), B-4, supra, 
this may have been only very natural and inevitable between two male immigrants from 
the same home country.  In the end, these are what the triers of fact will have to judge. 
 
G. Summary of Accuracy Verification: from an Interpreting Expert Witness’s Standpoint 
 As long as an interpreter is human, errors and mistakes do occur, though when 
it comes to interpreting, even machines may not surpass the expertise of truly skilled 
interpreters in a long time. 
 
1. 95% Accuracy and 95.1% Conduit   
 In this police interview, too, as was already shown in Table 7, the interpretation 
was not 100% accurate, though the figures showed a remarkable high average accuracy 
rate of 95% in total, 100% for English-Dari translations and 90% for Dari-English 
translations.  Also, throughout the entire recording, the interpreter performed as 95.1% 
conduit.  Considering the fact that this interview began past midnight, around 3:00a.m., 
and the interpreter made a total of 555 translations back and forth with no break taken 
during the entire 77:39-minute part of the interview, providing each rendition with an 
average pause time of “0.5 second from English to Dari” and “0.428 second from Dari to 
English,” this 95% average accuracy rate shows, in the opinion of the author of this 
thesis if acting as an expert witness, that this interpreter can be deemed as highly 
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proficient and reliable.  
 
2. Confirmations and Corrections (15.1% of Total Utterances): Sign of Reliability   
 For interpreters whose work requires instantaneous renditions, making 
confirmations and corrections by stopping the clients or by asking the clients for 
permission to make those remedies requires humbleness, honesty, and sincerity. 
 In this interview, the interpreter made a total of 98 utterances (44 in English and 
54 in Dari, comprising 15% of his total utterances in both languages) solely for the 
purpose of making confirmations and corrections.  From an interpreting expert 
witness’s point of view, this seems to demonstrate another very important quality that 
attests to his reliability as an honest, sincere, and conscientious interpreter. 
 
3. Check Interpreter’s “Check Translation”: Absolutely Indispensable   
 The thesis concludes this chapter by emphasizing that both Chapter XI, supra, 
and Chapter XII (this chapter) have more than sufficiently demonstrated that a check 
interpreter’s “check translation” is absolutely necessary and indispensable, not only for 
the purpose of validating the accuracy of the interpreter’s translations but also to “dispel” 
any potential “suspicion” created by the inevitable “foreign language” exchanges that, 
though not ideal, must take place for the purpose of confirmations and clarifications to 
ensure “accurate” translation and communication.   
 All the findings that have been shown and discussed in these two chapters 
would be what the author of the thesis would testify to from an interpreting expert 
witness’s standpoint, and what the fact-triers would obtain as crucial additional evidence 
to base their judgement on in assessing the reliability of the interpreter’s translation. 
  
 
 
Chapter XIII 
Accuracy and Impartiality Determination by Fact-Triers 
 
 After listening to all the data and explanations presented in the testimony by an 
interpreting expert witness, the triers of fact must determine the “reliability” of the 
interpreter’s translation on the basis of its “accuracy” and “impartiality.”  For this 
purpose, mandatory recording alone will never be sufficient.  Only with an 
accompanying “check translation,” monolingual fact-triers can, for the first time, make 
truly complete determinations on the translation accuracy and interpreter impartiality . 
 
A. Recording and Transcript for Accuracy Determination 
 As was already shown in Chapter XI, B-1, supra, in the recording this thesis has 
analyzed, the three participants made a total of 1,283 utterances: 284 by the police 
officer, 346 by the suspect, 305 Dari utterances by the interpreter, 304 English 
translations by the interpreter, and 44 as the interpreter’s own utterances in English.   
 Out of the total 284 utterances made by the police officer, 257 were addressed 
to the suspect in the form of notifications, confirmations, questions, and challenges.  Of 
the 305 Dari utterances made by the interpreter, 251 were translations of the police 
officer’s questions into Dari, and the remaining 54 utterances were used for confirmation 
of the meaning with the suspect in direct exchanges.  
 In short, the triers of fact would have to determine the accuracy of the 
interpreter’s 251 translations from English to Dari and 304 translations from Dari into 
English, which amount to a total of 555 renditions.  A complete authenticated transcript 
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of “check translation” would be absolutely indispensable for such determination work, 
as only by comparing each translation pair (the police interpreter’s translation during the 
interview and the expert witness’s “check” translation) made available in English, the 
fact-triers can, for the first time, make any meaningful accuracy determination. 
 
B. Recording and Transcript for Impartiality Determination 
 As we have seen, detection and determination of “impartiality” is more difficult 
than that of “accuracy,” as “impartiality” is less transparent than “accuracy.”  For this 
reason, many court rulings have required a clear and tangible proof of “bias” shown, 
almost always, in the form of “inaccurate translations caused by bias.”354  For this 
purpose, too, a complete “check translation” transcript is of vital importance, not only 
for accuracy determination but also for impartiality determination. 
 Also, the thesis has demonstrated that what may count more in assessing the 
interpreter’s bias is the evaluation of all the “asides” made by the interpreter.  As was 
mentioned above, the interpreter in this interview made 54 utterances in Dari which were 
not translations from English, and likewise 44 English utterances which were not 
translations from Dari, constituting a total of 98, or 15% of all the utterances he made.  
 If English-speaking, monolingual fact-triers listened to the video-recording only, 
they would only “indirectly get an impression” that the interpreter is making many more 
utterances in Dari than the original utterances made by the police officer.  In addition, 
while the suspect made 346 total utterances, the interpreter made only 304 total 
translations into English, which may also become disturbing for monolingual fact-triers. 
 Only with a complete “check translation,” all these unintelligible “asides” and 
                                                   
 
354
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possibly untranslated information can be examined, verified, and assessed for their 
impartiality.  Thus, only with such “check-translation,” the fact-triers can make a truly 
informed judgement on the interpreter’s impartiality by assessing his “verbal demeanor.” 
 
C. Recording and Transcript: Feasible, Cost-Effective, and Absolutely Indispensable 
 As has been stated in Chapter VII, D-3, the recording and the translation 
transcript will each become independent and indispensable evidence for the fact-triers, 
not just one being auxiliary
355
 or superfluous.  
 These new changes would undoubtedly impose extra burden and cost, but just 
like the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, which dramatically improved the downstream 
due process for LEP suspects in the U.S., the implementation is never infeasible.  On 
the contrary, the new changes will prove cost-effective
356
 as they will significantly 
improve the quality of evidence gathered in the upstream criminal process, by giving the 
police a strong incentive to start using certified interpreters who would pass muster as 
truly “conduit” interpreters, enabling the application of FRE 801(d)(2)(A). 
 The U.S. jurisprudence demonstrated a landmark example with the 1978 Court 
Interpreters Act.  Linguistic diversity and language needs in every corner of the world 
have been accelerating since then.  It is the author’s strong and sincere hope and wish 
that the U.S. will once again set a similar example to those parts of the world that still 
lag further behind, including the author’s home country, Japan, of improved due process 
rights protection for LEP suspects in the upstream criminal justice process.  
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 United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 948 (5th Cir. 1976), 947.  See Chapter VII, D-3, 
supra. 
  
 
356
 See the discussion in Chapter VII, D-1, supra.   
217 
 
 
  
Appendix 1 
Complete Annotated Transcript of Dari-Interpreter-Assisted Toronto Police Interview 
 
 The following is a complete annotated transcript of the Dari-interpreter-assisted 
Toronto Police interview that was conducted on March 19, 2008. 
 
A.  Participants/Interlocutors  (3 Participants/5 Interlocutors) 
  
P Police Officer’s utterances  (There are two officers.  This is the main, 
interviewing officer.)  
ID Interpreter speaking in Dari  (Translation of Police Officer’s English 
utterances into Dari and Interpreter’s own utterances in Dari.  Only their 
English check-translations in italics are shown.)  
S Suspect’s utterances in Dari  (Only their English check-translations in italics 
are shown.) 
IE Interpreter’s translation of Suspect’s Dari utterances into English  
I Interpreter’s own utterances in English   
 
B.  Transcription Markers 
 
001- Number for each interlocutor’s utterance; the number counts cumulatively 
up to each total as follows: 
     P001-P284 (total of 284 utterances) 
     ID001-ID305 (total of 205 utterances) 
     S001-S346 (total of 346 utterances) 
     IE001-IE304 (total of 304 utterances) 
     I001-I044 (total of 44 utterances) 
non-italic 
sentences 
Utterances rendered in English (Police Officer’s utterances, Interpreter’s 
translation of Suspect’s Dari utterances into English, and Interpreter’s 
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own utterances in English).  A Dari word that appears in an English 
sentence is shown in italics enclosed in quotation marks.   
(Example: I013: Just on a correction, I asked what’s the word “nafgh 
bad,” so explained “gas.”)     
italic 
sentences 
English check-translation of the utterances originally rendered in Dari 
(Suspect’s utterances, Interpreter’s translation of Police Officer’s 
utterances into Dari, and Interpreter’s own utterances in Dari).  If an 
English word is used in a Dari sentence, it is shown in non-italics 
enclosed in quotation marks.  (Example: ID144: “OK, one, OK slowly, I 
said…,” where did the truck come from?)  
<    > Description of what the author judged to be relevant non-verbal behavior 
of the interlocutor for the given utterance.  
<<  >> Description of what the author judged to be relevant surrounding 
information, e.g. other participants’ verbal/non-verbal behavior occurring 
concurrently in the background. 
[     ] Words that were not actually rendered but abbreviated, though obviously 
meant and thus were filled in.   
(Example: ID004: [The video machine is] for checking.) 
“nafgh 
bad” 
An original Dari word that appears in Interpreter’s English translation is 
shown in italics and put in quotation marks, without an accompanying 
translation except when it is necessary.   
(Example: I013: Just on a correction, I asked what’s the word “nafgh 
bad,” so he explained “gas.”) 
“Nafgh 
bad 
(gas)”  
A key Dari word in the English check-translation of the utterances 
originally rendered in Dari (Suspect’s utterances, Interpreter’s translation 
of Police Officer’s utterances into Dari, and Interpreter’s own utterances 
in Dari) is put in the original Dari language, enclosed in quotation marks 
immediately followed by its English translation in non-italics enclosed in 
parentheses. 
(Example: S084: “Nafgh bad (gas)” is produced and it hurts my stomach, 
and...)   
 
C.  Annotation Markers 
 
X001 Utterance in an extra round-trip in Dari without excuse or explanation in 
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English. 
X001 Utterance in an extra round-trip in Dari with excuse or explanation in 
English. 
X001  Utterance in an extra round-trip in English without excuse or explanation 
in Dari 
X001  
Utterance in an extra round-trip in English with excuse or explanation in 
Dari 
he / he Third-person pronoun, instead of first-person, used to refer to the other 
party, with a footnote annotation given in the following 3 categories: 
     1) Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect,  
     2) Interpreter Using “He” for Suspect, and  
     3) Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer. 
you Second-person pronoun used by Suspect to address his statement to 
Interpreter.
357
  
(RG1) Translation with a “Register” issue with cumulative numbering and a 
footnote annotation. 
Xxx 
(RD1) 
Translation with a “Reduction” issue with cumulative numbering and a 
footnote annotation.  The parts in the preceding Dari utterance which 
were “Reduced” in the following English translation are underlined.  
Xxx 
(OM1) 
Translation with an “Omission” issue with cumulative numbering and a 
footnote annotation.  The parts in the preceding Dari utterance which 
were “Omitted” in the following English translation are underlined. 
Xxx 
Yyy 
(AD1) 
Translation with an “Addition” issue with cumulative numbering and a 
footnote annotation.  The preceding, original Dari utterance is 
underlined, and the “Addition” in the following English translation is 
shadowed in gray. 
Xxx 
Yyy 
(AL1) 
Translation with an “Alteration” issue with cumulative numbering and a 
footnote annotation.  The preceding, original Dari utterance is 
underlined, and the “Alteration” in the following English translation is 
shadowed in gray. 
 
D.  Four Turn-Taking Cycle Pattern Markers 
                                                   
 
357
 For detailed explanation on these pronoun switches and footing shifts, see Chapter XII, 
B, supra. 
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P001 Police Officer’s utterance code number that begins each new turn-taking 
cycle is shown in gray-color shadow.  
(2S 
001)/ 
(3S 
001)/ 
(4S 
001)/ 
(OS 
001) 
At the end of every Police Officer’s utterance that started a new 
turn-taking cycle, a “Turn-Taking Cycle Pattern” category with 
cumulative numbering is shown inside gray-color-shadowed parentheses.  
The following abbreviations are used for each category.
358
 
     “2S” for “2-Step Unilateral,”  
     “3S” for “3-Step Untranslated,”  
     “4S” for “Full 4-Step Q-&-A,” and  
     “OS” for “Officer Interrupted by Suspect.” 
P001 Police Officer’s utterance code number that does not begin a new cycle 
(e.g. untranslated nodding or affirmation, often addressed to Interpreter) 
and thus appears in the middle of a cycle is underlined and non-shadowed. 
  
                                                   
 
358
 For detailed explanation of these four “Turn-Taking Cycle Pattern” categories, please 
see Chapter XI, C, supra.  
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SCENE 1 (Police Caution) ************************17:37 minutes (02:13-19:50) 
 
P001: Right here.  Please sit down.  (2S 001) 
ID001: Please sit here. 
 
P002: <pointing to an IC audio-recorder after putting it on the center table>  Now, 
 this is an audio-recorder.  (4S 001) 
ID002: [We will] check if the audio-recorder is OK. 
S001: <in a nodding tone>  “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE001: Yes. 
 
P003: This machine.  There’s also a video machine,  (2S 002)  
ID003: There is also a video machine. 
 
P004: <looking up at and pointing to the video camera>  if you see up in the ceiling, 
 (2S 003) 
ID004: [The video machine is] for checking. 
 
P005: that is turned on,  (3S 001) 
ID005: The video machine is on. 
S002: “Baleh (Yes).”   
 
P006: to protect any question that…we have said something we have not said.   
 (4S 002)  
ID006: We will record any questions that we will ask. 
S003: <turning to the interpreter>  I must ask my lawyer. 
IE002: Should talk to my lawyer, Sir. (RG1)
359
 
 
P007: I know that he spoke to a lawyer, and I…, that is a private conversation, and not 
 something that I want to discuss with him
360
 at this point.  (2S 004) 
ID007: I understand that the talk between you and your lawyer is private, and I do not 
                                                   
 
359
 Register 1: The addition of a politeness register “sir” in IE002 changed the politeness 
tone of S003, as was explained in Chapter XII, F, supra. 
 
 
360
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #1 
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 want to discuss that talk. 
 
P008: This is…  <taking out his police ID to show to the suspect, but interrupted by 
 the suspect>  (OS 001)      
S004: <interrupting the police officer, looking at the interpreter>  What should I say?  
 I don’t know.  Please talk to my lawyer.     
IE003: Should also speak with my lawyer.  I cannot say anything. 
 
P009: I understand,  (2S 005) 
ID008: I understand, 
 
P010: that he has had a conversation with his
361
 lawyer.  (3S 002) 
ID009: that you talked with your lawyer. 
S005: “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P011: It is his
362
 right,  (3S 003) 
ID010: It is your right, 
S006: “Baleh (Yes).”     
 
P012: under the constitution of this country,  (2S 006) 
ID011: under the law in this country, 
 
P013: not to talk to me.  (2S 007) 
ID012: under the constitution of this country, you have a right not to talk to me. 
 
P014: Does he
363
 understand this?  (4S 003) 
ID013: Do you understand this? 
S007: <nodding>  “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE004: Yes, I know. 
 
P015: This is my identification.  (4S 004) 
                                                   
 
361
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #2 
 
 
362
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #3 
 
 
363
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #4 
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ID014: This is my ID. 
S008: I don’t understand it.  I can’t read it. 
IE005:  I cannot read the, the letter. 
 
P016: Just so he
364
 knows that I’m a policeman.  (3S 004) 
ID015: I want to tell you that I am a policeman, 
S009: “Baleh (Yes).”    
ID016: …a member of the police.  
 
P017: I’m Detective Barsky.  (2S 008) 
ID017: My name is Barsky.  <<The suspect nods.>>  I am a police detective. 
 
P018: This is Detective Code.  <<Detective Code leans forward toward the suspect to 
 show his ID.>>  (3S 005) 
ID018: This is Detective Code. 
S010: <nodding a couple of times looking at Detective Code’s ID>  “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P019: We work in the Toronto Police Homicide Squad.  (4S 005) 
ID019: Both of us work for the Toronto Police. 
S011: <in a slightly higher and forceful pitch, looking at the interpreter>  Please talk 
 with my lawyer.  What should I say?  I don’t know anything.    
IE006: If you want to talk anything, you can talk to my lawyer. 
 
P020: As I said before, it is his
365
 right not to answer my questions.  (3S 006) 
ID020: As I said before, it is your right not to talk to me. 
S012: <cutting in just before the police officer begins the next sentence, raising both 
 hands up, shaking his head slightly>  I can’t…  
 
P021: But it is…  <pauses as the suspect kept talking>  (OS 002) 
S013: <continuing from S012>  …talk anything.  I’m under nervous stress.  
IE007: I can’t talk anything.  I’m not normal.   My brain does (sic) not working. 
 
                                                   
  
 
364
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #5 
 
 
365
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #6 
224 
 
 
P022: <softly interrupting the suspect, who is still mumbling>   Before…, before we 
 say anything, about anything, I’d like to just explain why we are here.   
 (4S 006)   
ID021: Before we talk, I want to explain to you why we have come here.  
S014: I don’t know anything at all. 
IE008: I don’t know.  I don’t know. 
 
P023: The gentleman in the corner, off the camera, is an interpreter,  (2S 009) 
ID022: This person over here is an interpreter. 
 
P024: who is not a policeman,  (2S 010) 
ID023: [He is] not a policeman. 
 
P025: and not a lawyer,  (2S 011) 
ID024: not a lawyer, either, 
 
P026: and not employed by the Toronto Police.  (4S 007) 
ID025: and does not work for the police. 
S015: <nodding> “Baleh (Yes), baleh (yes),” I know that.    
IE009: I know that. 
 
P027: He is employed by a separate company,  (2S 012) 
ID026: He works for a different company. 
 
P028: and we have asked him to come here today to assist with translation.  (4S 008) 
ID027: We have asked him to come here to do interpreting. 
S016: <to the interpreter>  Thank you very much.  I don’t know the language.  I 
 don’t know English.  I don’t know any other language except Dari.    
IE010: Thank you very much for you[r] coming here, and as I said I don’t know 
 English, except Dari. 
 
P029: When you came to the police station today,  (3S 007) 
ID028: When you came to the police station today, 
S017: “Baleh (Yes).” 
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P030: a number of policemen had contact with you,  (4S 009) 
ID029: several policemen were with you, 
S018: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE011:  Yes. 
 
P031: and spoke to you.  (4S 010) 
ID030: and spoke with you. 
S019: “Baleh (Yes),”… 
IE012:  Yes, …  <interrupted by the suspect, who is still continuing>     
S020: I didn’t know that I was talking without a lawyer. 
IE013: Yes, my lawyer didn’t know about this, and they spoke to me without the 
 knowledge of my lawyer. (AL1)
366
 
 
P032: Some of the…  <interrupted by the suspect>  (OS 003) 
S021: <interrupting the police officer, using hands, in a higher, stronger pitch>  My
 lawyer had not come yet, and the police asked me many questions.  I asked
 them to get me someone who understood Dari, [and that] I wanted to talk to
 that person.  They asked me if I understood Hindi.  I said I didn’t know any 
 Hindi. 
IE014: I told them I don’t know any other language, and I know only Dari.  They keep 
 (sic) saying that (sic) Hindi, Hindi.  I said, “No, I don’t know any Hindi.” 
 (RD1)
367
 
ID031: <extending his right hand and lightly touching the suspect’s chair’s left 
 armrest>  You don’t know Hindi.  Right?      
S022: Right.  I don’t know much Hindi. 
IE015: Yes, I don’t know a lot of Hindi. 
                                                   
 
366
 Alteration 1: “I didn’t know that I was talking without a lawyer” in S020 was altered to 
“my lawyer didn’t know about this, and they spoke to me without the knowledge of my lawyer” in 
IE013.  When the described incident was happening, the suspect had neither spoken to nor retained 
a counsel yet, so the altered expressions “my lawyer didn’t know about this” and “without the 
knowledge of my lawyer” with a possessive pronoun determiner “my” (instead of an indefinite article 
“a”) in IE013 have changed the implied facts.    
 
 
367
 Reduction 1: IE014 reduced S021 by not rendering “[m]y lawyer had not come yet, and 
the police asked me many questions.  I asked them to get me someone who understood Dari, [and 
that] I wanted to talk to that person,” though the pragmatic meaning is more or less retained 
contextually by the preceding exchange starting from P029.  
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P033: I understand that some officers were English,  (2S 013) 
ID032: I understand some police officers were English-speaking. 
 
P034: and one officer, in particular, was an officer who spoke Hindi.  (4S 011) 
ID033: One police officer was special and spoke Hindi. 
S023a: <in a rather strong tone, continuing without pausing for the interpreter to start 
 translating>  Yes, this officer asked me many questions in Hindi, and I told him 
 I did not understand him at all.  I told him I could not talk with him.  I…   
IE016:  Yes, … yes, I…,  <unable to start as the suspect would not pause> 
S023b: <continuing without allowing the interpreter to start translating>  …didn’t 
 know the law in this country.  I didn’t know that I should not speak without a 
 lawyer.  
IE017: Yes…, erm…,    
I001: <to the police officer>  I’ll try my best.    
IE018: Yes, I know, I didn’t know about that, and I didn’t know that, I didn’t know 
 lawyer.., I should not speak to.., and I didn’t understand Hindi, either. (OM1)368 
 
P035: OK.  The Hindi officer tells me in English,  (3S 008) 
ID034: The Hindi officer has told me in English, 
S024: “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P036: that he explained to you,  (2S 014) 
ID035: [that] he explained to you, 
 
P037: in Hindi,  (2S 015) 
ID036: in Hindi, 
 
P038:  your rights to counsel,  (4S 012) 
ID037: that you have a right to a lawyer.  
S025: Yes, he said [that]. 
IE019: Yes, …  <pauses to let the suspect continue> 
                                                   
 
368
 Omission 1: “I…didn’t know the law in this country.  I didn’t know that I should not 
speak without a lawyer” in S203b was omitted from IE018, due to the lack of clear rendition. 
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S026: <continuing>  My lawyer should be here.  You
369
 came here, and I talked 
 with my lawyer.    
IE020: Yes, he said that, and after you came here, I spoke with the lawyer. (OM2)
370
 
 
P039: And this officer who spoke Hindi told me,  (2S 016) 
ID038: The Hindi officer has told me in English, 
 
P040: that you understood your rights.  (4S 013) 
ID039: that you understand your rights. 
S027: <shaking his head slightly>  I don’t know the law in this country at all.   
IE021: As I mentioned, in fact, I don’t know anything about the law in this country. 
 
P041: Which part of what the officer said do you not understand?  (4S 014) 
ID040: Which part of what the officer told you did you not understand? 
S028: He asked me to tell him what was the matter, and I told him I could not answer 
 [his questions] because I could not understand him.  
IE022: He would keep insisting that (sic) “tell me what was the matter,” and I told him 
 that (sic) “I cannot say,”  
ID041: And after that?  And after that?  <prompting the suspect to say more or 
 continue>   
S029: <in a stronger pitch, sounding irritated>  I don’t know the language.  I’m 
 telling the truth.   
IE023: and even though he insisted that (sic) “I do not understand,” and I’m telling the 
 truth.  (AL2)
371
 
 
P042: OK.  (2S 017) 
ID042: “OK.” 
 
P043: I would like to go back to those rights,  (2S 018) 
                                                   
 
369
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #1 
 
 
370
 Omission 2: “My lawyer should be here” in S026 was omitted from IE020. 
  
 
371
 Alteration 2: “I don’t know the language” in S029 was altered to “and even though he 
insisted that (sic) ‘I do not understand’” in IE023, most probably due to a syntactic error in the target 
language rendition.  
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ID043: I want to go back to your rights. 
 
P044: so that you are certain that you understand what the laws in our country mean 
 and say.  (4S 015) 
ID044: so that you will understand the law in our country and what it says. 
S030: Yes, I should know that. 
IE024: Yes, I should know that. 
 
P045: The officer told you you have the right to retain and instruct counsel.  (4S 016) 
ID045: The officer told you that you have a right to have a lawyer,  
S031: “Baleh (Yes).” 
ID046: to consult him. 
S032: Yes, he said, and…   
IE025: Yes, yes, he said that. 
S033: <continuing>  Already, before this interview, you
372
 came, and I talked with 
 my lawyer.  
IE026: Yes, when my lawyer spoke to me, when you, he’s pointing to the interpreter, 
 when you came in, and he talked to me. 
 
P046: And does he
373
 understand what that means?  (4S 017) 
ID047: Do you understand what he said? 
S034: <in a stronger pitch>  As I said earlier, I don’t know the law in this country, 
 and my lawyer knows it.    
IE027: As I said earlier, that (sic) I do not understand, I don’t know about the law in 
 this country, and the lawyer knows about it. 
 
P047: OK,  (2S 019) 
ID048: OK. 
 
P048: but do you know what “retain and instruct counsel” means?  (4S 018) 
ID049: Do you know what getting a lawyer and consulting a lawyer means? 
S035: If I get a lawyer, I can consult him and he defends my right.  
IE028: To retain lawyer and to instruct the lawyer means that the lawyer defends my 
                                                   
 
372
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #2 
 
 
373
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #7  
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 right. 
 
P049: Yes,  (2S 020) 
ID050: Yes. 
 
P050:  but also,  (2S 021) 
ID051: but also, 
 
P051: “retain” means to “hire a lawyer.”  (4S 019) 
ID052: “Retain,” to get a lawyer means you hire a lawyer. 
S036: To hire a lawyer, you
374
 told me earlier, means that a lawyer will come.  I’m
 not very literate.  A Dari interpreter will also come.  The Dari interpreter will 
 ask me questions, and I will respond, and the interpreter will tell this to the
 lawyer. (OM3)
375
 
I002 : <to the police officer>  Excuse me,     
P052 : Yes?  
I003 : I don’t want to…,   
ID053: <to the suspect>  Could you repeat from the beginning?    
S037: Already, before this interview, you
376
 came, and my lawyer also came.  I’m not 
 very literate, …    
IE029: Earlier, you said that tomorrow when we go to the court, (AL3)
377
  
ID054: “OK,”  <to the suspect>  When we go to the court,  
S038: <leaning towards the interpreter, as if to ensure his understanding>  Earlier 
                                                   
  
 
374
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #3 
 
 
375
 Omission 3: The details such as “I’m not very literate” and “[t]he Dari interpreter will 
ask me question, and I will respond, and the interpreter will tell this to the lawyer” in S036, which 
was also repeated in S037 were omitted from IE030. 
 
 
376
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #4 
 
 
377
 Alteration 3: IE029 was not a translation of S037 but was more like a flow 
readjustment, leading the suspect to refocus, with more cohesion, on what he had been told earlier as 
an arrangement for the following day in court, i.e. that a counsel and an interpreter would be 
provided for him.  Only after giving IE029, the interpreter gave the same sentence in Dari to the 
suspect in ID054, both of which were actually “authored” by the interpreter, using Goffman’s 
terminology.  See Chapter IX, B-2, supra. 
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 you
378
 told me that when we go to the court tomorrow, a lawyer will come, and 
 a person who understands my language, the Dari language, will also come.   
IE030: there would be a lawyer present, and also a person who could (sic) interpret, 
 who could (sic) know my language, would be present tomorrow. 
 
P053: That’s correct.  (4S 020)   
ID055: “OK,” And after that?  <prompting the suspect to continue>  
S039: That’s all. 
IE031: That’s it. 
 
P054:  But it means also that if you cannot afford to pay for a lawyer yourself, the 
 province, the government will pay for a lawyer for you at no cost to you.   
 (4S 021) 
ID056: It also means that if you cannot pay for the lawyer yourself, this country will 
 pay for your lawyer. 
S040: <to the interpreter>  Yes, you
379
 told me that.  I don’t have any money.  I 
 don’t have anything. 
IE032: Yes, you told me that, and I don’t have any money. 
S041: You
380
 told me that, and thank you very much. 
IE033: That, you told me that.  That’s correct.  Thank you very much. 
 
P055: And does he..,
381
 do you understand that?  (4S 022)   
ID057: Do you understand this well? 
S042: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE034: Yes. 
S043: Since you
382
 have explained it to me, I understand it now. 
IE035: Since you’ve told me that now, I understood. 
 
                                                   
 
378
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #5 
 
 
379
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #6 
 
 
380
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #7 
 
 
381
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #8 
 
 
382
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #8 
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P056:  And to “instruct counsel” means that your right is to give direction to your 
 lawyer, to your counsel.  (3S 009) 
ID058: To “instruct” means, for instance, that the lawyer…  <a slight pause> 
S044: “Baleh (Yes).”   
ID059: that [we] will give you a right and will defend you, …  
S045: “Baleh (Yes).” 
I004 : Can you just please, Officer Barsky, can you repeat that… to “instruct” 
 means… 
 
P057 : “To instruct” means that it is his right to give direction to his383 lawyer.   
 (4S 023) 
ID060: “To instruct” means you have a right to tell your lawyer what to say or what to 
 do. 
S046: Yes, if the lawyer says what I say, it is fine.  He writes what I tell him, and the 
 lawyer knows what he should do. 
IE036: I understand that “to instruct” means that I give him the provision to do work 
 for me,  and whatever I say he writes. 
 
P058: Yes,  (2S 022) 
ID061: Yes. 
 
P059: but because he…,384 you were in a police station,  (3S 010) 
ID062: You are now in a police station, 
S047: “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P060: and you have been arrested,  (3S 011) 
ID063: and you have been arrested, 
S048: <almost inaudibly>  “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P061: for murder,  (3S 012) 
ID064: for murder. 
 
                                                   
 
 
383
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #9 
  
 
384
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #10 
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S049: “Baleh (Not necessarily ‘yes’).”385 
 
P062: and other officers, other than my partner and myself, have spoken to you,   
 (3S 013) 
ID065: Other officers, except me and my partner, have spoken with you. 
S050: <nodding a couple of times>  “Baleh (Yes).”  
 
P063: I don’t want, anything they have said to you, to make you think, that you need 
 to talk to me.  (2S 023) 
I005 : <to the officer>  Ah…, I don’t understand this word…   
  
P064 : I don’t want anything that the officers have said to him to make him think that 
 he needs to talk to me, to influence him
386
 to talk to me.  I don’t want that to 
 happen.  (2S 024) 
I006 : <to the police officer>  OK, so whatever other officers told you…, ah 
 whatever 
  other officers spoken (sic) to him doesn’t mean that you are, you have told 
 him?
387
  So, I don’t understand this part.         
 
P065 : <moving forward in his chair>  The other officers that had contact with you 
 here,  (2S 025) 
ID066:  The other officers have spoken with you here.  
 
P066: I don’t want that contact, that talking,  (3S 014) 
I007: OK, 
ID067: The talk that they had with you,  
S051: <nodding>  “Baleh (Yes).”  
 
P067: to make you think that you need to talk to me.  (4S 024) 
ID068: does not require you to tell me the same as what you told them.   
                                                   
 
385
 The Dari word “baleh” has a broader meaning than the English word “yes,” and it can 
also mean “Yes, I have comprehended what you have said though my answer is negative.” 
 
 
386
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387
 Interpreter Using “He” for Suspect: #1 
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S052: I will talk, but I said without my lawyer I don’t know what to say. 
IE037: I will talk, but since my lawyer’s not here, how can I talk? 
 
P068: It is his
388…your right,  (2S 026) 
ID069: It is your right, 
 
P069: not to talk to me.  (2S 027) 
ID070:  not to talk to me.  It is your right not to talk to me. 
 
P070: But the highest court in our country,  (2S 028) 
ID071: But the court in our country, 
 
P071: the Supreme Court of Canada,  (2S 029) 
ID072: the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest court in Canada, 
 
P072: tells me, as the investigator,  (2S 030) 
ID073: tells me, 
 
P073: that I can ask you any question that I believe is relative.  (4S 025) 
ID074: that I have a right to ask any questions that are related to this incident. 
S053: If my lawyer tells me to talk, I will talk. 
IE038: If my lawyer allows me to say or talk, I will do that. 
 
P074: It is your right to decide whether you talk to me or not.  (4S 026) 
ID075: It is your right to decide whether you talk to me or not. 
S054: I cannot talk without my lawyer. 
IE039: Without the lawyer, I cannot say anything. 
 
 
Scene 2 (Prescriptions)****************************14:63 minutes (19:50-34:13) 
 
P075: After you spoke to your lawyer,  (3S 015) 
ID076: <reaching for a bottle of water placed on the floor and getting a quick sip>  
                                                   
  
 
388
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #12  
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 After you spoke with your lawyer, 
S055: “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P076: you asked for some medicine.  (4S 027)   
ID077: <putting the bottle back on the floor>  You asked for “dava (medicine).” 
S056: “Baleh (Yes).”       
IE040: Yes.   
 
P077: When you came to the police station,  (4S 028) 
I008 : <interrupting the police officer>  Let me correct that, please.    
P078 : I’m sorry? 
I009 : Because, because I said something different. 
ID078: <to the suspect>  When you talked to your lawyer,   
S057: “Baleh (Yes).”    
ID079: <to the suspect>  did you asked for “davayet (your own medicine)”? 
S058: “Baleh (Yes), davabejeman (my medicine).”   
I010 : OK, I’ve just corrected, because I said, “You asked for medication,” 
P079 : Instead of “medicine”? 
I011 : Yes. 
P080 : OK, perhaps medication is a better term. 
I012 : “Dava (medicine),” yes. 
 
P081: Erm…, that you believed that we had here,  (4S 029) 
ID080: You thought we had that medicine here, that your medicine had been brought 
 here.  
S059: <shaking head>  No, I didn’t think that. 
IE041: No, I didn’t think that. 
 
P082: Perhaps that’s my mistake.  (4S 030) 
ID081: Perhaps it is my mistake. 
S060: No, I didn’t think that.  “Dava (medicine)” is at home. 
IE042: I didn’t think that.  The medication is at home. 
 
P083: OK.  (2S 031) 
ID082: OK. 
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P084: This medicine, is for what?  (4S 031) 
ID083: What is that “dava (medicine)” for? 
S061: One is for my “sar (head).” 
IE043: One is for my psychotic, 
S062: One is for sleeping. 
IE044: one is for sleeping, 
S063: Another one is for pain from “nafgh bad (gas in the bloated stomach).” 
IE045: one is for my stomach…erm, this pain, and “hast in (for this),” (OM4)389 
S064: And another one is for “ghabziat (indigestion causing constipation).”  
IE046: and one is for constipation.   
S065: There are five types of medicine. 
IE047: There are five types of medication. 
 
P085: Do you take this medicine every day?  (4S 032) 
ID084: Do you take this medicine every day? 
S066: For the last one year, I’ve been taking this medicine. 
IE048: For the last one year, I’ve been taking this. 
 
P086: Every day?  (4S 033) 
ID085: “Har roz (Every day)”? 
S067: “Har roz, baleh (Every day, yes).” 
IE049: Yes, every day. 
S068: At night I take two sleeping pills. 
IE050: At night, I take two sleeping pill (sic), 
P087: Yes. 
S069: The stomach medicine, I take two in the morning, two at lunch time, and two at 
 night. 
IE051: The stomach medication, I take two in the morning, two at lunch time, and two 
 at dinner time. 
S070: And there is another medicine.  The doctor told me to take one in the morning 
 and one at night. 
IE052: And there’s another medication or medicine, I take one in the, 
                                                   
 
389
 Omission 4: “[N]afgh bad (gas in the bloated stomach)” in S063 was omitted from 
IE045, leaving the cause of the “stomach pain” unknown.  This omission, however, was recovered 
later in the correction made by the interpreter in I013.  
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ID086: <confirming>  One in the morning, and one at night?   
S071: In the morning and at night. 
IE053: one in the morning, and one at night. 
 
P088:  And what is that medication?  (4S 034) 
ID087: What is this medicine for?  
S072: This is also for my stomach. 
IE054: That is also for the stomach. 
 
P089: OK, continue.  (4S 035) 
ID088: OK, continue. 
S073: <in a strong, clear voice>  Another medicine is for “ghabziat (indigestion 
 causing constipation).”  The doctor said this medicine will help me control 
 myself by making my stomach feel better. 
IE055: OK, the other one is for the constipation.  The doctor told me to take it to 
 control myself, my constipation. 
 
P090: OK.  (2S 032) 
ID089: OK. 
 
P091: What other medicine?  (4S 036) 
ID090: Any other medicine? 
S074: That’s all.  There’s no other medicine. 
IE056: That’s it.  There’s no other medication. 
 
P092: I didn’t hear you speak of medication for your head.  (4S 037) 
ID091: He
390
 said you didn’t talk about the medicine for your “sar (head).” 
S075: I’ve mentioned the medicine for my “damagh (head).”  I told the police, too.  
IE057: I said that for my brain.  I in… told the police. 
 
P093: When does he
391
 take…  <pauses as interrupted by the suspect>  (OS 004) 
S076: I take one in the morning and one at night.  It’s [a] long [tablet]. 
ID092: This is for the “sar (head)”? 
                                                   
 
390
 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #1 
 
 
391
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S077: It is “sar (head).” 
ID093: For the “sar (head)”? 
S078: <nodding>  Yes.   
IE058: The…, my psychotic medication is one for the morning, and one for the night. 
 
P094: And did he
392
 take all of these medications yesterday?  (4S 038) 
ID094: Did you take all these medicines yesterday? 
S079: Yes, I took one this morning, too. 
IE059: Yes, even today I took one. 
 
P095: OK, all of the medications that he
393
 was supposed to take up to that point of 
 today?  (4S 039) 
ID095: All of the medicines you are supposed to take,  
S080: “Baleh (Yes).” 
ID096: You have taken them all up to today? 
S081: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE060: Yes. 
 
P096: And what happens if you don’t take your stomach medication?  (4S 040) 
ID097: What happens if you don’t take your stomach medicine?   
S082: I will get “nafgh bad (gas causing a bloated stomach).” 
ID098: What is “nafgh bad”? 
S083: “Nafgh bad” is “gaaz (gas).” 
ID099: Ah…  
S084: “Nafgh bad (gas)” is produced and it hurts my stomach, and it also comes to 
 my head [to cause a headache]. 
I013: Just on a correction, I asked what’s the word “nafgh bad,” so he explained 
 “gas.” 
S085: Gas. 
IE061: If I don’t take that, gas will be produced, 
P097: Yes. 
IE062: It will… 
                                                   
 
 
392
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393
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #15 
238 
 
 
ID100: come to your “sar (head)” to cause a headache? 
S086: “Baleh (Yes).”   
IE063: It will “ahead to (sic)”394 my head. 
P098: OK. 
IE064:  Will “affect” my head. 
P099: Affect, you said. 
 
P100: And what about the other medications?  (4S 041) 
ID101: How about other medicines? 
S087: Other medicines?  If I take them, I will be OK. 
IE065: The other medication…, if I take them…, 
S088: The other medicines the doctor gave me, 
IE066: …I will be OK.  <interrupted by the suspect> 
S089: if I take them I’ll be OK. 
IE067: All these other medicines that the doctor prescribed, I will be OK. 
S090: The doctor said another thing.  I must take the medicine at eight o’clock and 
 go to bed at eight o’clock. 
IE068: But the doctor also told me that I should take medication at eight o’clock and I 
 go to bed at eight o’clock. 
 
P101: So the only medicine you must take, every day, is for the gas.  (4S 042) 
ID102: The only medicine you must take is the one for the gas? 
S091: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE069: Yes. 
S092: <explaining in a strong voice, using fingers for counting>  I take two in the 
 morning, two at lunch time, and two at night.  There are two types that have 
 been given me.  One, I take two in the morning, two at lunch time, and two at 
 night, right?  So there are six in total.  The other one, I take two, one in the 
 morning and one at night.  This is for the gas.  
IE070: Yes, this, two types of medications; one, I take two in the morning, two at 
 lunchtime, and two at dinner time…at night time.  And there’s also  another 
 one that I take two, one in the morning, one at night.  Both of them are for 
 stomach. 
                                                   
 
394
 This is only a phonetic representation of what was obviously mis-phrased and was 
corrected in IE064.   
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ID103: Both of them are for the stomach? 
S093: Yes, they are both for the stomach. 
ID104: One, you take two in the morning, two at lunch time, and two at night...   
S094: <in a stronger voice as if to make sure that the interpreter understands this 
 time>   There are two types.  One, I take two in the morning, two at lunch 
 time, and two at  night.  The other one, I take two: one in the morning, one at 
 night.   
IE071: There are two types.  One I take six a day, another one I take two a day. 
 
P102:  And these are all for the stomach?  (4S 043) 
ID105: And are they all for the stomach? 
S095: Yes, they are all for the stomach, my “asab (nerve/brain),” and for “khab 
 (sleep).” 
IE072: Yes, they are all for my stomach and for my psychotic, for my brain, and for 
 sleeping, the other one. 
 
P103: OK.  Tell me about the one for your brain.  (4S 044) 
ID106:  Tell me about the one for your “maghz (brain),” your “asab (nerb/brain).” 
S096: The doctor told me to take two at night. 
IE073: For the psychotic one, for my brain, the doctor told me to take it at night time. 
ID107: Two? 
S097: One in the morning and two at night. 
ID108: One in the morning and two at night? 
S098: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE074: He told me to take one in the morning, and two at night. 
 
P104: And what is this for?  (4S 045) 
ID109: What is this for? 
S099: This is for my “asab (nerb/brain).” 
IE075:  For my brain, for my psychotic. 
 
P105: What does the doctor say is wrong with your brain?  (4S 046) 
ID110: What did the doctor say is wrong with your brain? 
S100: The doctor said I think/worry too much, [and that] my “fekr (thinking)” gets 
 affected by the gas in the stomach. 
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IE076: It’s…er,  <pauses approximately 4.9 seconds>  it’s the gas from your stomach 
 affects your brain to operate properly.  So affects your brain in… 
 
P106: What does the doctor call this sickness?  (4S 047) 
ID111: What is this sickness called? 
S101: He didn’t tell me anything. 
IE077: He didn’t tell me. 
 
P107: How long have you taken medicine for this?  (4S 048) 
ID112: How long have you been taking this medicine? 
S102: I said one year.  
IE078: I told you one year. 
 
P108: And in that year, have you ever missed taking that medicine  (4S 049) 
ID113: During this past one year, have ever missed taking this medicine? 
S103: My doctor goes to India twice a year.  His name is Naghib.     
IE079: My doctor is, name is Naghib.  He goes to India twice a year. 
S104: For a vacation. 
IE080: On vacation. 
S105: This doctor has given me the medicine, but sometimes he didn’t give me [the 
 medicine].  I didn’t have the medicine while the doctor was away.  I didn’t go 
 to another doctor, because this doctor is my “famil (relative).” 
IE081: When he goes to vacation, as…., I…,   
I014: <to the police officer>  Excuse me,    
ID114: When this doctor is away, you don’t go to a different doctor to get the medicine? 
S106: No, I don’t go to a different doctor. 
IE082: When he’s not here, I don’t go to anybody else to take that medication. 
 (OM5)
395
  
 
P109: How long would you go without that medication?  (4S 050) 
ID115: How long can you stay all right without this medicine? 
S107: Without this medicine, I can remain all right for only one or two days. 
                                                   
 
395
 Omission 5: “[B]ecause this doctor is my “famil (relative)” was omitted from IE081 
and IE082.  While this particular reason may not have been a crucial part of the response to the 
given question, the deletion of this logic element made the target language rendition not completely 
equivalent.  
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IE083: The longest I could…go without it is one or two days. 
 
P110:  And then what happens?  (4S 051) 
ID116: What happens then? 
S108: My “fekr (thinking)” becomes bad.  My stomach gets bloated with gas. 
IE084: I just…control… 
I015 : No…, it’s difficult this part… 
P111 : Hmm. 
I016 : Difficult…erm…’cuse me for a second…,  
IE085 : The gas affects my…, my thought, my thinking, my brain, …so I can’t control, 
 I get… 
I017 : No, no, not the word “control,” excuse me…  
ID117: <putting his right hand on the suspect’s chair’s armrest>  I’m sorry.  
IE086: Erm.., I cannot think properly. 
 
P112: What else does it do?  (4S 052) 
ID118: What else are there?  I said that the medicines…,  
S109: “Baleh (Yes).”  
ID119: the gas makes it difficult for you to think properly.  Is this correct?   
S110: My “fekr (thinking)” becomes bad. 
ID120: Your “fekr (thinking)” becomes bad.  << The suspect says “Baleh (Yes)” in the 
 background.>> 
IE087: I just lose my thought of chain…, chain of thought.  
 
P113: Yes.  And then what happens?  (4S 053) 
ID121: What happens after that? 
S111: After that, I can’t sleep at night. 
IE088: Even at night, I can’t fall asleep. 
 
P114: And what else happens?  (4S 054) 
ID122: What happens after that? 
S112: After that, I drink “doogh,” and if I can sleep I sleep.  If I can’t sleep, I don’t 
 sleep. 
IE089: Then I just make a glass of a…   
I018 : It’s a kind of drink called “doogh.”  It’s made of yogurt.  So just put water in, 
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 and shake it to mix it together.      
P115 : Yes. 
I019 : That’s called “doogh.”   
IE090: So I just make one of that and eat, drink it. 
 
P116: And that helps?  (4S 055) 
ID123: Does it make things better? 
S113: Only a little. 
IE091: Very little. 
 
P117: What else happens?  (4S 056) 
ID124: What happens then? 
S114: From the night until the next morning I just remain that way. 
IE092: I just spend the night till daylights. 
 
P118: Nothing else happens?  (4S 057) 
ID125: What else happens? 
S115: I can’t sleep. 
IE093:  I don’t fall asleep…  <interrupted by the suspect>  
S116: <continuing>  Gas bloats my stomach.  I can’t sleep.  My “fekr (thinking)” 
 gets bad.  
IE094: I produce more gasses in the stomach, and I don’t fall asleep. 
 
P119: But other than the gasses and losing your train of thought, nothing else happens 
 to you?  (4S 058) 
ID126: Other than the gas [bloating your stomach] and your “fekr (thinking),” 
 anything else happens? 
S117: No.  I just can’t sleep. 
IE095: I don’t fall asleep. 
 
P120: That’s all.  (4S 059) 
ID127: That’s all. 
S118: Yes. 
IE096: Yes. 
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P121: And how long would you go without falling sleep?  (4S 060) 
ID128: Until when do you remain unable to sleep? 
S119: From early in the evening until the next morning, I only sleep about an hour or 
 half an hour. 
IE097: From the beginning of the night till morning, I sleep probably one hour or half 
 an hour. 
 
P122: So you’re more tired, then?  (4S 061) 
ID129: So you are very tired? 
S120: That is my sickness. This is what this sickness does to me. 
IE098: This is the pro…, the…, the.., the…, this is the problem that causes me, that 
 brings about this kind of tiredness.  
 
P123: Does it make you sick?  (2S 033) 
ID130: Does it… 
 
P124: To throw up, to vomit?  (4S 062) 
ID131: Does it make you feel like vomiting? 
S121: My stomach gets very painful,  <gestures vomiting>  and in the morning, my 
 tongue tastes bitter like “zughal (charcoal).”  
IE099: Causes me to vomit, but also in the morning, when I wake up, my mouth is 
 so…b[e]tter (sic).396 
P125 : Bitter? 
I020 : B-i-t-t-e-r. 
P126 : Yes. 
I021 : B[e]tter, did I pronounce…? 
P127 : Yes, that’s exactly.., thank you. 
 
P128: Er, but nothing else?  (4S 063) 
ID132: Nothing else? 
S122: <shaking head>  No.  Nothing else. 
IE100: No. 
 
 
                                                   
 
396
 Here, the word “bitter” was pronounced as “better.” 
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Scene 3 (Past Traffic Accident) ********************17:00 minutes (34:13-51:13) 
 
P129: When you came to the police station,  (2S 034) 
ID133: When you came to the police station, 
 
P130: they told me,  (2S 035) 
ID134: they told me, 
 
P131:  on this report,  (2S 036) 
ID135: on this report, 
 
P132: that you were involved in a car accident.  (4S 064) 
ID136: that you were in a car accident. 
S123: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE101: Yes. 
S124: <nodding and touching his right knee>  In a traffic accident, …    
    
P133: And you have a sore leg.  (4S 065) 
ID137: You have a sore leg. 
S125: Yes, please give me a little time.  I will explain the accident more completely 
 and accurately. 
IE102: Please allow me to explain this traffic accident. (RG2)
397
 
 
P134: Please.  (4S 066) 
ID138: Please. 
S126: I was coming from Scarborough, 
IE103: I was coming from Scarborough, 
S127: on a highway. 
IE104: on a highway, 
S128: I was on the right, first lane. 
IE105: on my right hand on a first lane. 
S129: Not on the collector, but on the express. 
                                                   
 
397
 Register 2: The phrase “allow me to” in IE102 changed the politeness tone of S125, 
making the original statement more courteous than it actually was, as was explained in Chapter XII, F, 
supra. 
 
245 
 
 
IE106: Not on the collector, but on the express. 
P135: Yes. 
S130: My “motar (car)” suddenly got tired, and its speed went down. 
ID139: Were you driving? 
S131: Yes, I was driving. 
IE107: I was driving…, and suddenly my “engine (motor)” got slowed down. (AL4)398 
S132: I turned on my right-side emergency signal, turned it on, and tried to pull up my 
 car on the right-side emergency lane, but then suddenly I heard behind my head 
 “gharanboss”!399 
IE108: I turned on the signal, the emergency signal, and wanted to go to the emergency 
 lane, and on the back I heard, “gharanboss.” 
S133: Inside my car, there was a sound like a bomb-like explosion. 
IE109: It was like a…, exploded like, it was like the sound like a bomb...explosion. 
S134: My brain suddenly went up, I lost my consciousness, and then my brain got 
 back to where it had been. 
IE110: My brain just got out of my head and this came back inside, and then…, 
S135: <putting his hands right below his left-side ribs>  After I open my eyes, my belt 
 was here, and…         
IE111: When I opened my eyes, my belt just hurt my ribs. 
S136: After I opened my eyes, I opened my door and saw a car of “ambulance 
 police.” 
IE112: When I opened my eyes, I noticed that ambulance and police. 
S137: <becoming more and more eloquent, using big gestures>  I saw an ambulance 
 car and a police car.  I got on the ambulance and saw no car in front of or next 
 to my car.  When I saw over there, I saw a truck.  It had hit the right side of 
 my car from behind, where my car’s back door was gone. (OM6)400      
                                                   
 
398
 Alteration 4: “[M]otar (car)” in S130 was most probably mistaken for and 
mistranslated as “engine (motor)” in IE107, altering the factual description of the original.  (In Dari, 
“motar” means a “car” and “motor” means an “engine,” according to the check interpreter the author 
hired for this research.) 
   
 
399
 This onomatopoeic word was obviously used to signify a bomb-like explosion, but its 
exact pronunciation and spelling remain unknown. 
  
 
400
 Omission 6: “[W]here my car’s back door was gone” in S137 was never recovered in 
the following section in which the suspect repeated his previous statements for the interpreter from 
IE113 all the way to IE121.  As a result, this particular information that got omitted was never 
communicated to the interviewing police officer. 
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ID140: The truck hit your car from behind? 
S138: Yes, it hit my car from behind. 
ID141: And where did the truck go after that?  Was it still behind? 
S139: When it hit my car..,   
I022: <to the police officer>  Excuse me, one moment, I’ll tell him…,401 can, 
ID142: <to the suspect>  Your car got hit, and after that?    
S140: I said that it became a “gharanboss,” like a bomb. 
IE113: I said that there was “gharanboss” noise…; it’s like a bomb. 
S141: My brain went up and came back. 
IE114: My brain was just displaced and came back.   
S142: I became unconscious and came back. 
IE115: [I was] unconscious, and I came back.   
S143: When I became conscious, 
IE116: When I became conscious, 
S144: I opened my belt, I got my glasses, and saw the police…and ambulance. 
IE117: I opened my belt, and I got my glasses, and I saw the ambulance…,  
ID143: “and police, too”?  <in English though addressed to the suspect in a rising  
 intonation> 
S145: <in a strong voice>  I don’t know who called the ambulance, but I thanked 
 whomever made the call.  The ambulance was there, and it took me to the 
 hospital. 
IE118: I don’t know who called the ambulance, but I said thank you, whoever called, 
 the ambulance was present there.   
S146: There was no car in front of or beside my car.     
IE119: When I got up, got off, I didn’t see any car in front of me, on this side of me.  
S147: <leaning on to the center table, showing directions and movements with hands, 
 on top of the police officer’s manila folder, as if it were a highway lane>  The 
 truck came this way.  My car was here.  The truck went all the way like this 
 and turned in this direction.  
ID144: “OK, one, OK slowly, I said”…,  <in English first and from here in Dari>  
 where did the truck come from?   
S148: <in a strong voice, sounding excited>  The truck hit me from behind.  
IE120: The truck hit me from behind,     
S149: <in a strong voice>  It hit my right side.  
                                                   
 
401
 Interpreter Using “He” for Suspect: #2 
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IE121: hit me on my right side,    
S150: <in a strong voice, sounding excited, leaning way forward over the center table, 
 showing actual directions with hands on top of the table>  It went ahead all the 
 way far up and turned around this way and crashed.  
IE122: It went all the way like ahead, and then turned like this. 
 
P136: <referring to the audio-recorder placed on the center table to describe where the 
 suspect’s car probably had gone to after it had been hit>  Like the 
 tape-recorder.   (4S 067) 
ID145: Like the tape-recorder. 
S151: Yes, like the tape-recorder. 
IE123: Yes.   
S152: I saw the truck.  It had gone all the way over there.  My car was over here
 like this, and my car’s wheel cap was over there near the truck. 
ID146: <pausing the suspect>  “OK,”    
IE124: I saw, I noticed my vehicle’s (RD2)402 
I023: wheel caps (sic)…? 
P137: Yes. 
IE125: Was just… 
ID147: was near the truck?  
S153: No, it was on this side. 
IE126: Was on this side, and…  
ID148: And what after that?  
S154: After that?  Nothing after that. 
IE127: And I didn’t see anything else.   
S155: <in a strong voice, sounding eloquent>  I went to the hospital.  I can’t say this 
 for sure but the police came in less than or a little more than half an hour.   
IE128: OK, when I went to the hospital, I can’t say this for sure when it was half an 
 hour or one hour, the police came.      
S156: The ambulance took me, and after that… 
IE129: [The] ambulance took me, and after that the police came. 
S157: …when I was on the “bestar (bed),”  
                                                   
 
402
 Reduction 2: Some of the repetitive details in S152 such as “I saw the truck.  It had 
gone all the way over there.  My car was over here like this” were reduced, but the pragmatic 
meaning did not change very much as the information was contextually repetitive. 
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IE130: And I was on the bed. 
S158: the police asked me questions. 
IE131: Er, while on the stre… (RD3)403 
ID149: <to the suspect>  Er, what is (what do you mean by) a “bestar (bed)”?  
S159: It is a “chapelket mareez (patient’s bed).”      
IE132: I was on the bed.  I was on the patient’s bed. 
 
P138: And what did the police say happened?  (4S 068) 
ID150: What did the police say? 
S160: <in a strong, confident voice>  The police told me that I was driving at 20 
 kilometers, and that my emergency was on. 
IE133: The police told me that you, I saw.., your speedometer was 20 kilometers, and 
also I  was told that your emergency light was on. 
S161: <in a strong voice, confidently and eloquently>  The police told me that they 
 had the truck driver’s insurance and asked me to show them my insurance, so I 
 showed them my insurance and my driver’s license.  The police wrote 
 something on paper and handed it to me.  
IE134: He gave me, he told me that he got insurance from the truck driver, and he told 
 me that he got my insurance, and he wrote some…, (AL5)404 
ID151: What did the police need? 
S162: They wrote a note of my insurance, the truck driver’s license, and my license, 
 and the plate number, and gave me the note. 
I024: OK, I’ll just repeat again, erm…,   
IE135: His insurance, my insurance, his driver[’s] license, my driver[’s] license,  
 <<The suspect says “number plate” in the background.>>  and also the plate 
 number…on a piece of paper and gave it to me.  The police officer gave it to 
 me. 
S163: There were two officers. 
IE136: There were two police officers.   
                                                   
 
403
 Reduction 3: S158 “The police asked me questions” was not translated, but from the 
previous two renditions (IE128 and IE129), the contextual meaning that “after the suspect had been 
taken to the hospital, the police came later to see the suspect at the hospital” did not change. 
 
 
404
 Alteration 5: “[The police] asked me to show them my insurance, so I showed them my 
insurance and my driver’s license” in S161 was altered to “he told me that he got my insurance” in 
IE134, which has a different propositional or factual meaning. 
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S164: I don’t know English, so I showed with my hand like this, like this, like this.  
 <moves his right arm like he did at that time>  
IE137: I…, then no English, I was just saying that I was going this lane, on this lane, 
 on this lane. 
 
P139: Did they make sure you were OK?  (4S 069) 
ID152: Did they check and make sure you were OK?  
S165: <in a strong voice, eloquently, looking at the interpreter>  I was on the bed.  
 It was around one o’clock in the morning.  No one knew I was at this hospital, 
 so at around five o’clock I made a phone call but no one answered.  Then they 
 took me to where they take a photo (MRI) of my head, got my signature, put me 
 into a machine, and took my head’s photo (MRI). (OM7)405  
ID153: Er…, was it one o’clock in the morning? 
S166: Perhaps around one o’clock at the hospital. 
IE138: It was around one o’clock, and I didn’t see…  
S167: <interrupting the interpreter>  I didn’t look at my watch. 
IE139: <trying to stop the suspect>  I didn’t see the watch, or the clock, around one 
 o’clock, and after they took me there…,  
I025 : I have to ask him
406
 because I don’t want to…say…something wrong…,  
P140 : Please. 
I026 : To the best of my ability..,  
ID154: <to the suspect, touching his char’s armrest>  Excuse me, …   
S168: “Baleh (Yes).”   
ID155: Could you… speak in short sentences one by one, so I won’t mistranslate what 
 you say or add something you didn’t say? 
S169: Sure, sure, I understand.  
ID156: Er, they took you to the hospital around one o’clock in the morning.  After 
 that?  
S170: They took me to the hospital around one o’clock. 
ID157: “OK,” after that?  
S171: After that, they gave me a “serum” and after that nothing else. 
                                                   
 
405
 Omission 7: “No one knew I was at this hospital, so at around five o’clock I made a 
phone call but no one answered” in S165 was omitted and never got recovered in the following 
section, where the suspect repeated his previously given statements for the interpreter.  
 
 
406
 Interpreter Using “He” for Suspect: #3 
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IE140: After they took me to the hospital, at one o’clock, they give (sic) me… 
I027 : Er…, something like glucose, glucose “liquidicadance”407 (sic), so it’s…what’s 
 that called…er… 
P141 : What does he
408
 call? 
I028 : “Serum.”  <<The suspect also repeats the word “serum” in the background.>> 
P142 : Yeah, that’s fine. 
I029 : Yes, “serum”…,  <finally remembering>  intravenous!      
IE141: So, they gave me the intravenous,  
ID158: “OK,” continue.  
S172: Then they gave me food. 
IE142: Then then gave me any (sic) food.    
S173: Then nothing until supper.  Before supper around four o’clock, I tried many
 times to ask someone to telephone this number…  (OM8)409 
ID159: Was it four in the morning or four in the afternoon? 
S174: Four in the afternoon. 
IE143: At 2:00, until 4:00 p.m. next day, 
S175: They told me to sign this paper to they could take a photo (MRI) of my head.  
 They wanted to take a photo (MRI) of my head.  
IE144: They told me to, they requested me to sign on this paper so we could take 
 roentgen or X-ray of your head. 
S176: I couldn’t speak the language, but there was an Indian there, so I asked him to 
 translate what they were saying so I would know what I should do. 
IE145: I couldn’t speak English, so there was an Indian.  I asked him to go with me to 
 see what they were saying, so…  <interrupted by the suspect> 
                                                   
 
 
407
 The exact lexical formation of this word remains unclear, and the spelling only reflects 
the perceived phonetic sound. 
  
 
408
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #16 
 
 
409
 Omission 8: Just as “No one knew I was at this hospital, so at around five o’clock I 
made a phone call but no one answered” in S165 was completely dropped in Omission 7, “[b]efore 
supper around four o’clock, I tried many times to ask someone to telephone this number” in S173 
was also omitted.  Consequently, the fact that the suspect most probably tried to contact his family 
many times, albeit unsuccessfully, was never communicated to the interviewing officer.  While this 
may have only been a minor omission, if the police officer had obtained this piece of information, the 
officer’s reaction later in P171, after the suspect responded that he did not know his home phone 
number, might have differed from just saying “Don’t know?” 
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S177: He had a patient, too.  His small daughter was ill. 
IE146: They also had a patient there, (OM9)
410
 
S178: Beside me. 
IE147: beside me. 
 
P143: How long have you been driving for?  (4S 070) 
ID160: How many years have you been driving for? 
S179: I’ve been driving for about 40 years. 
IE148: About 40 years. 
 
P144: How old are you now?  (4S 071) 
ID161: How old are you? 
S180: Sixty-one, or above sixty. 
IE149:  Over sixty, almost sixty-one. 
 
P145: Now…,  <pauses approximately 2.3 seconds, looking at the suspect>   
 (OS 005)  
S181: <quickly resumes before the police officer phrases his next question>  I have 
 an Afghan license, an Indian license, and a license here. 
IE150: I have [an] Afghani license, [an] Indian license, and also have [a] Canadian 
 license. 
S182: <continuing>  In India…,   
I030: Driver[’s] license, I mean. 
S183: I worked in a hospital, so I drove an ambulance and other vehicles.  In 
 Afghanistan, we drove on the right side, in India they drove on the left side, and 
 here we drive on the right side. 
IE151: I had a…, I was in India, where I was working in a hospital, and I could drive 
 any vehicle, 
P146: Hum. 
IE152: so I had a provision to drive any vehicle. (RD4)
411
  In Afghanistan, we were 
                                                   
 
410
 Omission 9: “His small daughter was ill” in S177 was omitted from IE146, thus 
making the meaning of “they” in “[t]hey also had a patient there” unclear (the Indian man’s family or 
the hospital?).    
 
 
411
 Reduction 4: “I drove an ambulance and other vehicles” in S183 was reduced to “I 
could drive any vehicle” in IE151 and “I had a provision to drive any vehicle” in IE151, though from 
the context it is not impossible to infer the same pragmatic meaning from the context.  
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 driving  on the right side.  In India, they were driving on the left side.  Here 
 in Canada, we drive on the right side. 
 
P147: So you are a good driver.  (4S 072) 
ID162: You are a good driver. 
S184: <again speaking for a long time, without looking at the police officer>  Yes.  
 Up till now I have had no accidents or got any tickets from the police.  My son
 came to the hospital, at four o’clock, after they took my photo (MRI).  I 
 handed my insurance to him and told him that this [accident] was not my fault.  
IE153: Yes, I was a good driver, and up to today I didn’t have any accident nor I had 
 any tickets, and I told my sons, …, told him to take the provisions to the 
 insurance, and talk to them, and the police didn’t, (OM10)412 
ID163: The police didn’t charge you? 
S185: No. 
IE154: The police didn’t charge me.  
S186: <<The police officer tries but fails to cut in as the suspect continues without 
 looking at him.>>  But when my son went to the police, they told him that the 
 officer was on vacation for four days. 
IE155: And when my sons went there, they said the police officer went to the vacation, 
 four days, not here. 
 
P148: You have children?  (4S 073) 
ID164: Do you have children? 
S187: Yes. 
IE156: Yes. 
 
P149: You said “sons.”  How many sons?  (4S 074) 
ID165: You said “bacheha (boys).”  How many sons? 
S188: Two sons.  
IE157: Two sons. 
 
P150: Do you have daughters?  (4S 075) 
ID166: Do you have “dakhtars (daughters)”? 
                                                   
  
 
412
 Omission 10: “My son came to the hospital, at four o’clock, after they took my photo 
(MRI)” in S184 was omitted from IE153, deleting this element from the suspect’s fact statement.  
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S189: Yes. 
IE158: Yes. 
 
P151: How many?  (4S 076) 
ID167: How many daughters? 
S190: Four. 
IE159: Four. 
 
P152: Four daughters?  (4S 077) 
I031: Yes.  
 
P153: And two sons?  (4S 078) 
ID168: Four daughters and two sons? 
S191: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE160: Yes. 
 
P154: Do they all live in Canada?  (4S 079) 
ID169: Do all of them live in Canada? 
S192: “Baleh (Yes).”   
IE161: Yes. 
 
P155: Do they live with you?  (4S 080) 
ID170: Do they live with you? 
S193: Yes, they live with me. 
IE162: Yes. 
 
P156: All of them?  (4S 081) 
ID171: All of them live with you? 
S194: “Baleh (Yes).”     
IE163: Yes. 
 
P157: How do I properly pronounce your name?  (4S 082) 
ID172: How can I pronounce your name? 
S195: <sounding a little puzzled>  My name? 
ID173: “Baleh (Yes).”    
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IE164: My name? 
 
P158: Yes.  (4S 083) 
ID174: “Baleh (Yes).”      
S196: My name is Peer Mohammad.  
IE165: My name is Peer Mohammad. 
 
P159: Peer Mohammad?  (4S 084) 
I032: Yes. 
 
P160:  Is Mohammad your family name?  (4S 085) 
ID175: Is Mahammad your family name? 
S197: My family name is Khairi. 
IE166: My last, my last name is Khairi.  Peer Mohammad Khairi. 
 
P161: Now, how do I spell Khairi?  (4S 086) 
ID176: How do I pronounce or write Khairi? 
S198: I can’t write. 
IE167: I don’t know how to write. 
 
P162: That’s fine.  (2S 037) 
ID177: It’s OK. 
 
P163: Can I call you Peer Mohammad?  (4S 087) 
ID178: Can I call you Peer Mohammad? 
S199: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE168: Yes. 
 
P164: Thank you.  (4S 088)  
ID179: Thank you.   
S200: <looking away from the police officer, who was about to ask the next question, 
 and turning to the interpreter, instead>  Till now, I’ve never had a [car] 
 problem involving insurance.  I’ve never been charged for a traffic violation.  
My car  is broken and is still there, and no one has asked me anything about it. 
IE169: So far, we don’t know anything about my insurance, my car’s down there, and 
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 nobody just ask (sic) me anything about it. (AL6)
413
   
S201: <regaining strength in the voice>  Do you
414
 understand?  The tow truck 
 took away my car immediately. 
IE170: And [a] tow truck, this.., immediately a tow truck came and towed my vehicle 
 and just went to this place again.   
S202: <regaining even more strength in the voice>  Except for me and that truck, 
 there was no other car on the highway. 
IE171: There was no any other vehicle on the highway except me and the tow truck.  
S203: Not the tow truck but the truck that hit me. 
I033: I’m sorry, my mistake.   
IE172: Erm…, except me and the truck…,  
I034: Not tow truck.         
S204: <without looking at the police officer, who tries to cut in again but fails>  If 
 there had been any other cars on the high way at that time, then this truck could 
 have hit other vehicles. too.  
IE173: If there were any other vehicle, there was a possibility of, this truck could have 
 been, could have hit other vehicles, too.  
I035: OK. 
 
P165: And this is on a highway?  (4S 089) 
ID180: Was it on a highway? 
S205: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE174: Yes. 
 
P166: Four oh one (401), that was four zero one?  (4S 090) 
ID181: Highway 401? 
S206: “Baleh (Yes),” 401. 
IE175:  Yes 401. 
 
P167: When you came to Canada, did you have to take a driver’s test?  (4S 091) 
ID182: When you came to Canada, did you have to take a driver’s test to get a license? 
                                                   
 
413
 Alteration 6: “Till now, I’ve never had a [car] problem involving insurance.  I’ve 
never been charged for a traffic violation” in S200 was replaced by “[s]o far, we don’t know 
anything about my insurance” in IE169. 
 
 
414
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #9 
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S207: Yes, why not? 
IE176: Yes, why not. 
 
P168: And did they…, did you have to write a test?  (4S 092) 
ID183: Was there a written examination?  Did you have to take a written 
 examination? 
S208: I studied for the exam.  I studied the traffic signs,  but failed many times.  
 Finally, I passed.  
IE177: Yes, I have the signs; I know the signs, and also, er, a number of times…, I got 
 a certificate from there, and also I got, a number of times failed.  Eventually, I 
 passed. 
 
 
Scene 4  (Murder Interrogation) ******************26:26 minutes (51:13-77:39) 
 
P169: Your phone number at your home,  (3S 016) 
ID184: Your telephone at home, 
S209: “Baleh (Yes).”  
 
P170: What is it?  (4S 093) 
ID185: What is it? 
S210: I don’t know. 
IE178: I don’t know. 
 
P171: Don’t know?  (4S 094) 
I036: No. 
 
P172: But he has a telephone at home?  (4S 095) 
ID186: You have a telephone at home? 
S211: “Baleh (Yes).”   
IE179: Yes. 
S212: It’s a home telephone.  I don’t have a cell phone. 
IE180: It’s a home phone number.  It’s (a) home phone.  I don’t have a cell phone. 
 
P173: OK.  Today,  (2S 038) 
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ID187: Today, 
 
P174: you used the telephone.  (2S 039) 
ID188: You used the telephone. 
 
P175: Yes?  (4S 096) 
S213: <answering directly, nodding>  “Baleh (Yes).”  
ID189: <overlapping with the suspect’s response>  “Baleh (Yes)”?  
IE181: Yes. 
 
P176: You called the police.  (4S 097) 
ID190: You called the police yourself. 
S214: “Baleh (Yes).”     
IE182: Yes. 
 
P177:  Tell me why you called the police.  (4S 098) 
ID191: Why did you call the police? 
S215: How should I talk without my lawyer? 
IE183: Now again, how should…, 
S216: <interrupting the interpreter>  What should I say?  
IE184: without my lawyer?  Things I’m supposed to say, I say.  
 
P178: But it was you who called 911?  (4S 099) 
ID192: You called 911 yourself? 
S217: Yes, I know I called 911.  I don’t know anything else. 
IE185: Yes. I know…, the only thing I know is 911.  The rest I don’t know. 
 
P179: But it was you who called 911 today.  (4S 100) 
ID193: Did you call the police yourself? 
S218: “Baleh (Yes).”    
ID194: You called 911. 
IE186: Yes. 
 
P180: Because of something that happened at your home.  (4S 101) 
ID195: Something happened at your home. 
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S219: <looking down very uncomfortably for a moment, moving his legs slightly>  I 
 really don’t know this at all.  You415 were not in my situation.  I called the
 police and asked them to come fast so that the problem would not become
 serious.  
IE187: I don’t know the…, the…incident.  All I said is, come on, come here, come on 
 in, that is er…, (OM11)416 
I037: <to the police officer>  Excuse me,      
ID196: <to the suspect>  Come fast, what did you say happened?    
S220: I said, “come and see what happened.” 
IE188: Come on in and watch, see what happened, or what was the matter. 
 
P181: And what was the matter?  (4S 102) 
ID197: What was the matter? 
S221: I don’t know very much without…  My head aches, and my brain is not well. 
IE189: I cannot say anything without my lawyer. (AD1)
417
  Right now, I’m fainting.   
S222: As I said before, I’m not feeling well and feel like fainting. 
IE190: I’m getting the sweat, and also I’m fainting. 
 
P182: Because you’re upset.  (4S 103) 
ID198: Because you are “khafe (angry)”? 
S223: No, I’m not angry.  I’m not feeling well.  I haven’t eaten, and I haven’t taken 
 my medicine.   
IE191: No, I’m not upset.  It is because I didn’t eat, and also I didn’t take medication. 
 
P183: My officers tell me that you ate earlier.  (4S 104) 
ID199: My officers told me that you ate earlier. 
S224: At around two or three o’clock, they brought me a small bun of this size and a 
 glass of juice. 
                                                   
 
415
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #10  
 
 
416
 Omission 11: In S219, the suspect talked directly to the interpreter, saying, “You were 
not in my situation,” which was dropped from the following rendition IE187.  Also, “I called the 
police” and “(asked them to come fast) so that the problem would not become serious” in S219 were 
omitted from IE187. 
 
 
417
 Addition 1: In S221, there was no word after “without,” but in IE189 the word “my 
lawyer” was added after “without,” most probably by an inference made by the interpreter. 
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ID200: Two in the morning or two in the afternoon? 
S225: In the morning, morning. 
ID201: What time did you eat supper?  What did they bring? 
S226: Three or three-thirty or four.  I didn’t have a watch at that time.  I ate two 
 slices of bread wrapped in paper.  I don’t know what was inside. 
IE192: At 2:00 p.m., or two o’clock p.m., they brought something in the paper (sic).  I 
 eat that.  I ate that. (AL7)
418
 
P184: Yes. 
S227: With that, one glass of juice. 
IE193: And one glass of juice. 
 
P185: Did you need something to eat?  Do you have headaches from not eating?   
 (4S 105) 
ID202: He
419
 is asking if you have a headache because you haven’t eaten. 
S228: Headache is something else.  My stomach is “mede (not feeling well).” 
IE194: Not only…, I think also I get fainting right now, get dizzy. 
 
P186: When you called the police, you told them to come to your home.  (4S 106) 
ID203: When you called the police, you told them to come to your home. 
S229: I said earlier I would not talk without my lawyer. 
IE195: I said… 
S230: When my lawyer comes, I will tell everything. 
IE196: I said, until my lawyer’s not (sic) here, I cannot talk.  When he comes, I’ll say 
 anything. 
 
P187:  But the conversation you had on, with 911,  (4S 107) 
ID204: But the talk you had with 911 at that time, 
S231: <raising the pitch, sounding irritated>  I don’t know the language!  What 
 could I have said!   
                                                   
 
418
 Alteration 7: As to around “what time” he ate supper, the suspect said “[a]t around two 
or three o’clock” in S224, “[i]n the morning, morning” in S225, and “[t]hree or three-thirty or four” 
in S226, obviously quite confused about the time.  However, the translation in IE192 was “[a]t 2:00 
p.m., or two o’clock p.m.,” which was a little too much “editing” or alteration on the interpreter’s 
part.  Instead, the interpreter should have translated all the confused time descriptions just the way 
they were stated by the suspect and let the interviewing police officer do the figuring out.      
 
 
419
 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #2 
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IE197: I didn’t know the language.  What should I say? 
 
P188: But you know that this conversation is recorded.  (4S 108) 
ID205: But do you know that the talk with 911 was recorded? 
S232: I don’t know that. 
IE198: Yes, I don’t know about that.  
 
P189: I’m telling you now that it is recorded.  (4S 109) 
ID206: Now I tell you that it was recorded. 
S233: I don’t know anything about it. 
P190:  <before the interpreter translates the suspect’s response in S233>  OK? 
IE199: I don’t know.  Yes.  
S234: I don’t know about that recording.  I was not recorded in front of my eyes.  
IE200: I don’t know about it being recorded.  It’s not recorded in front of me. 
S235: They recorded it?  They did what?  Whatever they did, I don’t know anything 
 about it.   
IE201: If they recorded, whatever they recorded, they did it. 
 
P191: Yes.  (2S 040) 
ID207: Yes. 
 
P192: But when I listen,  (2S 041) 
ID208: When I listened, 
 
P193: to your voice,  (2S 042) 
ID209: to your voice, 
 
P194:  talking to the operator,  (2S 043) 
ID210: when you talked with the operator, 
 
P195: and talking to the translator or the interpreter on the telephone,  (3S 017) 
ID211: and talked with the interpreter, 
S236: “Baleh (Yes).” 
 
P196: you told the, you told the operator, through the interpreter,  (2S 044) 
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ID212: you told the operator through the interpreter,  
 
P197:  that you spoke Hindi.  (4S 110) 
ID213: that you spoke Hindi. 
S237: <making a long statement>  I only told him, “You come.”  I know just a little 
 Hindi only.  If I knew Hindi, why would I be here all night?  If I did, why
 would I ask for a lawyer?  < to the interpreter>  If I knew Hindi, why would
 you be here?  Why would I be relying on you now?
420
     
IE202: I told him to...er, (OM12)
421
  
I038 : <to the police officer>  Excuse me, I have to go back again.   
P198 : Please. 
ID214: I’m sorry. 
S238: “Baleh (Yes).”  
ID215: What I understood was…,  <interrupted by the suspect> 
S239: I said if I knew Hindi, 
IE203: If I knew Hindi properly, 
S240: I would have said everything I wanted to say.    
IE204:  I would have said, I would have told them all of everything, 
S241: After that he kept talking to me, but I said I could not understand anything 
 anymore.  
IE205: And they talked to, and they talk (sic), I told them that I didn’t know too much. 
S242: And they asked me what language I understood.  I told them Dari. 
IE206: And they asked me, “What language do you speak?”  I told them Dari. 
 
P199: OK.  But you told them if they came to your home, you would tell them what 
 happened to your wife.  (4S 111) 
ID216: And when you told them to come to you home, you said you would tell them 
 what happened to your wife. 
                                                   
  
 
420
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #11 
 
 
421
 Omission12: In S237, the suspect re-emphasized his limited Hindi proficiency, 
addressing his statement directly to the interpreter, “If I knew Hindi, why would I be here all night?  
If I did, why would I ask for a lawyer?  If I knew Hindi, why would you be here?  Why would I be 
relying on you now?”  Though the main point, i.e. the suspect had limited Hindi proficiency, was 
recovered in the following section (IE203: If I knew Hindi properly; and IE204: I would have said, I 
would have told them all of everything), the original emphatic tone and expressions in S237 
remained unrecovered. 
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S243: I don’t know anything. 
IE207: I don’ know. 
 
P200: You don’t remember that?  (OS 006) 
S244: <Interrupting and thus overlapping the interpreter’s translation for P200>  
 Without my lawyer, I won’t say anything.  
IE208: Without my lawyer, I cannot say anything. 
 
P201: So you don’t remember this conversation?  (4S 112) 
ID217: Don’t you remember this conversation? 
S245: What? 
IE209: What? 
 
P202: This conversation with the 911 operator.  (4S 113) 
ID218: The conversation you had with 911. 
S246: I said what I remember.  I didn’t say anything else. 
IE210: Whatever I knew, I said.  I didn’t say anything else. 
 
P203:  But you said, if the police didn’t come, you would kill someone else.  (4S 114) 
ID219: You said if the police didn’t come, I would kill someone. 
S247: <shaking his head clearly and decisively in negation>  No.  I never did. 
IE211: No, I didn’t say.  No. 
S248: No. 
IE212: No. 
 
P204: What were the words you used?  (4S 115) 
ID220: What did you say using what kind of words? 
S249: All I said was, “‘Tiz bian (Come fast).’  Otherwise, something would happen 
 to me which would ‘khodamo az bein mibaram (make me destroy myself)’.” 
IE213: I said, “tiz bian,” come fast.  “Age nayin,” if you don’t come, there’d be, “yek 
 vaghe dghe sar e man mishe (another incident will happen on me),” there 
 would be another incident, on me. 
 
P205: I do not understand that.  (4S 116) 
ID221: I don’t understand that. 
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S250: <sounding frustrated>  I told you the truth.  I didn’t say anything else.  I just 
 said, “Tiz bien, tiz bien, tiz bien (come fast, come fast, come fast).”  The 
 police didn’t come early enough.  They came very late.  
IE214: I didn’t say anything else.  I just said, “Tiz bien. tiz bien, tiz bien.”  [It] means 
 come fast, come fast, come fast.  Still, they come late. 
S251: If you don’t come fast, something will happen to me. 
IE215: If you do not come fast, there would be something happening on me. 
 
P206: What?  (4S 117) 
ID222: What? 
S252: “Be khodam yek vaghea mishe (something bad will happen to myself, or I 
 might die).”  I myself would be terminated. 
IE216: Perhaps, I would have been…wasted. 
 
P207: What does “wasted” mean?  (4S 118)  
ID223: What does “be khodam yek vaghea mishe (something bad will happen to myself, 
 or I might die)” mean?  
S253: I might have jumped from somewhere.  I was under a lot of stress and could 
 not think well.  
IE217: Perhaps, I would have…maybe…jumped somewhere, like top to bottom…to, or 
 maybe I thrown away myself somewhere down. 
 
P208: Why?  (4S 119) 
ID224: Why? 
S254: I could not think well. 
IE218:  My thought was not thinking (sic).  I wasn’t thinking. 
 
P209: Why?  (4S 120) 
ID225: Why? 
S255: I am sick.  I said I am sick. 
IE219: I said that…I am…I’m sick. 
 
P210: What kind of “sick”?  (4S 121) 
ID226: What kind of sickness? 
S256: Suddenly my “asab (nerve)” becomes irritated.  Suddenly I lose temper. 
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IE220: My.., the problem with my brain.  Suddenly, I lose control. 
 
P211: You told me earlier, that makes you not be able to sleep.  (4S 122) 
ID227: Like what happens when one cannot sleep?  You can’t sleep well? 
S257: Yes, [that is right].  I can’t sleep. 
IE221: Yes, [that is right].  I don’t fall asleep. 
S258: If I don’t sleep, I become easily irritated and lose temper. 
IE222: If I don’t fall asleep, my…just…I get…, 
I039: “Asabum kharab mishe (nerves become bad, become irritated)” means… 
IE223: <after 5.121-second pause>   …I lose my thought…I, er…, I can’t think 
 properly…, I get…,  <pausing to think>   
I040: Er, ‘cuse me once again, it’s the word I can’t say that would… , er try to 
 remember, “asabum kharab mishe”…,  
IE224: <after 6.493-second pause>  Very angry.  <<The other police officer nods.>> 
 
P212: Did you get angry yesterday?  (4S 123) 
ID228: Did you get “ghach (very angry)” yesterday? 
S259: What? 
ID229: Did you get “ghach (very angry)” yesterday? 
S260: Yesterday? 
ID230: Yes. 
S261: No.  Not yesterday. 
IE225: Not yesterday. 
 
P213: Today?  (4S 124) 
ID231: Today? 
S262: Yes. 
IE226: Yes. 
 
P214: Why?  (4S 125) 
ID232: Why? 
S263: If I can’t sleep at night, my condition worsens. 
IE227: I said at night if I don’t fall asleep, I can’t control myself. 
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P215: <looking at the suspect>  So he
422
 gets angry?  (4S 126)     
ID233: Then you get angry? 
S264: What? 
ID234: Then you get angry? 
S265: My “fekr (thinking)” gets bad. 
IE228: I just can’t think. 
  
P216: And that’s what happened today?  (4S 127) 
ID235: Did you become that way today?  
S266: I became unable to think today. 
IE229: Today, I just lost my thought. 
 
P217: Who was home when this happened?  (4S 128) 
ID236: Who was home when you fell into this situation? 
S267: Do I have to answer all these questions? 
IE230: Should I answer all these questions? 
 
P218: We’ve already discussed.  His…, his…, it’s up to him423 to answer…,   
 (2S 045) 
ID237: He
424
 says… 
 
P219: <interrupting the interpreter’s translation in ID237>  up to him425 to decide.   
 (4S 129) 
ID238: He
426
 says we’ve already talked with you about it.  It’s something you decide. 
S268: You know what I have already told the police.  You do, don’t you?427  But the 
 police took a very long time [to arrive].   
                                                   
 
422
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #17 
 
 
423
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #18 
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 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #3 
 
 
425
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #19 
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 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #4 
 
 
427
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #12 
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IE231: But then what I said already, the police knows (sic) about it.  The police came 
 late. 
I041:  OK. 
 
P220: And what happened?  (4S 130) 
ID239: And what happened? 
S269: I don’t remember. 
IE232: I don’t know…that incident. (AL8)428 
S270: I told you,
429
 without my lawyer, I can’t say anything! 
IE233: Until my lawyer’s not (sic) here, I can’t say anything. 
 
P221: You don’t know what happened to you wife?  (4S 131) 
ID240: Don’t you know what happened to your wife? 
S271: Without my lawyer, I can’t say anything. 
IE234: Till my lawyer’s not (sic) here, I can’t say anything. 
 
P222: But you made the call, to 911.  (4S 132) 
ID241: You called 911 yourself. 
S272: “Baleh (Yes).”     
IE235: Yes.  
 
P223:  And it was only you and your wife at home.  (4S 133) 
ID242: Only you and your wife were at home. 
S273: My eldest son was at home but he went out. 
IE236: My eldest son was there, but he got out. 
 
P224: When this was happening?  (4S 134) 
ID243: When this was happening? 
S274: “Baleh (What)”? 
ID244: When this was happening? 
S275: What was happening? 
                                                   
 
428
 Alteration 8: As was explained in Chapter XII, D-4, supra, “I don’t remember” in S269 
was altered to “I don’t know…that incident” in IE232, the expression “that incident” grammatically 
implying the suspect’s knowledge about “what incident” is being questioned about. 
 
 
429
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #13 
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IE237: What happened? 
 
P225: You know your wife is dead.  (4S 135) 
ID245: He
430
 wants to say your wife has died. 
S276: <shaking his head>  I didn’t know that until now.  
IE238: I don’t (sic) know it till now. 
 
P226: Nobody told you your wife is dead?  (4S 136) 
ID246: Nobody told you that your wife has died? 
S277: No. 
IE239: No. 
 
P227: You never saw your wife on the bed?  (4S 137) 
ID247: Didn’t see your wife on the “bestar (bed)”? 
S278: “Baleh (What)”? 
ID248: Didn’t you see your wife on the “bestar (bed)”?  On the “takht (bed)”? 
S279: I saw her on the bed, but I didn’t know that she was dead. 
IE240: I saw her on the bed, but I didn’t know about her dead. 
 
P228: <after 6.906-second pause>  You know she was killed today in your apartment.  
 (4S 138) 
ID249: Do you know she was killed in your apartment? 
S280: <Moves in his seat very uncomfortably, looking at the interpreter>  Earlier, 
 “goftin  (plural you)”431 told me that without my lawyer, I should not talk. 
IE241: You told me that until… 
S281: <looking at the interpreter>  Why do you do it like this?  Do you
432
 know if
 my lawyer will come?  When he comes, I will talk. 
IE242: You told me that till my lawyer’s not (sic) here, don’t talk. (OM13)433 
                                                   
 
430
 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #5 
 
 
431
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #14 
 
 
432
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #15 
 
 
433
 Omission 13: IE242 only covered S280 and did not translate the sentences in S281 
(“Why do you do it like this?  Do you know if my lawyer will come?  When he comes, I will talk.”), 
all of which were addressed directly to the Interpreter.  
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P229: I told him
434
 that?  (4S 139) 
ID250: Did I say that? 
S282: On the telephone you
435
 told me. 
IE243: On the telephone you told me. 
 
P230: We never spoke on the telephone.  <<The suspect looks at the police officer.>>  
 (2S 046) 
ID251: I didn’t talk… 
 
P231: You and I never spoke on…  (OS 007) 
S283: <turning from the police officer to the interpreter>  That’s right.  That’s right. 
ID252: You and I never… 
S284: That’s right.  That’s right.  Someone told me the police can only take your 
 finger prints and take your picture… 
ID253: <to pause the suspect>  “OK.”    
IE244: The person who spoke to me on the phone,  
P232: Yes. 
IE245: He told me that only the police could take your fingerprints, … 
 
P233: <putting up his hand to stop the interpreter>  OK, stop, please.  This is the 
 conversation with the lawyer, yes?  (4S 140)   
ID254: Is this what you talked about with your lawyer? 
S285: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE246: Yes. 
 
P234: <shaking his head>  That’s, that’s private.  (4S 141)    
ID255: That’s private.  It’s your own confidential content. 
S286: I don’ know. 
IE247: I don’t know. 
 
P235: That’s between…OK, I’m telling you…,  (2S 047) 
ID256: I tell you, 
                                                   
 
434
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #20 
 
 
435
 Suspect Using “You” for Interpreter: #16 
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P236: Your conversation with your lawyer,  (2S 048) 
ID257: The conversation between you and the lawyer, 
 
P237: is just for you and your lawyer, and your interpreter.  (4S 142) 
ID258: is only for you, your lawyer, and the interpreter. 
S287: “Baleh (Yes).” 
IE248: Yes. 
 
P238: Today,  (2S 049)  
ID259: Today, 
 
P239: did you go out?  (4S 143) 
ID260: did you go out? 
S288: From where? 
IE249: From where? 
 
P240:  <looking at the interpreter>  From his
436
 home.  (4S 144)   
ID261: From your own home. 
S289: From my home?  No. 
IE250: No.  Not from my home. 
 
P241:  Not until the police arrived?  (4S 145) 
ID262: Until the time the police came?  Until the police came?  
S290: The police came.  I was home.  The police came and tied my “shaana 
 (shoulders/arms).”  
IE251: Until the police arrived, I was at my home.  They, they tied me up. 
S291: They tied my hands behind me. 
IE252: They tied my hand (sic) behind me, and…,  <prompting the suspect with a 
 hand> 
S292: They brought me here. 
IE253: and they brought me here. 
 
P242: How long before the police arrived at your home, did your son leave?   
                                                   
 
436
 Police Officer Using “He” for Suspect: #21  
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 (4S 146) 
ID263: What did your son do until the police came?  Your son left home? 
S293: My son left home about 15 or 20 minutes earlier. 
IE254: My son…got out of home almost 20 minutes, 15 to 20 minutes, 
 
P243: Before the police?  (4S 147) 
ID264: Before the police came? 
S294: <nodding first, and then continuing in a strong pitch>  Before the police 
 arrived.  The police were late.  The police were very, very late.  The police
 did not want to come [to my house].  The police were scared that maybe I had
 something.  I told them I didn’t have anything (dangerous), so “come and find 
 out.”    
IE255: Before the arrival of the police….the police were scared.  They came very, 
 very late, and I told them, come on, there’s nothing with me. (RD5)437 
S295: They even asked me to open the door of our house and said that they were 
 coming in. 
IE256:  They asked me to…“open your door…we come in, we come in.” 
S296: When I opened the door, two police officers were outside holding guns.  Three 
 or four people were also there, and immediately they arrested me and tied my 
 “shaana (shoulders/arms).”  They wouldn’t let me go back to my house.  They 
 dragged me out [of my house].  I didn’t know what they wanted to do. 
IE257: When I opened the door, two people...er…two persons, I mean officers,  
 <<The interviewing officer nods.>>  two persons went to the…  <<Here, the 
 suspect says “zeena (stairs)” in the background.>>  stairway, four…three 
 people…, (OM14)438 
S297: And over there were one “dukhtar (girl)” and another, male police officer.  
 They pointed the guns toward me, …  
IE258: one girl and one other police was (sic) on the other side, and they just pointing 
 (sic) the gun towards me, and… 
                                                   
  
 
437
 Reduction 5: The details in S294 describing how the police seemed to be acting right 
before the suspect’s arrest (“The police did not want to come [to my house].  The police were scared 
that maybe I had something.  I told them I didn’t have anything (dangerous), so ‘come and find 
out.’ ”) were reduced in IE255, though the overall pragmatic meaning was retained. 
 
 
438
 Omission 14: Several factual details in S294 (“They wouldn’t let me go back to my 
house.  They dragged me out [of my house].  I didn’t know what they wanted to do.” were omitted 
from IE257 and did not get recovered in the following section, either.  
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S298: told me to raise my head this way.  I did so immediately.  They stood on top of 
 me and tied my… 
IE259: told me to raise your hands, and turn your head up, and they  <<Here, the 
 suspect  says “tied my hands (behind my back).” >>  tied up my hands. 
 (OM15)
439
 
 
P244: Your son who left, how old is he?  (4S 148) 
ID265: How old is your son who left the house, the son who left the house? 
S299: My son is 32 years old. 
IE260: My son is 32 years old. 
 
P245: Thirty-two?  (4S 149) 
ID266: Thirty-two? 
S300: <nodding>  “Baleh (Yes).”     
IE261: Yes. 
 
P246: What is that son’s name?  (4S 150) 
ID267: What is that son’s name? 
S301: “Sakhi Ahmad” 
IE262: “Sakhi Ahmad…, Sakhi Ahmad” 
 
P247: And you have another son?  (4S 151) 
ID268: Do you have another son? 
S302: “Baleh (Yes),” I have another son.  
IE263: Yes, I have another son. 
 
P248: How old is he?  (4S 152) 
ID269: How old is he? 
S303: That son is 20 years old. 
IE264: That son is 20 years old. 
 
                                                   
  
 
439
 Omission 15: “They stood on top of me” in S298 was omitted from IE259.  While 
what exactly “stood on top of me” meant is not clear, it might have meant that some police officers’ 
feet were on top of the suspect’s back when he was forced to either kneel or lie on his stomach at the 
time of the arrest, and the importance of such detail is for the fact-triers, not the interpreter, to judge.   
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P249: Twenty?  (4S 153) 
ID270: Twenty? 
S304: Yes, twenty. 
IE265: Yes, twenty. 
 
P250:  And was he home today?  (4S 154) 
ID271: Was he home today? 
S305: No, he left much earlier. 
IE266: He got out earlier. 
 
P251: Do you know where he went?  (4S 155) 
ID272: Do you know where he went?  
S306: He went to college to study. 
IE267: He went to college to study. 
 
P252: OK.  Where did your older son go?  (4S 156) 
ID273: Where did your eldest son go? 
S307: I don’ know. 
IE268: I don’t know. 
 
P253: You have four daughters?  (OS 008) 
S308: <to the interpreter>  Doesn’t work.  Doesn’t have a job.  That’s all I know.      
I042: <to Detective Barsky>  OK..., OK…, let me say if this one,    
ID274: You said you have four daughters? 
S309: “Baleh (Yes).”  I have two “bacheha (boys/sons).” 
ID275: What did you say?  Doesn’t work? 
S310: My eldest son doesn’t work. 
IE269: And my..,  
I043 : Come back to this point…er…two say at the same time, so.., 
P254 : Yes. 
IE270: My older son doesn’t work. 
P255: OK. 
I044 : Now…, about the daughters, you asked him about the daughters… 
 
P256 : You have four daughters.  (4S 157) 
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ID276: You have four daughters? 
S311: “Baleh (Yes).”   
IE271: Yes. 
 
P257: How old are they?  (4S 158) 
ID277: How old are they? 
S312: My daughters? 
IE272: My daughters? 
 
P258: Yes.  (4S 159)  
ID278: “Baleh (Yes).”      
S313: I don’t know very well, but one will be 18 years old in one or two months. 
IE273: One is, next one or two months, will be 18 years old. 
P259: Yes. 
S314: Eighteen years old. 
IE274: Eighteen years old. 
S315: Eighteen years old. 
IE275: Eighteen years old. 
 
P260: Three of the girls are 18 years old?  (4S 160) 
ID279: The other three… 
S316: <interrupting the interpreter>  The other three, I don’t know.  
IE276: The rest I don’t know.   
S317: Look at their IDs yourself and check their age. 
IE277: Read their IDs and find out. 
 
P261: Are they older or younger?  (4S 161) 
ID280: Are they older or younger? 
S318: Older. 
IE278: They are older. 
 
P262: Do they work?  (4S 162) 
ID281: Do they work. 
S319: “Baleh (Yes),” they work.  
IE279: Yes, they work. 
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P263: All four?  (4S 163) 
ID282: All four? 
S320: One of my daughters, three work, one doesn’t. 
IE280: One of my daughter (sic), three works (sic), one doesn’t. 
S321: They go to school.  They also work. 
IE281: They go to school, and they go to work. 
 
P264: Were they home today?  (4S 164) 
ID283: Were they home today? 
S322: No, they weren’t. 
IE282: No, they were not. 
 
P265: When did they leave?  (4S 165) 
ID284: When did they leave? 
S323: They left early, at around 930 or 10:00. 
IE283: They got out earlier, around 9:30, ten o’clock. 
 
P266: And do you remember what time your oldest son got out?  (4S 166) 
ID285: Do you remember what time your eldest son left home? 
S324: No, I don’t remember well.  This “vaghe (accident/incident)” was very “ghavi 
 (forceful/powerful).”  I don’t remember at all. 
IE284: No, I don’t remember, from this incident, maybe 15 or 20 minutes earlier. 
 (AL9)
440
 
 
P267:  Fifteen or twenty minutes before this?  (4S 167) 
ID286: Fifteen or twenty minutes before this “vaghe (accident/incident)”? 
S325: Fifteen minutes before. 
IE285: Fifteen minutes. 
 
P268: Did anybody come to your house today?  (4S 168) 
ID287: Did anyone come to your home today? 
                                                   
 
440
 Alteration 9: This alteration is actually a combination of one omission and one addition.  
IE284 altered S324 by dropping the adjective “ghavi (forceful/powerful)” from the word “vaghe 
(accident/incident),” and by adding an unstated fact “maybe 15 or 20 minutes earlier,” as was 
discussed in Chapter XII, D-4, supra.        
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S326: No. 
IE286: No. 
 
P269: So when your last son left,  (2S 050)  
ID288: When your last son left, 
 
P270: only you were home,  (2S 051) 
ID289: only you were home, 
 
P271: and your wife was home.  (4S 169) 
ID290: and only your wife was home. 
S327: “Baleh (Yes).”  
IE287: Yes. 
 
P272: And nobody came to the house.  (4S 170) 
ID291: And no one came to your house. 
S328: Except the police, no one came. 
IE288:  Except police (sic), nobody else. 
 
P273:  When your son left, your oldest son,  (2S 052) 
ID292: When your elder son left home,  
 
P274: Where was your wife?  (4S 171) 
ID293: Where was your wife? 
S329: I can’t say anything anymore.  Without my lawyer, I cannot say anything. 
IE289: I can’t… 
S330: <interrupting the interpreter>  If you want to hear everything, bring my lawyer 
 here.  In front of my lawyer, I will answer everything.  
IE290: I cannot say anything else till my lawyer’s not (sic) here.  If you want anything, 
 ask my lawyer to come here, and then I’ll say anything. 
S331: The car accident, I knew everything, so I told you everything. 
IE291: The car accident that I knew, I told you everything about that. 
 
P275: And you have a good memory of the car accident.  (4S 172) 
ID294: You remember he car accident very well.  You have a good memory. 
276 
 
 
S332: I said my brain went up and came back to the same place.  An ambulance 
 came, and I went to the hospital in the ambulance car. 
IE292: That thing that I said that my brain got out and came back and I opened my eyes 
 and the ambulance was in.  
 
P276:  Yes.  (2S 053) 
ID295: “Baleh (Yes).”  
 
P277: But you remember the things that happened before your brain and after that 
 happened.  Yes?  (4S 173) 
ID296: He
441
 says, “Do you remember what happened before your brain went up…”  
S333: “Baleh (Yes).”   
ID297: “and what happened after it came back?” 
S334: “Baleh (Yes).”      
IE293: Yes. 
 
P278: So you have a good memory.  (4S 174) 
ID298: You have a good memory. 
S335: My memory is that…I tell the truth, I don’t say anything untrue. 
IE294: My memory is that…my memory is that.., what I saw, I told you, and I am 
 telling the truth.  Nothing else. 
 
P279: You have a cut under your chin.  (4S 175) 
ID299: He
442
 said you have a scar here. 
S336: The “fullbag” is here, right?  The “fullbag” hit me here, and my head hit this 
 behind me.  The “fullbag”’s this part, the head of the “fullbag” hit and cut me 
 here. 
ID300: “OK, airbag”? 
S337: “Airbag.” 
ID301: “OK.” 
S338: The “airbag”’s this part hit me here, and it became like this. 
IE295: It’s the airbag, when it exploded, it hit here, and they’re all stitches here. 
S339: My head also hit the ceiling and the airbag hit here, too. 
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 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #6 
 
 
442
 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #7 
277 
 
 
IE296: And my head just hit the ceiling of the vehicle, 
P280: Uh-huh. 
IE297: and they (sic) are back here. 
 
P281: And you still have stitches here?  (4S 176)  
ID302: Since then till now it is still there? 
S340: Yes, it is still here.  You can see it. 
IE298: Yes, ‘cause see, they are stitches. 
 
P282: How many stitches did you get?  (4S 177) 
ID303: How many stitches did you get? 
S341: I think maybe three stiches.  One here, another here, and another here. 
IE299: I think three and then, 
S342: I think three.  One here, another here, and another here.  All was done in the 
 hospital. 
IE300: I think three, and there’s another, there’s another, and they did this in the 
 hospital. 
 
P283: <putting out both of his own hands, fingers spread>  Can I see your hands?   
 (2S 054)   
ID304: May I look at your “dastha (hands)”?  
 <<The suspect puts his right hand on the armrest next to the police officer.>>  
  
P284: <looking closely at the suspect’s right hand>   You have marks on your hands.  
 (4S 178)   
ID305: He
443
 says you have marks on your hand. 
S343: This “aghvar (=jarahat=injury) shode (became=got [injured]).” 
IE301: This got injured, 
S344: In the car accident,.., became like this.  It hurts. 
IE302: [in the] car accident…, they took…, 
S345: This (my foot) also “aghvar (=jarahat=injury) shode (became=got [injured]).”  
 It hurts. 
IE303: and my foot also.., 
S346: “In pa (this other foot)”also “aghvar (=jarahat=injury) shode (became=got 
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 Interpreter Using “He” for Police Officer: #8 
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 [injured]).”  It hurts. 
IE304: my foot also accident (sic), injured in the accident…    
 <<The recording stops here.>> 
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Appendix 2 
ELAN Data on Each Pause Time Length and Utterance Time Lengths 
 
PP:  Police Officer Pause Time Length 
PU:  Police Officer Utterance Time Length 
IDP:  Interpreter into Dari Pause Time Length 
IDU:  Interpreter into Dari Utterance Time Length 
SP:  Suspect Pause Time Length 
SU:  Suspect Utterance Time Length 
IEP:  Interpreter into English Pause Time Length 
IEU:  Interpreter into English Utterance Time Length 
ISP:  Interpreter Self (in English) Pause Time Length 
ISU:  Interpreter Self (in English) Utterance Time Length 
 
(Unit: Seconds) 
# PP PU IDP IDU SP SU IEP IEU ISP ISU 
001 0.73 2.26 0.89 0.82 0.37 0.252 0.92 0.37 0.433 0.75 
002 2.25 4.2 1.38 1.82 0.147 0.3 0.402 1.739 4.523 0.666 
003 0.254 2.14 0.433 1.22 0.582 2.765 0.537 3.9 0.548 0.703 
004 0.07 1.134 0.266 3.574 0.018 3.874 0.153 0.926 1.492 3.458 
005 0.246 1.014 0.32 1.073 0.106 0.162 0.327 2.148 1.538 3.843 
006 0.8 7.787 0.54 4.335 0.089 0.371 0.321 3.553 0.142 13.818 
007 1.805 13.497 0.295 7.416 0.06 0.674 0.257 4.656 0.294 0.281 
008 1.678 0.114 0.349 0.826 1.355 1.834 0.285 1.59 0.164 1.621 
009 1.067 0.746 0.202 2.604 0.32 0.414 0.14 0.578 0.218 2.26 
010 0.423 3.228 0.328 1.369 0.302 0.363 1.034 4.617 0.158 6.045 
011 0.141 1.376 0.389 1.86 0.946 5.468 0.549 0.14 0.153 0.233 
012 0.134 1.839 0.284 5.154 1.033 0.239 0.062 0.292 0.043 0.599 
013 0.336 1.339 0.027 0.835 0.019 6.208 0.176 5.744 0.672 4.723 
014 0.667 0.936 0.222 1.473 2.085 2.159 0.271 8.097 1.508 0.524 
015 0.79 1.281 0.309 3.576 0.193 1.362 0.088 1.89 0.341 3.021 
016 0.778 1.652 0.56 1.142 0.23 6.854 0.223 0.755 0.397 3.053 
280 
 
 
017 1.561 1.549 0.414 5.315 0.302 0.332 0.345 1.393 0.111 2.456 
018 0.316 1.281 0.995 4.527 0.811 0.277 1.099 10.711 1.523 13.265 
019 0.288 3.39 0.672 4.386 0.187 0.705 0.239 0.228 0.111 1.371 
020 2.317 5.11 0.336 6.489 0.062 2.458 0.124 4.524 0.181 1.423 
021 1.291 0.377 0.751 5.439 0.012 16.615 0.287 5.123 0.371 2.515 
022 0.654 8.652 0.878 3.318 0.348 1.871 0.719 9.257 0.236 1.641 
023 1.704 5.706 0.396 1.378 1.457 15.541 0.028 6.766 1.34 0.532 
024 1.207 1.15 0.471 1.111 0.645 0.146 0.464 1.163 0.16 2.461 
025 0.368 0.878 0.301 2.146 0.548 1.058 0.01 1.834 0.951 3.869 
026 0.451 2.418 0.521 3.37 0.324 5.218 0.564 9.859 0.15 1.666 
027 0.553 2 0.383 4.224 1.79 4.705 1.027 11.041 1.572 5.952 
028 1.212 4.431 0.277 3.025 1.273 6.645 1.339 9.892 0.34 0.341 
029 2.685 4.137 0.635 3.532 0.865 4.564 2.514 5.664 0.095 3.08 
030 1.039 3.566 0.549 1.447 0.427 1.27 0.253 9.703 0.638 1.076 
031 0.072 1.009 1.086 1.565 0.269 0.217 0.217 0.649 0.317 0.249 
032 1.151 0.398 0.815 4.56 0.277 0.929 0.13 3.12 0.13 0.353 
033 3.309 3.571 0.715 4.828 0.159 4.589 0.297 3.897 0.248 1.867 
034 1.148 6.078 0.795 4.961 1.527 7.825 0.483 0.185 1.267 1.012 
035 1.004 6.541 0.406 2.184 0.507 5.214 0.615 2.598 1.108 0.157 
036 0.554 1.895 0.399 1.569 0.667 14.16 0.958 7.064 0.317 0.199 
037 0.3 0.764 0.656 4.613 1.67 8.336 0.458 7.16 0.851 0.479 
038 0.411 1.247 0.272 3.267 0.455 5.012 0.769 5.614 0.936 1.443 
039 0.877 3.604 0.369 3.445 1.502 0.739 0.443 3.452 0.165 3.157 
040 0.681 1.682 0.636 6.045 0.236 3.654 0.601 0.324 1.844 5.675 
041 2.151 6.289 3.808 0.252 0.321 2.352 0.524 1.304 2.254 0.4 
042 0.806 0.41 0.411 0.234 0.414 0.284 0.463 2.918 0.521 3.85 
043 0.92 2.821 0.731 3.906 0.695 1.428 0.551 1.671 0.301 4.602 
044 1.373 9.622 0.71 6.199 0.267 0.255 0.198 1.056 0.156 3.611 
045 1.854 7.592 1.674 4.762 0.011 0.13 0.806 4.747   
046 1.624 2.92 0.231 1.217 0.254 11.062 0.531 1.448   
047 0.753 0.213 0.419 2.067 0.069 0.348 0.211 1.611   
048 0.095 7.554 0.567 0.434 0.351 0.396 1.522 2.927   
049 0.54 0.372 0.478 8.258 0.686 0.42 0.204 0.994   
050 2.363 1.362 0.305 0.246 0.405 0.641 0.296 2.892   
281 
 
 
051 0.754 2.913 0.576 0.976 0.055 0.134 0.58 6.359   
052 0.148 0.217 0.472 6.119 1.946 5.871 0.042 4.72   
053 0.683 0.688 1.742 1.316 1.455 2.537 0.296 2.501   
054 1.849 16.53 1.3 1.473 1.98 2.791 0.266 1.818   
055 0.675 2.024 0.684 0.687 0.096 0.158 0.452 8.137   
056 1.944 9.238 0.82 13.563 0.256 0.194 0.299 1.8   
057 0.012 6.455 0.258 1.258 0.464 0.155 0.493 5.04   
058 0.826 0.191 0.961 10.529 0.028 1.532 1.179 5.454   
059 2.749 2.921 0.275 1.981 0.734 2.051 0.386 2.23   
060 0.724 1.446 0.701 6.768 0.753 2.997 0.615 0.365   
061 0.188 0.55 0.749 0.225 0.589 1.303 0.061 2.216   
062 1.563 7.362 0.417 3.607 1.058 1.045 0.11 0.504   
063 0.352 9.4 0.413 2.934 0.775 4.769 0.315 1.14   
064 1.132 12.279 0.605 1.495 1.522 1.904 0.045 1.257   
065 1.483 4.37 1.171 9.032 2.194 0.855 0.938 3.052   
066 1.712 5.162 0.368 4.41 0.465 1.434 0.076 0.496   
067 0.72 3.07 0.266 3.211 1.119 0.844 0.016 3.765   
068 2.027 1.586 0.551 5.239 0.266 2.511 0.123 6.214   
069 0.44 1.347 0.233 1.645 0.136 6.6 0.192 0.181   
070 0.847 2.55 0.111 3.697 0.299 5.347 0.871 20.421   
071 0.615 1.457 0.481 4.486 0.061 0.751 0.519 5.226   
072 1.227 2.191 0.344 3.841 0.431 1.668 0.3 6.795   
073 0.493 5.992 0.961 3.095 0.595 13.784 0.477 6.322   
074 1.788 5.582 1.174 6.921 0.057 1.092 0.894 2.789   
075 1.989 1.71 0.52 6.271 1.143 4.051 0.469 2.579   
076 2.603 7.052 2.495 3.654 0.225 6.183 0.641 14.784   
077 1.332 2.494 1.744 5.469 0.876 0.604 0.776 0.74   
078 0.044 0.518 0.656 2.213 0.233 0.474 0.366 1.099   
079 1.383 1.235 0.057 2.273 0.54 2.02 0.399 7.513   
080 0.143 2.762 0.725 6.626 0.154 0.181 0.326 0.77   
081 1.353 6.51 0.619 2.085 0.047 0.196 0.131 4.834   
082 2.983 1.18 0.378 0.256 0.129 1.187 0.314 3.294   
083 0.714 0.343 0.851 1.518 0.434 0.462 0.503 5.752   
084 0.819 3.278 0.489 1.471 0.269 4.4 0.504 3.9   
282 
 
 
085 1.28 2.227 0.349 0.524 0.604 0.246 1.165 9.403   
086 0.217 0.544 0.169 1.058 0.21 0.341 1.061 3.432   
087 1.806 0.376 0.007 1.059 1.062 3.926 0.34 3.696   
088 0.437 1.308 0.06 0.927 0.058 0.296 0.742 3.868   
089 0.352 1.478 0.38 0.372 0.092 3.571 0.452 3.086   
090 0.474 0.207 0.143 1.097 0.415 5.263 0.321 2.716   
091 0.42 0.939 0.674 4.583 0.642 0.418 0.919 0.712   
092 1.631 3.916 0.792 0.456 0.03 18.498 0.102 3.533   
093 0.949 0.796 0.256 0.97 0.218 3.163 0.452 0.77   
094 2.14 4.777 0.977 5.118 0.519 5.147 0.242 4.191   
095 1.577 4.981 0.492 2.42 0.198 3.243 0.357 1.002   
096 0.944 4.24 1.288 1.888 0.361 2.471 0.492 0.432   
097 0.393 0.172 0.676 2.919 0.594 3.156 0.472 6.26   
098 1.365 0.324 0.482 1.122 0.026 0.162 0.849 7.991   
099 0.27 0.657 0.43 0.335 0.685 1.069 0.654 9.37   
100  1.296 4.033 0.309 0.612 1.387 9.216 0.201 0.139   
101  1.91 8.252 0.689 1.206 0.551 0.732 0.082 0.231   
102  0.72 1.692 0.668 6.785 0.178 1.108 0.085 3.861   
103  0.511 3.052 0.991 1.539 0.365 7.327 0.347 1.262   
104  1.101 1.893 0.191 2.768 0.136 1.341 0.605 0.615   
105  0.417 2.649 0.46 2.226 0.066 8.664 0.638 3.242   
106  0.112 2.338 0.84 2.791 0.037 1.301 0.738 3.813   
107  3.169 2.159 1.228 0.772 0.115 3.92 0.204 7.418   
108  2.487 4.584 0.781 1.014 0.385 3.956 1.359 12.133   
109  1.615 3.912 0.49 0.819 0.186 0.229 0.26 5.586   
110  1.191 1.022 0.388 1.848 0.382 1.006 0.828 5.093   
111  0.098 0.272 0.584 2.826 1.006 2.944 0.274 5.832   
112  1.418 1.054 0.716 1.5 0.732 6.615 1.083 4.796   
113  0.435 3.3 0.334 4.59 0.42 0.939 0.343 4.2   
114  1.423 1.08 0.484 3.222 0.688 2.437 0.303 3.839   
115  0.078 0.142 1.002 5.41 0.093 1.949 0.098 2.139   
116  0.839 0.9 0.162 1.33 0.017 3.546 0.853 2.305   
117  1.928 1.077 0.511 0.833 0.016 1.941 0.149 6.175   
118  1.392 1.198 0.335 4.836 0.118 0.311 0.11 7.812   
283 
 
 
119  1.704 7.16 0.065 3.321 1.084 6.387 0.319 6.894   
120  0.555 0.447 0.41 0.828 1.54 4.21 0.103 1.908   
121  1.399 2.823 0.089 0.834 0.379 7.423 0.53 2.324   
122  2.002 1.667 0.275 1.115 0.42 0.525 0.11 4.212   
123  1.554 0.917 0.199 0.95 0.599 0.98 0.056 0.268   
124  0.237 1.628 0.59 0.919 0.28 0.433 0.155 4.669   
125  0.885 0.31 0.182 1.592 0.02 2.834 0.139 1.102   
126  0.091 0.24 0.264 4.139 0.285 1.241 0.034 3.66   
127  0.116 1.55 0.474 0.691 0.208 0.743 0.271 1.428   
128  1.248 1.449 1.153 1.754 0.406 4.326 0.102 8.279   
129  1.631 1.773 0.206 1.638 1.745 1.89 0.056 3.69   
130  1.239 0.886 0.764 0.194 0.854 7.51 0.273 1.448   
131  0.93 1.139 0.303 3.23 0.228 1.488 0.072 0.587   
132  1.138 2.219 0.056 0.69 1.825 12.118 0.179 1.315   
133  0.009 1.097 0.554 3.055 0.616 2.359 0.583 11.699   
134  0.331 0.309 0.251 1.094 0.183 5.336 1.055 9.168   
135  0.335 0.242 0.216 0.86 0.407 6.021 0.33 14.112   
136  1.571 1.276 0.471 3.664 1.657 4.93 0.277 1.628   
137  0.387 0.315 0.517 2.145 1.231 20.254 0.292 6.347   
138  2.102 1.881 0.442 0.569 0.372 0.315 0.251 2.589   
139  2.303 1.654 0.199 0.583 0.882 0.901 0.028 7.286   
140  0.256 0.304 0.535 0.87 1.245 1.175 0.395 4.893   
141  0.673 0.911 0.395 1.978 1.523 3.148 2.076 1.296   
142  0.347 0.984 0.509 2.944 0.546 1.64 0.326 1.357   
143  2.288 2.124 0.658 0.397 1.553 2.364 0.322 1.926   
144  1.509 0.8 0.396 5.128 0.688 5.558 0.088 7.235   
145  1.796 0.354 0.835 0.88 0.81 11.183 0.59 8   
146  0.353 0.333 0.188 0.257 1.219 4.42 0.18 1.79   
147  2.204 0.852 0.282 1.647 1.385 11.877 0.25 1.084   
148  1.401 0.829 0.773 0.686 0.527 1.486 0.472 1.089   
149  0.727 2.185 0.155 1.939 0.401 1.629 0.105 2.142   
150  0.402 1.043 0.787 1.831 1.476 5.017 0.259 5.19   
151  0.662 0.349 0.778 1.686 0.118 0.479 0.693 6.923   
152  0.554 0.606 0.482 4.496 0.097 11.127 0.045 10.03   
284 
 
 
153  0.098 0.456 2.059 2.768 0.041 2.017 0.241 18.456   
154  1.056 1.483 0.515 1.104 0.873 1.992 0.478 1.214   
155  0.713 0.956 1.635 3.306 0.315 9.675 0.699 8.758   
156  0.518 0.548 1.036 3.797 0.578 2.563 0.375 0.368   
157  1.582 2.767 0.316 1.089 0.022 0.888 0.413 0.493   
158  0.333 0.254 0.601 0.713 1.197 0.786 0.205 0.389   
159  0.369 0.857 0.012 2.188 0.132 2.266 0.526 0.335   
160  0.84 3.972 0.408 1.832 0.025 9.846 0.25 0.31   
161  0.705 2.255 0.279 0.968 1.257 14.723 0.153 0.378   
162  0.178 0.436 0.501 1.572 0.585 6.218 0.288 0.339   
163  0.652 1.727 0.601 1.095 1.059 0.751 0.348 0.362   
164  0.292 0.422 0.699 1.962 0.099 5.821 0.69 0.391   
165  1.387 1.177 0.109 1.542 0.949 27.7 0.295 1.65   
166  0.579 1.83 0.243 0.759 0.561 4.009 0.775 6.213   
167  0.915 5.163 0.398 0.126 0.035 1.7 0.154 1.731   
168  1.956 2.962 0.339 1.841 0.014 0.152 0.242 0.375   
169  4.116 1.562 0.46 1.542 0.062 0.693 0.044 8.856   
170  1.011 0.466 0.354 1.071 0.911 1.518 0.251 8.784   
171  0.551 0.303 0.332 1.236 0.428 4.46 0.195 5.589   
172  1.344 1.832 0.417 3.232 1.538 2.048 0.511 3.652   
173  0.734 2.636 0.11 0.255 0.619 8.067 0.319 9.141   
174  1.446 1.47 0.184 0.25 0.276 0.812 0.266 0.309   
175  0.572 0.283 0.475 2.177 0.361 7.258 0.563 0.74   
176  0.63 1.192 0.574 3.757 0.403 9.015 0.187 0.93   
177  3.281 1.876 0.367 0.581 0.046 2.255 0.682 12.807   
178  3.385 2.504 0.465 2.588 0.458 0.829 1.153 0.446   
179  1.593 2.434 0.294 0.458 0.534 4.941 0.297 0.212   
180  0.676 2.077 0.293 0.951 0.171 3.4 0.44 5.512   
181  1.163 0.987 0.164 0.803 2.083 4.545 0.994 0.294   
182  1.455 0.941 0.201 8.088 0.03 0.276 0.181 0.291   
183  1.455 2.351 0.458 4.347 0.015 10.786 0.492 1.459   
184  0.48 0.406 1.23 1.078 0.272 23.688 0.113 4.199   
185  1.899 4.434 0.319 0.231 0.043 0.237 0.427 3.918   
186  2.662 4.816 0.175 1.23 1.026 6.579 0.302 0.371   
285 
 
 
187  0.752 3.53 0.682 0.596 0.086 0.321 0.082 11.353   
188  1.978 2.841 0.229 2.009 0.017 0.515 0.731 4.201   
189  1.513 2.957 0.164 0.302 0.181 0.374 0.173 4.781   
190  0.621 0.454 0.115 1.42 0.111 0.525 0.026 3.621   
191  0.561 0.348 0.232 1.637 0.031 0.358 0.166 4.475   
192  1.649 1.008 0.373 1.579 0.297 0.347 0.125 7.474   
193  0.159 0.82 0.271 1.631 0.618 0.605 0.202 1.423   
194  0.431 1.5 0.049 1.287 0.35 0.287 0.019 4.835   
195  0.411 4.875 0.206 2.806 1.303 0.52 0.064 0.527   
196  0.801 6.085 0.907 1.346 1.087 2.448 0.135 5.62   
197  0.192 1.285 0.235 0.804 0.114 2.009 0.471 1.993   
198  0.279 0.4 0.233 0.987 0.584 1.922 0.078 1.322   
199  2.288 7.858 0.851 5.056 0.989 0.453 0.061 1.057   
200  0.696 0.933 1.642 3.932 2.763 11.85 0.224 3.957   
201  1.035 1.802 0.268 1.582 0.065 5.56 0.005 2.297   
202  1.208 2.762 0.183 2.411 1.048 5.672 0.382 2.513   
203  1.924 7.533 0.646 4.986 1.13 2.923 0.077 2.479   
204  0.542 1.485 1.047 3.098 0.1 5.363 0.017 3.179   
205  2.061 0.994 0.473 4.282 0.087 0.166 0.1 5.533   
206  1.035 0.276 0.358 2.233 0.049 0.812 0.196 3.357   
207  1.114 1.18 0.378 0.479 0.485 0.745 0.302 1.048   
208  0.553 0.342 0.691 1.393 1.056 13.89 0.123 1.943   
209  1.894 0.27 0.159 1 0.389 0.29 0.704 0.429   
210  2.765 0.848 0.276 1.508 0.091 0.315 0.03 3.615   
211  0.775 3.418 0.093 3.528 0.138 0.312 0.221 1.335   
212  1.683 1.551 0.194 3.649 0.529 4.149 0.373 0.384   
213  1.06 0.303 0.308 1.365 0.09 0.213 0.26 16.15   
214  0.746 0.287 0.027 0.745 0.196 0.229 0.017 9.534   
215  2.055 0.903 0.162 2.218 0.932 3.502 0.23 5.009   
216  2.325 1.127 0.414 6.422 0.049 0.631 1.166 4.598   
217  1.273 1.256 0.08 2.872 0.103 3.672 0.174 13.486   
218  1.8 8.8 0.01 2.584 0.319 0.261 1.04 5.301   
219  0.008 1.533 0.585 3.939 2.836 7.553 0.515 2.683   
220  3.426 0.785 0.154 2.331 0.936 2.712 0.029 7.248   
286 
 
 
221  0.656 1.323 0.358 0.847 1.165 4.742 0.218 1.377   
222  1.579 2.619 0.471 0.283 0.934 2.311 0.12 5.499   
223  1.832 1.85 0.205 1.92 0.694 5.26 5.121 5.018   
224  1.824 1.035 0.381 0.36 0.888 8.558 6.493 0.689   
225  1.833 1.221 0.791 0.276 0.037 0.854 0.932 1.42   
226  1.331 1.802 0.541 0.783 0.466 12.151 0.414 0.305   
227  0.514 2.522 0.656 3.938 0.845 1.201 0.154 5.744   
228  6.906 2.571 0.283 1.195 0.607 3.275 0.532 1.768   
229  0.574 0.863 0.063 1.235 2.719 4.715 0.828 2.544   
230  1.206 1.391 0.2 0.196 0.003 1.385 0.384 1.503   
231  0.005 1.176 0.468 0.467 0.064 2.253 0.913 4.487   
232  0.22 0.263 0.309 0.429 0.153 2.495 0.501 1.458   
233  0.099 3.679 0.418 1.139 0.071 1.82 0.343 3.229   
234  1.338 1.447 0.241 1.078 0.42 2.547 0.424 2.105   
235  0.021 2.464 0.269 1.792 0.673 2.524 0.59 0.255   
236  0.088 1.774 0.445 5.37 0.939 0.382 0.128 2.373   
237  0.149 4.668 0.106 0.43 0.037 15.164 0.179 0.635   
238  2.226 0.344 0.714 4.734 0.096 0.146 0.34 1.153   
239  2.211 0.728 0.176 1.061 0.017 1.913 0.063 0.303   
240  0.528 0.59 0.499 3.097 1.303 2.504 0.185 3.599   
241  0.501 1.575 0.207 1.802 1.152 5.945 0.363 1.458   
242  1.17 5.154 0.598 1.977 0.551 7.149 0.894 4.034   
243  1.132 0.921 0.166 1.28 0.918 0.445 0.663 1.174   
244  1.581 2.815 0.057 1.424 0.018 3.316 0.305 2.844   
245  0.472 0.511 0.306 1.68 0.436 0.328 0.203 6.166   
246  0.294 1.264 0.068 1.495 0.886 2.629 0.333 0.284   
247  0.9 1.1 0.466 1.93 0.345 1.051 0.215 0.611   
248  0.221 0.702 0.222 2.301 0.045 0.253 0.349 0.25   
249  0.304 0.393 0.42 3.174 1.174 7.611 0.662 0.392   
250  0.574 1.123 0.23 0.968 0.826 8.532 0.474 1.841   
251  1.433 0.957 0.123 1.004 0.667 2.632 0.257 5.746   
252  0.585 1.772 0.007 1.055 1.295 1.367 0.077 2.695   
253  1.455 1.05 0.024 0.273 1.061 3.782 0.14 0.92   
254  0.191 0.21 0.543 1.873 1.022 1.843 0.526 6.427   
287 
 
 
255  0.725 0.235 0.354 2.126 0.907 1.533 0.195 14.653   
256  0.008 0.856 0.244 0.869 0.546 3.14 0.765 5.961   
257  0.827 0.656 0.803 1.418 0.013 0.916 0.176 13.637   
258  0.365 0.393 0.224 5.238 0.71 3.433 0.1 8.797   
259  0.721 0.234 0.553 0.523 0.56 0.231 0.027 9.055   
260  2.931 1.542 0.783 1.113 0.757 0.406 0.445 1.876   
261  0.9 1.406 0.307 0.801 1.266 0.327 0.303 0.24   
262  0.914 0.551 0.257 6.089 0.156 0.452 0.634 1.922   
263  0.711 0.537 4.922 5.078 1.83 3.097 0.137 1.001   
264  1.597 0.855 0.412 1.975 0.503 0.306 0.447 2.983   
265  2.703 0.77 0.222 5.133 0.595 1.729 0.372 0.672   
266  2.631 3.232 1.204 0.553 1.054 1.342 0.494 2.094   
267  0.922 1.548 0.515 1.263 2.626 2.824 0.337 1.704   
268  1.812 1.6 0.4 1.467 0.553 8.453 0.498 0.56   
269  2.131 1.731 0.327 0.673 0.886 0.582 0.272 0.481   
270  0.852 1.088 0.585 0.888 1.51 2.512 0.127 1.461   
271  1.017 1.124 0.409 1.229 0.036 1.415 0.375 0.199   
272  2.669 1.895 0.62 1.256 0.607 0.159 0.538 0.652   
273  1.873 2.387 0.367 2.719 0.78 4.042 0.321 4.004   
274  3.727 0.778 0.457 1.393 1.043 0.398 0.123 0.841   
275  1.29 2.16 0.418 2.265 0.505 0.851 0.378 0.823   
276  0.768 0.246 0.07 1.143 0.619 1.229 0.189 0.907   
277  0.997 8.484 0.278 0.702 0.047 1.357 0.317 2.538   
278  1.391 1.279 0.204 0.186 1.102 0.288 0.706 1.211   
279  2.221 1.728 0.431 0.379 0.019 2.98 0.146 0.601   
280  0.444 0.296 0.35 1.594 3.4 7.438 0.621 4.382   
281  0.655 1.502 0.606 1.025 0.03 4.11 0.153 1.851   
282  0.38 1.432 0.646 0.711 0.142 1.665 0.751 0.877   
283  2.544 0.959 0.434 1.662 0.006 0.756 0.945 4.379   
284  5.664 1.546 0.625 1.234 0.084 9.719 0.578 6.664   
285    0.912 3.727 0.909 0.289 0.97 0.694   
286    0.508 2.919 1.294 0.855 0.474 0.266   
287    0.491 2.263 0.039 0.415 0.401 0.318   
288    1.629 4.207 1.741 0.552 0.639 1.792   
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289    0.361 1.003 1.515 0.548 0.103 0.412   
290    0.013 1.246 0.675 4.488 0.032 6.146   
291    0.089 1.798 0.305 1.164 0.015 5.868   
292    0.535 2.909 1.127 0.74 0.668 6.351   
293    0.48 0.791 1.596 3.562 0.413 0.259   
294    0.047 4.793 1.095 12.151 0.015 13.034   
295    0.538 0.301 0.928 4.823 0.052 4.368   
296    0.045 7.321 0.807 13.6 0.092 2.691   
297    0.093 1.457 0.196 4.599 0.213 0.87   
298    0.23 1.626 0.411 5.356 0.03 1.962   
299    0.432 1.038 1.272 2.343 0.03 1.35   
300    0.842 0.73 0.168 0.221 0.013 4.196   
301    0.257 0.353 0.111 0.626 0.333 1.757   
302    0.08 2.139 0.187 0.691 0.076 2.107   
303    0.161 1.55 0.509 3.143 0.253 1.046   
304    0.261 0.969 0.136 0.481 0.301 3.802   
305    0.418 3.668 0.263 1.108     
306      0.71 2.194     
307      0.329 0.598     
308      0.408 1.934     
309      0.163 0.945     
310      0.414 1.179     
311      0.01 0.145     
312      1.517 0.517     
313      0.311 4.424     
314      0.028 0.935     
315      0.654 0.935     
316      0.008 2.941     
317      0.127 2.101     
318      0.006 0.319     
319      0.602 0.842     
320      1.922 4.672     
321      0.01 3.09     
322      1.089 0.518     
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323      0.632 4.573     
324      0.118 5.205     
325      0.632 0.68     
326      0.751 0.172     
327      0.821 0.309     
328      1.553 1.142     
329      0.715 4.799     
330      0.01 4.83     
331      2.483 5.025     
332      0.643 8.211     
333      0.12 0.269     
334      0.08 0.2     
335      1.152 4.183     
336      0.007 10.504     
337      0.189 0.525     
338      0.416 4.033     
339      0.049 2.334     
340      0.419 0.94     
341      1.261 3.861     
342      0.017 1.434     
343      0.378 0.861     
344      0.231 3.159     
345      0.017 2.206     
346      0.066 1.941     
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